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Abstract
Despite media attention detailing labor abuses in fisheries, social-ecological
systems research has largely failed to consider whether fish stock declines could be
contributing to increases in forced labor slavery. Empirical fisheries data suggests,
though not a ubiquitous response to declining stocks, many vessels will fish longer,
farther from shore, and deeper in waters to maintain yields. This effort intensification
increases production costs, and Brashares et al. (2014), consistent with slavery theory,
posited cheap and/or unpaid labor as an approach to offset increasing costs and continue
harvesting fish species at a rate otherwise cost-prohibitive.
Using fuzzy cognitive mapping—a participatory, semi-quantitative systems
modeling technique that uses participants’ knowledge to define complex system
dynamics including fuzzy causality (causality represented as a matter of degree on a
spectrum rather than certainty)—this study tested the hypothesis by interviewing
stakeholders from global slavery hotspots. Data was obtained through semi-structured,
qualitative interviews (n = 44) that included a cognitive mapping activity. An iterative,
systematic, and inductive thematic content analysis condensed each map into major
variables. Using structural models derived from graph theory, each cognitive map was
converted into an adjacency matrix. From the matrix, influence metrics were calculated to
elicit further information about each graph’s structure and group like maps. ANOVAs
and independent sample t-tests to test for map structure differences across demographic
ii

variables were statistically insignificant. As such, using vector-matrix operations, all 44
maps were aggregated into one cumulative, consensus map. This consensus map was then
used to refine the posited theory and execute case scenario analyses to assess the value of
forced labor slavery changes in proposed case scenario simulations.
Broadly, participants identified forced labor slavery as a distal outcome of marine
fish stock declines, describing a process wherein declines intensify effort—increasing
production costs. These increasing costs then incentivize the use of forced labor in
response to narrowing profit margins, ultimately normalizing the use of forced labor as an
economically rational decision. Case scenario analyses suggested if overfishing is not
addressed, and marine stocks continue to decline, forced labor slavery in the fishing
sector will continue to increase. Additionally, increases in forced labor slavery may
increase stock declines. Proposed policy interventions to mitigate overfishing could
reduce labor abuses in the sector. Therefore, the framework produced by the consensus
map should guide more wide-scale, empirical testing of the relationship between fish
stock declines and forced labor slavery and identify points-of-intervention for policy and
fisheries management practices to mitigate social-ecological injustices in the fishing
sector.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Problem Statement
Globally, vulnerable populations facing extreme poverty disproportionately
depend on marine fish for food, nutrition, livelihood, and export earnings (Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO], 2014, 2016a). Approximately 3.1
billion people worldwide, or more than 40% of the world’s population, rely on seafood as
their primary protein source, with oceanic fish accounting for more than 20% of protein
consumption. However, in most small island developing states (SIDS) and coastal lowincome food-deficit countries (LIFDCs) (e.g., Bangladesh, Ghana, and Sierra Leone),
marine fish species constitute more than 50% of dietary protein intake. In these poorer
countries, more than 120 million impoverished persons also depend on marine capture
fisheries for all or most of their income (FAO, 2014, 2016a). Approximately 90% of all
small-scale1, marine capture fishers and more than two-thirds of all marine fishers
worldwide live in developing countries’ coastal areas where few alternative livelihood
activities exist (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD],
2015; World Bank, 2013). Additionally, developing countries export more than 50% of
all global fish products, stimulating development through job and income generation
(Bellmann, Tipping, & Sumaila, 2016; FAO, 2016a; Smith et al., 2010). The human

1

See Appendix A for a list of terms commonly used to describe fisheries and vessels.
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population is projected to reach 9.7 billion people by 2050, with the majority of this
increase in developing countries with pre-existing high food insecurity rates, rendering
fisheries essential for poverty alleviation and the achievement of the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs)in the developing world (United Nations [UN], 2017).
Despite developing countries’ dependence on fish, anthropogenic pressures
primarily perpetrated by industrialized nations (countries with developed economies and
the social capacity to adapt to environmental hazards) have endangered approximately
77% of marine fish stocks, with at least 30% of stocks classified beyond or near beyond
ecological recovery (FAO, 2016a). These human-induced pressures include overfishing
and wasteful bycatch2 and discard from extractive industries;3 pollution from coastal
development; and ocean acidification and warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions
(Halpern et al., 2008; World Wildlife Fund [WWF], 2015; Zeller, Cashion, Palomares, &
Pauly, 2017). The resulting ecological impacts on fish stocks from these pressures
include food web disruptions, anatomical and physiological changes, catastrophic
population and abundance declines, and shifts in spatial and depth distribution (Jackson
et al., 2001; Maureaud et al., 2017; Pauly & Cheung, 2017; Rijnsdorp, Peck, Engelhard,
Möllmann, & Pinnegar, 2009).

2

Bycatch is all unintended, non-targeted specimens harvested in a catch. This includes
specimens that are the wrong species, sex, or age (i.e., a juvenile or undersized
specimen).
3

Marine extractive industries include various fishing methods, deep sea trawling wherein
weighted nets are dragged along the sea bed, deep sea and seabed mining, and deep-water
gas and oil drilling.
2

Slavery as a proposed social outcome of fish stock changes. While these
ecological impairments are well understood and extensively documented, research on the
social impact of fish stocks’ changes (specifically fewer and smaller fish with altered
spatial distributions that result in reduced catches) has been limited to primarily proximal
outcomes such as malnutrition (Golden et al., 2016). Changes the influence of fish stocks
on more distal outcomes, such as social conflicts like forced labor slavery, is less
understood and often unanalyzed.
Defining modern forced labor slavery.
For this study, forced labor slavery was defined as “the involuntary entry and
holding of people at a workplace through force, fraud, or coercion for purposes of forced
labor so that the slaveholder can extract profit” (Free the Slaves, 2017, para. 1), and was
consistent with the author’s previous scholarly work on the subject matter (Decker Sparks
& Hasche, 2018). The reasons for using this definition, espoused in Decker Sparks &
Hasche (2018), and repeated here, include focusing the identification of labor abuses on
the victims’ experiences versus legal frameworks which overemphasize the need for
specific forms of movement across borders (Bales, 2017). Human trafficking, the more
rhetorically popular term in scholarship, media, and the public, instead centers legal
frameworks and is influenced by conflicting and inconsistent definitions that vary
between governments and institutions (Bales, 2017). As a result, the term human
trafficking is applied more narrowly, and likely under identifies the scope and scale of
labor abuses on fishing vessels.
The definition used in this study points to the nuanced differences between
historical slavery and modern slavery, wherein slavery is still defined by the relationship
3

between victim and abuser (akin to an owner in historical slavery). However, over time,
slavery has evolved from an owner-property relationship to a relationship where the
victim receives little or no payment for their labor while the perpetrator’s profits increase
(Bales, 2006). Other shifts include the transposition of unfreedoms, or when the victims’
freedom is restrained, from point of entry into the exploitative relationship (historical
slavery) to the point of exit from the relationship (modern slavery) (Barrientos, Kothari,
and Phillips, 2013; Phillips and Mieres, 2015; Stringer, Whittaker, & Simmons, 2016)
and control of the victim at point of entry into the relationship being exerted by a person
(historical slavery) to socio-economic conditions (modern) (O’Neill, 2011). Indeed, while
some victimized fishers are still purchased by boat captains (Chantavanich,
Laodumrongchai, and Stringer, 2016), many exhibit a degree of agency at point of entry
caused by desperation to meet basic needs and exploited by brokers and/or recruiters’
deception (O’Neill, 2011). These subtle differences are important distinctions to
encompass in a definition, as they challenge misconceptions about what constitutes
slavery that lead to misunderstandings about the nature and extent of modern slavery.
Beyond the legal concept of human trafficking, some governments, international
frameworks and protocols, and non-governmental organizations also make a distinction
between non-sexually exploitive coercive labor practices such as forced labor, debt
bondage, and bonded labor. Because these definitions can differ between inter and intracountry based on laws, political structures, and cultural influences, the International
Labour Organization (ILO) defines any activity or process involving involuntary consent
into an exploitative labor relationship and using the threat of or actual force, coercion, or
punishment to remain in the exploitative relationship as forced labor exploitation, one of
4

the four types of modern slavery4 (Walk Free Foundation & International Labour
Organization [ILO], 2017). Therefore, this definition is considered holistic enough to
encompass all manifestations of forced labor slavery globally. The ILO’s authority is
derived from the perception that it is a global governing body impervious to country or
regional biases, and thus more objective in defining and identifying slavery. Indeed,
within the human rights community, governments are often accused of minimizing
slavery whereas NGOs are accused of inflating the problem (e.g., Kessler, 2015).
Slavery in the fishing industry.
The shift from historical to modern slavery as noted by Bales (2006), also
challenges the legitimacy of slavery in the fishing industry as a problem. Because slavery
is illegal in every country and most forced labor slavery victims are no longer sold in
public venues, slavery is perceived as a historical relic, and therefore not a current or
important problem. Also, unlike historical slavery, modern slavery is more fluid, where
victims spend on average 20.5 months enslaved, instead of lifetimes, (ILO & Walk Free
Foundation, 2017), further contributing to false beliefs and perceptions that slavery has
been eradicated and is no longer a problem.
Enslaved persons’ hidden nature, and the physical inaccessibility of fishing fleets
sailing hundreds of miles from shore for years at a time have created a dearth of empirical
research on the problem, making it difficult to quantify the problem and further
contributing to hiding the problem from the public. Investigations suggest the fishing
industry is one of the biggest users of forced labor slavery, with a conservative estimate
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Beyond forced labor exploitation, the other three types of modern slavery are forced
sexual exploitation, state-imposed exploitation, and forced marriage.
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of two million people enslaved in the fishing/agriculture sector (Walk Free Foundation &
ILO, 2017), including on boats originating from the United States, Thailand, New
Zealand, United Kingdom, Nicaragua, and Peru amongst others (Bales, 2016; Bureau of
International Labor Affairs, 2016; Environmental Justice Foundation [EJF], 2014, 2015a;
FishWise, 2014; ILO, 2013a; Mendoza, McDowell, Mason, & Htusan, 2016; United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2011; Verité, 2016; Yea, 2014).
Additionally, of all the sector estimates for forced labor slavery, fishing is the most
challenging in that victims in the middle of the ocean remain inaccessible and
unaccounted for despite technological advances such as drones which have aided the
counting of victims in other sectors. In 2017, out of concern that the problem is growing,
INTERPOL even issued a notice alerting law enforcement about the presence of labor
exploitation, human trafficking and slavery in the fishing industry (INTERPOL, 2017).
From the little existing research, it is believed that most slavery victims in the
fisheries sector are illiterate, impoverished, male domestic and transnational migrants
(Bales, 2016; EJF, 2014; ILO, 2013a; International Organization for Migration [IOM],
2008). Unable to read contracts, they are frequently tricked into debt bondage schemes by
middlemen and employers who offer employment agreements that include debt
repayment, advanced wages, equipment loans, and/or travel advances and documents for
“higher paying” work in foreign countries in exchange for labor until the “debt” to the
employer is satisfied. These schemes persist as employers continuously add new debts
(e.g., for food and shelter) making repayment impossible, enslaving the laborer, and
increasing the employer’s profits (Aghazarm & Laczko, 2008; Bales, 2006, 2007, 2012,
2016; ILO, 2005; Chantavanich, Laodumrongchai, & Stringer, 2016; End Slavery Now,
6

2017; Ferolin & Dunaway, 2013; IOM, 2008; MacFarlane, 2015; Stringer et al., 2016;
Wheaton et al., 2010; Yea, 2014). However, though debt bondage is the most common
mechanism for victims to enter slavery, it is not the only one. A smaller number of
victims have reported being kidnapped. Moreover, though slaves may board a vessel in
their country of origin, they can be released from bondage and/or slavery without
resources in countries anywhere in the world, making them vulnerable to enslavement on
a ship in their new country and perpetuating a vicious cycle (Mendoza et al., 2016).
Extensive changes in fish stock abundance, distribution, and individual specimen
size (herein referred to as fish stock declines) force fishing vessels to fish longer, farther
from shore, and in deeper waters to maintain yields (Brashares et al., 2014; UNODC,
2011). This fishing intensification increases production costs and inflates cheap labor
needs in response to narrowing profit margins (Bell, Watson, & Ye, 2016; Gascuel et al.,
2016; Hutchings & Myers, 1995; Watson et al., 2013). Therefore, ecological drivers of
forced labor slavery must be considered in conjunction with other known indicators, such
as poverty (Bales, 2006, 2007), to efficaciously mitigate labor abuses on fishing vessels.
Thus, this dissertation frames anthropogenic-induced fish stock declines and forced labor
slavery as a coupled social-ecological problem within the context of Social-Ecological
Systems theory (SES). SES postulates that social and ecological multilevel systems are
nested, interactive, and interdependent, exhibiting complex feedback loops that result in
disturbances in one system impacting all systems (McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014; Ostrom,
2007, 2009, 2010). As a result, SES provides the theoretical rationale for linking two
previously considered disparate systems.

7

Study Purpose and Specific Aims
Data characterizing fish stock declines and forced labor slavery’s relationship
does not yet exist and trans-disciplinary research is necessary to create efficacious, linked
social-ecological interventions that balance ecological and human security. Fisheries
management approaches have historically been reactive and siloed within biology,
ignoring and potentially perpetuating human rights violations. To shift fisheries
management towards preventive strategies inclusive of socially just outcomes, social
work must aid in the production of trans-disciplinary knowledge exploring the linkages
between fish stocks and labor conditions.
Guided by an overarching research question, “What is the relationship between
fish stock changes and forced labor slavery,” this exploratory study’s goal is to build a
theoretical framework modeling marine fish stock declines and forced labor slavery as a
social-ecological system using fuzzy logic cognitive mapping (FCM) to assess
relationships and their strength between key constructs and variables. FCM is a
participatory, semi-quantitative systems modeling technique that uses participants’
knowledge and experiences to define complex system dynamics, including fuzzy
causality (causality represented as a matter of degree on a spectrum rather than certainty),
and infer proposed interventions’ impacts on the system by executing case scenario
analyses (Kosko, 1986; Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). While several NGOs, including
Environmental Justie Foundation (EJF) and FishWise have posited a relationship between
fish stock declines and forced labor slavery, data quantifying the strength of the
relationship and the processes that create the relationship are still lacking.

8

Based on the fishing farther, longer, and deeper premise supported by empirical
fisheries data (see Bell et al., 2017; Costello et al., 2012; Pauly & Zeller, 2016; Watson et
al., 2013; White et al., 2008) and human rights theory (see Brown, 2000; Crane, 2013;
Domar, 1970), this author previously posited a framework (Figure 1) hypothesizing a
negative association between fish stocks and forced labor slavery (Decker Sparks &
Hasche, 2018). An adaptation of Brashares and colleagues’ (2014) Wildlife Decline and
Social Conflict framework, the framework theorized the mechanisms, processes,
outcomes, and contextual constructs linking the two problems (Decker Sparks & Hasche,
2018). Revisions to the new framework from Brashares et al.’s (2014) original included
improved integration of human rights theory with fisheries empirical data and a greater
emphasis on power differentials in that incite exploitative labor relationships.
Figure 1. Revised Wildlife Decline and Social Conflict Framework
Industry Context
Fish
catch-peruniteffort
decreases

Fish
stocks
decrease

Geographic
Context

Regulatory
Context

Cultural
Context

Effort
increases

Profit
margins
decrease

Effort
increases

Profits
increase

Sla

ver

y

Labor
exploitation
increases

Cheap
labor
demand
increases

Socioeconomic Context

Figure 1. Theoretical framework hypothesizing the pathways linking fish stock declines and
increases in forced labor slavery and the contextual constructs influencing the proposed
pathways (Decker Sparks & Hasche, 2017).
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Using the revised framework, and still hypothesizing a negative association, this
study’s specific aims are to: (1) test the framework’s validity, and use participants’
knowledge to refine the framework’s social-ecological system’s components,
organization, and interrelationships; (2) quantitatively characterize the relationship
between fish stock declines and slavery using adjacency matrices; (3) identify constructs
and variables that potentially mediate and/or moderate the relationship between fish
stocks and forced labor slavery; and (4) explore how the system might react under a
range of possible changes in stock abundance and fishing intensification due to proposed
interventions.
Dissertation Organization
This introductory chapter identifies and provides a context for the substantive
topic under study, as well as an overview of the study’s purpose and aims. Chapter two
provides a brief review of empirical and theoretical literature, from diverse disciplines,
supporting the linking of these two historically disparate problems. A concise assessment
of international policy gaps is also included. In chapters three and four, the study’s
methods and results are presented in detail. The dissertation concludes with a discussion
of key findings from the results and implications for future research as well as the
identification of opportunities for transdisciplinary collaboration.

10

Chapter Two: Literature Review
Misconceptions and disagreement in public and academic arenas about what
constitutes post-20th century slavery, coupled with the hidden nature of forced labor
slavery victims and the physical inaccessibility of fishing fleets sailing hundreds of miles
from shore have created a dearth of traditional research in the area. Recently,
investigative journalism from the Associated Press augmented existing traditional
research by providing first-hand testimony of the fishing industry’s numerous and
extensive labor abuses, including slavery (Mendoza et al., 2016). The reporting’s scope
was limited, though, focusing almost exclusively on the supply chain. As a result, still
very little empirical research explores the drivers of slavery on fishing vessels and
theoretical research on forced labor often fails to consider the complex linkages between
social and ecological systems when conceptualizing slavery drivers. If the motivation for
enslaving persons is profit maximization (Bales, 2006), then the mechanisms that inhibit
profits must be assessed for their contributions to slavery. As such, Decker Sparks and
Hasche (2018) posited Figure 1, delineating the potential economic mechanisms
facilitating a relationship between fish stocks and labor conditions, and further
explicating the empirical and theoretical support for each pathway represented in the
figure.

11

Anthropogenic Pressures on Fish Stocks
This study’s underlying premise is that human behavior is inducing changes in
fish stock abundance, distribution, and individual specimen size, resulting in increasing
pressures to human economic systems in the fishing sector. These anthropogenic threats
include overfishing, coastal pollution, and ocean warming and acidification resulting
from climate change. Though studies and conversations about these problems are
typically siloed in the natural sciences, these pressures on marine ecosystems have dire
social impacts on predominantly vulnerable populations, though they are
disproportionately caused by industrialized societies, making this a social justice issue
pertinent to fields like social work and social welfare research.
Overfishing. Since 1970, unsustainable global fishing has resulted in a 50%
decrease in populations of fish species consumed by humans for food products (FAO,
2014). Additionally, the percent of assessed marine commercial fish stocks classified as
overexploited (near beyond ecological recovery) or depleted (beyond ecological
recovery) increased from 10% to 31.4%, with the plausibility of recovery in some stocks
(e.g., cod) questionable (FAO, 2016a). These classifications are based on the ecological
theory of maximum sustainable yield (MSY), or the maximum number of fish that can be
harvested from a stock in a period without impacting the stock’s ability to reproduce and
maintain or replenish the stock’s population size over time (Fox, 1970; Schaefer, 1954).
When fish extractions exceed MSY, the stock declines. The global fishing fleet,
dominated by EU and US subsidized trawlers, harvests two to three times more fish than
the ocean’s MSY (Sumaila et al., 2015; WWF, 2015).
12

Increased demand. Increased demand for fish drives overfishing. Since 1960, the
annual per capita fish consumption in industrialized countries has continued to grow
annually, reaching 26.8 kilograms in 2013 (FAO, 2016a). Demand in the United States,
European Union countries, and China has surpassed the production capabilities of their
coastal waters, resulting in these countries fishing more and more in the territorial waters
of developing countries who lack the infrastructure to fully exploit (i.e., extract the
maximum amount of fish without jeopardizing a stock’s sustainability) their fisheries
(Pauly & Zeller, 2016). This continued demand growth in developed countries is
predicated on a growing obsession with exotic fish products such as sushi, trade
globalization, human population increases, and increasing scientific evidence of fish’s
health benefits (FAO, 2014, 2016a WWF, 2015). During the same 53-year period, the
annual per capita consumption in developing countries rose to 18.8 kilograms from 5.2
kilograms, and in LIFDCs from 3.5 to 7.6 kilograms, while per capita consumption
declined in some African countries (FAO, 2016a). While consumption in developing
countries is also increasing, overall per capita consumption is still substantially inferior to
developed countries. Though this consumption data is not differentiated by marine versus
freshwater species, more than half of all fish consumed by humans for food is harvested
from marine waters (FAO, 2014).
Historical overfishing. Marine overfishing is also not a recent phenomenon. It
has long been rooted in the freedom of the seas principle, a belief that (privileged)
humans are entitled to harvest as much as they want from the shared ocean; therefore,
marine fishing practices should not be subjected to regulation. While it is difficult to
13

reconstruct exhaustive historical accounts of fish harvests and extractions (in part,
because fish decompose quickly and human consumption includes bones),
paleontologists, archaeologists, and biologists have documented centuries of large marine
vertebrate (e.g., whales) and small invertebrate (e.g., invertebrates with shells such as
conchs) culls (Clapham & Baker, 2002; Jackson et al., 2001). For example, in the 16th
and 17th centuries the Basque extirpated entire whale populations in the Bay of Biscay,
then began whaling farther into the sea. This behavior further decimated other North
Atlantic whale populations that five hundred years later have yet to recover (McLeod et
al., 2008), and likely impacted indigenous populations access to a subsistent natural
resource. Scholars hypothesize that historical overfishing likely coincided with mass
whale and invertebrate slaughters, and suggest three distinct periods of human impact on
marine ecosystems: aboriginal, colonial, and global (Jackson et al., 2001).
During the aboriginal period, while indigenous populations impacted marine
ecosystems, most research suggests they fished sustainably and only for subsistence
purposes until contact with White settlers (Bennett, 2007; Jackson et al., 2011; Nuttall et
al., 2005). The colonial period, coinciding with colonization of indigenous populations,
was characterized by mercantile powers’ systematic exploitation of marine species for
financial and political gain (Jackson et al., 2001). And the current global period, starting
approximately after World War II, is similar to the colonial period in that fishing and
marine resource extraction is a strategy for usurping political power and economically
oppressing marginalized populations. However, it is also now characterized by new
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intensive extractive technologies that have increased the breadth and depth of
unsustainable fishing (Jackson et al., 2001).
In addition to the freedom of the seas principle, a belief that the ocean’s bounty
was limitless permeated all three periods (including the global period until the late
1990s/mid 2000s). In 1883, at the London International Fisheries Exhibition, professor
and biologist T. H. Huxley infamously stated, “all the great sea fisheries are
inexhaustible; that is to say, that nothing we do seriously affects the number of the fish.
And any attempt to regulate these fisheries seems to be useless” (as cited in North
Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration, 1909). By the 1940s, research suggested that
unregulated fishing’s deleterious impacts included collapsing fish stocks just five decades
after initial fishing; disruptions to food chains and natural predation that enabled nonnative fish and algae to flourish; and chemical imbalances that caused massive coral reef
die-offs (Finley & Oreskes, 2013; Graham, 1943; Russell, 1942; Thompson, 1936).
However, despite the growing evidence, overfishing was still widely considered
unimaginable. Globally, fishing marine areas was still framed exclusively as a political
and territorial issue. Further, the political resistance to regulation highlighted by Huxley
was pervasive, ignoring overfishing’s environmental and social implications.
Current overfishing challenges. Today, consensus about overfishing’s
occurrence exists, despite divergent paradigms and approaches between fisheries
managers and conservationists (Davies & Baum, 2012; Worm et al., 2009). Curbing
overfishing; however, faces numerous challenges. Foremost, catch quotas are an
imperfect, data-limited science, and most quotas are still based on the FAO fisheries
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statistics database—the only longitudinal, global repository of reported catch and landing
data (FAO, 2016b). While representing the best available, non-reconstructed or
hypothetically modeled data, the FAO’s catch data is flawed. It is not adjusted for illegal,
unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU), bycatch (i.e., the incidental harvesting of nontargeted marine organisms during extraction activities), or discard (i.e., targeted species
thrown overboard, often deceased, to harvest more profitable fish); excludes catches from
small-scale and artisanal fisheries; and mostly relies on self-reported data from countries
(Kelleher, 2005; Pauly & Zeller, 2016; Zeller, Cashion, Palomares, & Pauly, 2017). It is
believed that numerous countries under report their catch data to cover up rampant IUU.
Additionally, some countries also over report their catch data to exaggerate their coastal
fisheries’ productivity and minimize overfishing-induced declines (Pauly & Zeller,
2016). As a result, historical catch reconstructions have disagreed with FAO’s measures
by as much as 50% (Pauly & Zeller, 2016). These potentially erroneous catch data points,
are then part of the statistical calculations used to estimate abundance trends, which
provide the foundation for establishing quotas; therefore, potentially contributing to
“legal” overfishing.
Further, more reliable data on fish stocks, particularly deep sea fish, obtained via
scientific observations is difficult to obtain due to a lack of technological capacity. It is
also time intensive and cost prohibitive (Devine, Baker, & Haedrich, 2006). As a result,
less than 1% of all fish stocks have been assessed by scientists (Costello et al., 2012), and
80% of global fish catch is harvested from unassessed stocks (Richard et al., 2011).
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Consequently, many fisheries scientists interpret the available data as best case
scenario and recognize in their interpretations that the situations may be more dire than
presented. Within the scientific community, there is also a communal understanding of
which ports and countries have reliable data (e.g., Norway) and which do not (e.g.,
Somalia) and thus require extrapolations of potential worst case scenarios that include
adjusted models to account for potentially erroneous catch data. While the FAO data was
used in this study, newer, more complex abundance models that have yet to be validated
were also considered (Pauly & Zeller, 2016). And qualitative, ecological knowledge from
stakeholders based on first-hand testimony from fishers about length of time to fish and
catch sizes amongst other attributes of their fishing experiences was also integrated to
assess for the extent of overfishing.
Overfishing decreases abundance, causing fishers to fish longer, deeper, and
father to maintain yields (UNODC, 2011), and it also impacts the evolution of phenotypic
traits. For example, increasing fishing pressures in overfished stocks have decreased
fecundity, reduced stock age, and delayed sexual maturation (Pandolfi, 2009). The
decreased reproduction delays the stock’s ability to replenish itself when being fished,
further threatening the stock’s population and abundance. Additionally, overfishing has
decreased the overall size and quality of the fish, also causing fishers to fish deeper,
farther, and longer to harvest larger fish that are more profitable in economic markets
since quotas often limit the number of fish that can be harvested in a given haul (Zeller et
al., 2017).
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Ocean warming and acidification and coastal pollution. Modern overfishing is
also compounded by other anthropogenic pressures that are impacting phenotypic traits,
abundance, and fish stock distributions. Increased greenhouse gas emissions, which warm
the ocean, increase acidification, and decrease oxygen levels, are reducing fish
reproduction and growth rates and body weights (Cheung et al., 2012)—again resulting in
less economically valuable fish that could cause fishers to increase fishing intensification
to maximize profits. Warming temperatures have also caused notable distribution shifts in
latitude and depth (Perry, Low, Ellis, & Reynolds, 2005), forcing fishers to fish further,
deeper, and longer than previously. Some studies also suggest fish may not be able to
evolve sufficiently to decreased oxygen levels, potentially causing mass die-offs that
could affect population abundance (Cheung et al., 2012).
Marine pollution also compounds overfishing’s effects on population abundance.
Eutrophication (i.e., nitrogen enrichment) caused by chemical runoffs and fossil fuel
burning associated with coastal development is increasing the number of dead zones in
marine ecosystems (Diaz & Rosenberg, 2008). These zones lack enough oxygen to
support fish species. If concentration thresholds are surpassed too quickly, it can again
cause massive die-offs (lowering abundance), but even slower rates of eutrophication
lead to notable distribution shifts that can intensify fishing efforts (Diaz & Rosenberg,
2008).
Theoretical Support for Linking Social-Ecological Systems
As previously described on page 7, social-ecological systems (SES) theory
assumes human and non-human systems are nested and interconnected; therefore,
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disturbances in one system have impacts across all systems (McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014;
Ostrom 2007, 2009). It integrates social and behavioral theories with ecological resilience
theory and the ecosystem services framework in analyzing natural resource users’
decision-making processes (Berkes & Folke, 1998; Chan, Satterfield, & Goldstein, 2012;
Cote & Nightingale, 2012; Rands et al., 2010). Ecological resilience theory posits that an
ecosystem possesses an innate ability to self-organize to adapt to disturbances (Walker &
Salt, 2006), and the ecosystem services framework accounts for the “benefits people
obtain from ecosystems” (e.g., food, disease control, and nutrient cycling) (Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment, 2005, p. 49). Beyond providing a theoretical foundation for
linking traditionally disparate social and ecological problems, the theory’s goal is to
prevent segregated knowledge accumulation in traditional disciplinary silos by
integrating diverse knowledge sources, institutional structures and subsystems, and social
behavior patterns at all levels (Ostrom 2009; Rands et al., 2010). By modeling how the
social and ecological systems interface, practitioners determine how, when, and where to
intervene in each system to ensure the equitable and just sustainment of both ecological
resources and the human resources users.
Critiques of SES theory. SES functions like a grand theory and is often criticized
as too holistic, with abstract conceptualizations lacking the specificity needed to better
understand highly contextualized problems (Binder et al., 2013; Hinkel, 2011; Mills,
1959). While this non-specificity ensures the theory’s utility for a multitude of linked
social-ecological problems, the abstract nature becomes problematic when researchers
apply the framework to hypothesize coupled social-ecological problems whose linkages
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have not yet been validated or to data limited systems. When critics suggest the
framework’s ambiguity hinders its purported ability to detect and predict feedbacks and
identify causation (Hinkel, 2011; Ostrom & Cox, 2010), they are likely making
inaccurate generalizations from the SES framework’s applications to these hypothetically
associated problems and systems. Without entering empirically supported models into the
framework, SES is likely to “mask” deleterious uni- and bidirectional feedbacks and
maladaptive responses (e.g., increased slavery) to resource unit disturbances (e.g., drastic
declines in fish stocks) in favor of resilience thinking which assumes that systems (and
users in the system) can inherently adapt to a shock (Hughes, Bellwood, Folke, Steneck,
& Wilson, 2005, p. 383). The propensity to mask negative interaction outcomes results
from the framework’s underlying assumptions about innate self-organization and
consequent oversimplification and over consideration of emergent positive behaviors,
while neglecting emergent negative behaviors. SES may also oversimplify socialecological problems by only accounting for uncertainty in ecological systems and not in
human behavior, which perpetuates the framework’s positive emergence bias and limits
its predictive accuracy in relation to resource users’ behaviors (Fulton, Smith, Smith, &
Van Putten, 2011).
Since slavery and fisheries are both data limited systems (Bentley, 2015; Guth,
Anderson, Kinnard, & Tran, 2014), and research investigating a negative association
between fish stocks and slavery is limited, an analysis of the problem using socialecological systems theory is not yet appropriate. Instead a more specific model that seeks
empirical evidence to support the proposed relationship between fish stocks declines and
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slavery increases, and develops a comprehensive understanding of slavery as a
maladaptation to fish stock fluctuations, is needed. One such model is Brashares et al.’s
(2014) Wildlife Decline and Social Conflict framework.
Brashares’ Wildlife Decline and Social Conflict framework. While Decker
Sparks and Hasche (2018) reviewed Brashares’ Wildlife Decline and Social Conflict
Framework at length, the framework’s hypothesized pathways and empirical work from
supporting scholars were included here to further inform the reader of their relevance for
the dissertation. Brashares et al. (2014) postulated how and why fish stock declines could
be a driver of increases in child slavery through an amalgamation of previously siloed
empirical and theoretical disciplinary research (Figure 2). Building on the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) (2011) investigation that first speculated about
the potential relationship between overfishing and human trafficking based on the
presence of transnational criminal syndicates in illegal fishing rings, Brashares et al.
(2014) proposed that fish stock declines increase fishing effort which subsequently
increases costs. Specifically declines force vessels to fish longer, farther from shore, and
in deeper waters to maintain yields. The framework deduces that cheap or free labor is
thus an economically justified approach to offset increasing costs and continue harvesting
fish at a rate that would otherwise be cost-prohibitive (Brashares et al., 2014).
Despite providing a useful starting point for exploring the relationship between
fish stock declines and forced labor slavery, Brashares et al.’s (2014) framework has
several limitations. Foremost, without explanation, it focuses on child slavery as the
outcome of fish stock declines. However, because these scholars failed to consider
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differing cultural norms around child work, the outcome of interest they describe is more
akin to modern forced labor slavery of adults. Additionally, their construct language does
not consider the power differentials that incite these exploitative relationships, nor do
they define their non-technical constructs (e.g., child slavery). They also fail to provide
support for their pathways or consider several important variables from the human rights
literature which have been identified as increasing fishers’ vulnerability to enslavement
(e.g., transnational migration), since not all fishers are enslaved. As a result, Decker
Sparks and Hasche (2018) revised the framework (see Figure 1) to address these
concerns.

Figure 2. Brashares et al.’s (2014) Wildlife Decline and Social Conflict Framework

Figure 2. Brashares et al. (2014, p. 377) offer a hypothesized feedback loop linking fishery declines with
exploitative labor practices such as child slavery. It is hypothesized here that as demand for cheap labor
increase, more children will be enslaved.
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Revised Wildlife Decline and Social Conflict Framework
Decker Sparks and Hasche (2018) explicated in detail and analyzed the quality of
empirical and theoretical support for Figure 1’s pathways. The primary tenets are
described below.
Contextual constructs. As noted in Decker Sparks and Hasche (2018, p. 7),
“While forced labor slavery is a global phenomenon, not all fishers are enslaved and
context influences” the level of exploitation in a fisher and employer’s relationship.
Derived from Bales’ (2006) and Crane’s (2013) theories on modern slavery, geographic,
regulatory, cultural, and socioeconomic contexts “create an environment that not only
accommodates, but enables slavery” (Decker Sparks & Hasche, 2018 p. 9). Their
interaction with one another then essentially creates a slave labor supply, while the
industry contexts “create[s] the demand for slave labor” congruent with supply and
demand economics (Decker Sparks & Hasche, 2018, p. 9). In the revised framework
(Figure 1), though some indicators for each contextual construct were included (e.g., rates
of documented, undocumented, and irregular migration as a proxy for geographic context
or low education and literacy for the socioeconomic context), these constructs were
intentionally broad to allow for operationalizations that could be tailored to the unique
context of individual countries and regions.
Regulatory context. While there are numerous contextual constructs, the
regulatory context may be the most important as the exploitation of a compilation of
regularity gaps exacerbates the vulnerability of both the oceans and migrant fishers.
Regulating the ocean (of which 64% is an open-access, common pool resource), and
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transnational migration and fishing require multilateral, international legal agreements
through the United Nations (UN). However, an analysis of power disparities within UN
structures, using the six main organs leaders’ country of origin and country representation
as proxies for power, demonstrated that large-economies or developed countries
consistently vote in their own economic self-interests, usurp power and leadership
positions, and subvert the interests of small-economy, low-income, developing countries
(Decker Sparks & Sliva, 2018). As a result, most transnational issues are governed by: a)
bi- or unilateral instruments, b) non-legally binding instruments (i.e., soft laws), or c)
legally-binding instruments that are essentially a decentralized patchwork of
unenforceable obligations covering specific sub-issues (in the interest of developed
countries) of larger issues (in the interest of developing countries) (Decker Sparks &
Sliva, 2018). Further, countries are only obligated to binding and non-binding regulations
laid out in an instrument if they signed it, ratified it (often done through their own
domestic legislative bodies), and then ascent to the treaty—becoming a party to it once it
goes into force. Most UN multilateral treaties have a threshold for how many parties must
ascent before the instrument becomes a binding or soft law, and this threshold varies for
each instrument (UN, n.d.)
As a result, the following regulatory gaps persist (Figure 3). Foremost, the ocean
is governed by an international legally-binding document—the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Signed in 1982, UNCLOS has become
obsolete (Decker Sparks & Sliva, 2018). While UNCLOS ascribed authority over
territorial waters (marine waters within 200 miles of its shoreline), fishing on the high
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seas (international waters beyond 200 miles from a coastal state’s shoreline), was
essentially left unregulated to preserve the ‘freedom of fishing’ principle—the false belief
that marine fish stocks are so abundant they could never be exhausted (UN, 1982, Part
VII, Sect. 1, Art. 87, para. 1). Since then, more than a decade of negotiations for
regulating fishing on the high seas have continuously been thwarted and stagnated by the
lucrative commercial fishing interests of the United States, the European Union, and
Russia (Decker Sparks & Sliva, 2018). On the other hand, low-income and developing
countries lack the capacity to fish on the high seas, yet disproportionately incur the
ramifications of the high seas stock declines (Teh et al., 2016; White & Costello, 2014).
Figure 3. Multilateral Regulatory Gaps
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Figure 3. Venn diagram demonstrating that irregular (i.e., undocumented) fishers working on high seas vessels lack protections and rights under
international, legally-binding instrumentation.

No legally binding, international instrument for transnational migration exists,
resulting in the invisibility of irregular migrants left without protections or recourse—
further exacerbating their vulnerability. While documented migrant workers are afforded
some protections under the UN’s (1990) Convention of the Rights of All Migrant
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Workers and Members of Their Families, these are migrants who typically constitute
guest workers and thus receive temporary authorization for migration and work in the
destination country. These workers are also considered less vulnerable and typically have
more economic security than irregular migrants attempting to cross borders out of
economic desperation. Additionally, most of the countries that ratified the 1990
convention were origin countries and not host countries (ILO, 2003). Thus, the lack of an
international, legally-binding instrument for migration results in lower-income,
developing countries hosting a disproportionate number of irregular migrants while
wealthier countries like the United States and European Union member states select
migrants of their choosing and increase their border security to block the immigration of
migrants perceived as less desirable (IOM, 2017).
Similarly, while seafarers and transport workers (crew on non-fishing vessels) on
the high seas are protected under the ILO’s various international labor standards
protocols, all consolidated under the ILO’s 2006 Maritime Labour Convention, fishers
are specifically excluded and therefore have no labor protections when working in
international waters (ILO, 2013b). As a result, in 2007 the ILO Work in Fishing
Convention was signed; however, it just received enough in-country ratifications to enter
into force on November 16th, 2017 (ten years after its signing). Further, it has only been
ratified by 10 countries (Angola, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Congo, Estonia,
France, Lithuania, Morocco, Norway, South Africa), meaning only these 10 countries are
bound by its regulations (ILO, 2017). UNCLOS’ article 99, which is one sentence in
length, does prohibit the transport of slaves for trade on vessels traversing the high seas
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(UN, 1982). However, its language was never altered from the first UNCLOS in 1956, it
does not define what constitutes a slave, and its typical interpretation is more congruent
with historical slavery than modern forced labor slavery (e.g., UN, 2005).
Moreover, fishers lack rights and protections in most territorial waters as well.
The practice of ‘flags of convenience’ allows vessel owners to flag or register their ship
in any country they choose, and not necessarily where their boat is from or where their
boat is fishing (Dieter, 2014). It is estimated that 73% of the world’s fishing fleet flies a
flag or multiple flags of convenience (Braestrup, Neuman, & Gold, 2016). Per UNCLOS,
the flag state then has “exclusive jurisdiction” over the vessel, no matter where the vessel
is fishing (UN, 1982). Consequently, many owners flag their vessels to countries whose
regulations, monitoring, and enforcement are perceived as subpar or lax, or will change
their flag while at sea to evade regulation wherever they are fishing.
Flag state jurisdiction intersects with fishers’ labor rights because if a fisher is on
a vessel flagged to Indonesia, but fishing in South Africa’s territorial waters near
Capetown, they are not protected by South Africa’s labor laws. They would instead be
subject to Indonesia’s laws, but Indonesia lacks the capacity to monitor or enforce labor
regulations on a vessel in South Africa. South Africa could and should report the vessel
to Indonesian authorities, but only the flag state is responsible for penalty imposition
(Dieter, 2014). Currently, New Zealand is the only country in the world that requires
vessels fishing in their territorial waters to reflag or register with them so that fishers are
protected by New Zealand’s labor laws while fishing in New Zealand waters (New
Zealand Parliament, 2016). Flag state jurisdiction also obscures which country has the
27

right or authority to prosecute identified slaveholders when human rights violations,
which are criminalized under a legally-binding international treaty, are discovered—
resulting in most vessel owners caught using forced labor incurring little more than a
monetary fine.
Empirically supported pathways. As noted in expanded detail in Decker Sparks
and Hasche (2018), empirical analyses of longitudinal, global fish stock data support
Figure 1’s pathways from fish stock declines to decreased profits (Figure 4). When fish
stocks decline, as previously noted, so too do catches (Pauly & Zeller, 2016). However,
instead of reducing effort to minimize losses, fishing effort is increased to maintain yields
to meet subsistence needs and consumer demand (Bell et al., 2016; Watson et al., 2013).
This increased effort increases fishing costs, decreasing already narrow profit margins
(White et al., 2008) and increasing reliance on foreign subsidies to prop up the sector
(Gjerde et al., 2013).
Theoretically supported pathways. Empirical studies of fisheries behavior have
repeatedly found that fishing is a profit-driven industry continuously seeking to maximize
economic gains by reducing input costs (Sethi et al., 2010). Therefore, based on the 1970
Domar Serfdom Model, the combination of profit motivation, lack of ownership over
non-labor production means, and high labor intensity within the industry results in the
reduction of labor costs being one of the only options for reducing cost inputs. Therefore,
as highlighted in Figure 4, decreasing profits increase the demand for cheap labor
(Andrees & Belser, 2009; Domar, 1970).
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Figure 4. Empirically Supported Pathways in the Revised Wildlife Decline and Social Conflict Framework
Industry Context

Empirically
supported pathways

Fish
catch-peruniteffort
decreases

Fish
stocks
decrease

Geographic
Context

Regulatory
Context

Cultural
Context

Effort
increases

Profit
margins
decrease

Effort
increases

Profits
increase
Sla

ver

y

Labor
exploitation
increases

Cheap
labor
demand
increases

Socioeconomic Context

Figure 4. Highlighted are pathways in the framework supported by longitudinal and global empirical
fisheries data.

Moreover, Crane’s (2013) Theory of Modern Slavery supports increases in forced
labor exploitation (i.e., slavery) as a product of increased demand for cheap labor within
capitalist societies, where labor management is an entrenched value. Because of these
entrenched values and the lack of other production inputs to reduce costs, forced labor
becomes legitimized as an economically rational decision—making the use of forced
labor not only plausible, but a likely response to the decreased profit margins incurred
from increased effort amidst stock declines (Figure 5). And, since the cost of acquiring a
slave has decreased substantially to an average of $90 USD per person and as little as $7
USD for refugees (K. Bales, personal communication, October 6, 2017), modern slavery
is surprisingly inexpensive to enter. Then coercion and deception maintain the
slaveholder/slave relationship between captain and crew at no financial cost, thus
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increasing the slaveholder’s profits. Per Bales (2006), it is when labor exploitation leads
to increased profits, that slavery exists.
According to Bales’ (2016) Ecocide theory, once profits have increased, there is
no incentive for slaveholders to cease using forced labor. Instead, they will continue to
try to maximize their profits by using as much forced labor as they can acquire to harvest
as much fish as possible, thus increasing fishing effort and further overfishing stocks
(Figure 5). Indeed, it is believed the use of slave labor on fishing vessels contributes to
IUU fishing, a major driver of overfishing and fish stock declines (EJF, 2015b; Global
Ocean Commission, 2013). Per the theory, as long as a steady supply of slave labor exists
(which is created by the contextual constructs previously noted), and the demand for fish
is not reduced, the use of forced labor will persist in the fishing sector (Bales, 2016).
Figure 5. Theoretically Supported Pathways in the Revised Wildlife Decline and Social Conflict Framework
Industry Context
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Figure 5. Highlighted are pathways in the framework supported by human rights theory. While a data limited
field, most of these theories were constructed from in-depth case studies with victims, survivors, and offenders.
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While data characterizing fish stock declines and slavery’s relationship does not
yet exist, Decker Sparks and Hasche’s (2018) revised Wildlife Decline and Social
Conflict framework can be used to direct empirical testing. Research advancing the
framework is necessary to create efficacious ecological and social interventions and shift
the social-ecological systems field from reactive, crisis management strategies to
preventive ecological and anti-slavery strategies—particularly if fish stock declines are
demonstrated to predict a substantial enough amount of slavery prevalence to be
considered a root cause or driver.
Thus, this dissertation’s boundary breaking and reformulating hypothesis
challenged the boundaries of singular disciplines by linking two critical, yet historically,
disparate issues. It is imperative for both natural and social scientists to consider these
linkages as social-ecological conflicts inhibit equitable development and threaten
vulnerable populations’ security. Besides the continued framing of marine fish stock
declines as primarily an environmental and political issue, the historical disciplinary
boundaries that considered the social and natural sciences discordant also perpetuated the
lack of consideration of fish stock declines’ social impacts, including slavery.
By conducting this study, the author integrated social work knowledge, methods,
and values to ensure that social outcomes and mitigating marginalization, oppression, and
injustices are at the forefront of environmental interventions. Social work scholars have
produced limited research about the connections between social injustices and
unsustainable natural resources use, in spite of declarations by the International
Federation of Social Workers, the International Association of Schools of Social Work,
31

and the International Council on Social Welfare (2012) that environmental sustainability
and human trafficking and slavery are prioritized objectives for the discipline. In
addition, social work scholars are being called to develop evidence to address these
social-environmental inequities by the American Academy of Social Work & Social
Welfare’s 12 Grand Challenges for Social Work, one of which calls for a global agenda
to “create social responses to a changing environment” (Kemp & Palinkas, 2015, p. 1).
This paucity of knowledge threatens global equity. Instead, linking fish stock declines
and slavery (previously disparate areas) can potentially generate greater consideration of
relational power differentials between countries underlying overfishing practices and the
lack of marine fishing regulations.
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Chapter Three: Methodology
Methodological Orientation and Theory
This dissertation aimed to answer the research question, what is the relationship
between fish stock changes and forced labor slavery, through a fuzzy logic cognitive
mapping (FCM) methodological approach. The following aims were addressed in a stepwise process: (1) test the framework’s validity, and use participants’ knowledge to refine
the framework’s social-ecological system components, organization, and
interrelationships; (2) quantitatively characterize the relationship between fish stock
declines and slavery using adjacency matrices; (3) identify constructs and variables that
potentially mediate and/or moderate the relationship between fish stocks and forced labor
slavery; and (4) explore how the system might react under a range of possible changes in
stock abundance and fishing intensification due to proposed interventions.
Though underused in social work research, historically, a variety of disciplines
have used FCM as a theoretical and research approach, including engineering and the
computer, social, behavioral, and political sciences (Papageorgiou & Salmeron, 2012).
However, in the past decade, its popularity as a research tool to model complex and
interrelated social-ecological systems has increased (see Devisscher, Boyd, & Malhi,
2016; Gray, Chan, Clark, & Jordan, 2012; Hobbs et al., 2002; Berkes & Berkes, 2009;
Kok, 2009). Within social-ecological systems research, experts have primarily used FCM
to understand local communities’ decision-making processes including stakeholder
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perceptions of social-ecological issues (Gray et al., 2014); compliance with natural
resource management policies (Nyaki, Gray, Lepczyk, Skibins, & Rentsch, 2014);
adoption of conservation interventions (Halbrendt et al., 2014); and adaptation strategies
to perceived environmental risks (Henly-Shepard, Gray, & Cox, 2015).
FCM was selected for its known capacity to produce fuzzy causal theories in data
and knowledge-limited areas where robust quantitative data would be expensive or near
impossible to collect, but historically unrecognized stakeholder knowledge is extensive
and available (Glykas, 2010; Kosko, 1986; Reckien, 2014). Within the field of modern
slavery, a historical lack of transparency and cooperation between NGOs and academia
has resulted in substantial, previously unconsidered and untapped stakeholder knowledge
(Bales, 2017).
Prior research suggests FCM is particularly useful in building and refining theory,
distinguishing drivers, and identifying linkages between social and ecological phenomena
previously considered disparate (Fiss, 2011; Halbrendt et al., 2014). As such, FCM has
often been described as the default methodology for hypotheses that are ideal for
structural equation modeling (SEM), but lack empirical data for confirmatory model
testing (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). Similar to SEM, FCM’s foci is the entire model rather
than isolating individual pathways (Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000), and its strengths
include its ability to accommodate uncertainty created by insufficient data, abstract
variables, feedback loops, and varied knowledge sources (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004).
Approaching theory building comparably to grounded theory methodologies,
FCM emphasizes the participant’s construction of knowledge (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004).
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Unlike grounded theory, it is hypothesis driven, uses participant knowledge to confirm
expert developed premises, and uses a more positivist approach to data analysis by
quantifying qualitative data to make inferences (Bendassolli, 2013; Charmaz, 1990, 2014;
Kennedy & Lingard, 2006). On the other hand, the validated fuzzy causal algebraic
algorithms that underpin FCM’s data quantification are considered a less positivist
approach to causality more accepted by the social sciences (Glykas, 2010; Kosko, 1986).
As a result, FCM balances the philosophical tensions about rigor and limitations that
often exist between the social and natural sciences and hinder social-ecological systems
research by integrating research methodologies from both the natural and social sciences.
Thus, FCM was selected over purely qualitative methods.
FCM uses directed graph theory to integrate fuzzy logic, cognitive mapping, and
neural networks (i.e., interconnected, nonlinear, dynamic processes). In FCM’s first
phase participants construct models from cognitive maps based on their knowledge,
experiences, and observations. Guided by a research question, the researcher bounds the
system and facilitates a dialogue where participants define the system’s most relevant
variables and the dynamic (i.e., stock and flow) cause-linkage-effect relationships
between variables (Gray et al., 2014). Data to construct the model is typically obtained
through (1) questionnaires and surveys; (2) content analyses of written texts including
literature; (3) empirical data demonstrating causal relationships; (4) qualitative
interviews; or (5) a combination of the aforementioned strategies (Özesmi & Özesmi,
2004). Participants analyze within-map data using directed content analysis, which
permits conclusions about the degree, strength, and direction of relationships between
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variables (Gray et al., 2014). These within-map analyses are characterized as directed
since the researcher’s hypothesis guided interview question development, which
influences participants’ variable identification (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).
In the second phase, maps are quantified by the researcher using fuzzy graph
structure theory, which employs adjacency matrices and specifically edge and partial
edge connection calculations to produce a quantifiable, fuzzy causality (Glykas, 2010;
Kosko, 1986). Once all maps are individually quantified, they are aggregated using a
mean approach that averages values for common components and corresponding causal
descriptions and dynamics (based on directed graph theory) to produce a singular social
cognitive, consensus map that reflects the collective sample, explained in more detail on
pages 62-63 (Glykas, 2010; Henly-Shepard et al., 2015; Kosko, 1986; Papageorgiou &
Salmeron, 2012). Lastly, in the third phase, the converged consensus map is then used to
establish the system’s equilibrium and test “what if” case scenarios to identify the most
efficacious interventions (Gray et al., 2014; Kosko, 1986; Nyaki et al., 2014).
Study Population
The study population was staff of anti-slavery non-government organizations
(NGOs) working in the fishing sector, and staff from environmental justice and
migration/immigration NGOs focusing on labor abuses in the fishing industry. Agency
staff were selected over fishers as the study population, though many agency staff were
former fishers, to minimize risk to participants and the researcher and maximize
feasibility of engaging key stakeholders. Additionally, most fishers experiencing forced
labor slavery are hidden and inaccessible to research staff as they are detained on fishing
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vessels and not permitted to come ashore at landing sites (EJF 2014, 2015a; Fishwise
2014; ILO, 2013a; Mendoza et al., 2016). Therefore, it is highly unlikely that these
individuals could be recruited to a sample without the researcher boarding fishing
vessels. And when contacted by researchers who have boarded vessels, fishers are still
hesitant and unlikely to disclose abuse out of fear of losing what they perceived as one of
their only employment opportunities (Stringer & Simmons, n.d.). Further, due to these
accessibility limitations, a precedent exists in modern slavery research for using
stakeholder knowledge to generate estimations of the extent of the problem as well as an
understanding of the problem’s scope and nature (Bales, 2017).
Study Setting
Due to the limited number of NGOs working in this area globally, it was
necessary to sample from NGOs worldwide, rather than a specific region or country, to
achieve theoretical saturation for the methodology. Therefore, participants work in
countries ranging from southeast Asia to western Africa, North America and the Pacific
Islands/Oceania (see Table 1 on page 43 for inclusion of focus region in participant
demographics). Noticeably absent in the sample, despite targeted recruiting efforts, were
participants who worked exclusively in South America and participants from larger,
international NGOs. Despite the more global approach to the study’s setting, countries
that had NGOs with active anti-forced labor slavery programs in the fisheries sector were
comparable in terms of the contextual constructs posited in Figure 1 that resulted in the
country either being an origin or destination country for victims. That is, each of these
countries exhibited high densities of migrant laborers in the fishing sector; limited and/or
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corrupt regulatory environments; racial/ethnic/tribal stratification; and socioeconomic
inequalities (e.g., income, access to credit, and education) creating high risk for the use of
forced labor slavery in the fishing and agricultural sectors (Walk Free Foundation, 2016).
Participants from New Zealand and Sweden were also purposefully recruited for negative
case analyses to further explore the role of contextual factors. New Zealand Parliament’s
(2016) new fishing regulations, put into effect on May 1, 2016, under the 2014 Fisheries
(Foreign Charter Vessels and Other Matters) Amendment Act are characterized as the
most stringent globally and Sweden’s fishers have one of the highest ranking socioeconomic profile globally (T. Harré, personal communication, July 5, 2017).
Positionality Statement
As a doctoral candidate, of United States nationality, conducting global
qualitative research, the impacts of positionality on data collection and data analysis were
considered throughout the research process. Foremost, my own positivist orientation led
to methodological selections and research design, most notably selecting a FCM
approach over grounded theory and selecting fish stocks and labor conditions as the
boundary variables in the mapping activity (discussed further in “Interview and mapping
procedures”). Additionally, my hypothesis (which demonstrated my positivist core
beliefs that: a) fish stocks are indeed declining, and b) fish stocks and forced labor
slavery are related) was based on a critical review of empirical and theoretical literature
from the fisheries sciences and human rights sector. Whereas the study’s participants had
first-hand knowledge about the experiences of fishers with both fish stock declines and
labor conditions. Related, as I previously practiced in a different sector of social work,
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my years of experience working in the field of socially responsible fisheries was
substantially lower than most participants. As a result, the use of a participatory,
qualitative method was intended to center the participants’ knowledge.
While the knowledge imbalance favored participants, as the researcher, and being
an American citizen, I still possessed power in the short-term interactions and
relationships with participants. Notably, socially responsible fisheries research almost
always originates in the fisheries sector; is often hyper-focused on southeast Asian
countries or low-income, developing African countries; and the prevailing narrative
frequently blames these low-income and developing countries while ignoring the
existence of the problem or the role of western countries in perpetuating the problem.
Additionally, this study was conducted between October 2017 and January 2018, in a
political era of creeping economic nationalism and isolationism within developed
countries globally. Consequently, and justifiably, substantial distrust existed between
many participants and myself that led to participants requesting to not be audio recorded.
To mitigate this distrust, I identified myself as a social work researcher who studies
social-ecological systems, emphasizing the social aspects. I also purposefully recruited
participants from the United States and throughout this dissertation attempted to elucidate
the disproportionate role of western, industrialized countries’ power and privilege in
inducing fish stock declines.
Participant Selection
Sampling. The study used a non-probability, purposeful sampling frame.
Inclusion criteria were as follows. Participants must have had direct contact or
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interactions with fishers, be aged 18 years or older, English speaking, and affiliated with
a NGO registered with the home country’s government. For example, if the organization
was based in the United States, the organization must be registered as a 501(c)(3) with
the United States government. This specific criterion was intended to reduce risks to
participants. If the NGO was registered with the government, the government was already
aware of the work the organization and its staff were engaged in, versus “underground”
organizations that were assisting victims without the government’s knowledge— most
likely because the government did not support their work and would/could punish the
organization and/or individual. In regard to the English speaking criteria, per Thomas
Harré, director of Slave Free Seas legal advocacy, because of the United Kingdom’s
historic leadership in the human rights sector dating back to the abolitionist movement,
and the global nature of slavery, most inter-organization communication is already
conducted in English (personal communication, July 5, 2017). Therefore, most agency
staff members are fluent in English regardless of location.
The sample was a non-probability, purposive sample as participants were
interested persons with the time and availability to participate in an interview when
recruited. Due to the limited number of organizations available for participation, the
author tried to maintain a balanced sample across continents, services provided (i.e., legal
services, advocacy, etc.), type of fishery (i.e., large scale, small scale, and artisanal), and
organization’s focus (i.e., an anti-slavery organization versus an environmental
organization). While Southeast Asia was well-represented in the study, the researcher
also wanted to ensure that the study did not focus exclusively on this region as to date,
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most literature and research has, ignoring the issue in other parts of the world. Due to the
global setting, the study sample was also diverse in terms of age, gender, race and
ethnicity, and organizational focus (Table 1).
Recruitment. The researcher used multiple approaches to recruitment. First, the
investigator posted a digital recruitment flyer to the Freedom Collaborative—an online,
members-only platform intended to securely and confidentially connect anti-slavery
NGOs and other stakeholders across 55 countries to facilitate information sharing,
collaboration, and research. Part of the platform is a message board available to all 500+
member organizations and 2,000+ stakeholders where the researcher posted the flyer.
Each member organization and stakeholder also has access to personal messaging
through the platform, and the investigator sent the recruitment flyer via the personal
messaging option to organizations and stakeholders previously engaged in fisheries
threads on the platform (threads were archived and were available to the researcher for
searching).
In the second approach, the investigator sent recruitment emails to environmental
NGOs that have previously published reports on labor abuses in the fishing sector (e.g.,
Greenpeace and Environmental Justice Foundation) and immigration/migration and antislavery NGOs working in the fishing sector and who were not part of the Freedom
Collaborative. The researcher generated this list of organizations from a comprehensive
literature review performed, mining of NGO social media platforms, and communications
with experts in the field from around the globe to prevent geographic biases.
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Lastly, the investigator used snowball sampling wherein enrolled participants
referred other potential participants to the study. Study recruitment was also aided when
one participant served on a panel sponsored by the Freedom Collaborative and endorsed
the study and called attention to the recruitment messaging posted on the Freedom
Collaborative’s online platform. This panel was disseminated as a webinar, and thus
reached diverse audiences globally.
All potential participants who contacted the investigator indicating interest in
participating were screened to ensure they met the study’s eligibility criteria. These
screening questions occurred before the consent process so that the individual’s response
to the name of their NGO was not linked to their interview responses, protecting privacy.
The screening questions were as follows, and were conducted over email:
1) “Do you have direct contact with fishers in the context of your normal job
responsibilities?”
2) “Please identify the NGO that you are affiliated with.”
3) “Are you able to participate in an interview conducted in English?”
4) “Are you at least 18 years of age?”
All recruitment materials are included in Appendix B.
Sample size. The study’s total sample was 44 participants. Using the methods
described in “Recruitment”, 27 out of 51 (52.9%) prospective participants who were
individually approached by the researcher were recruited and enrolled in the study. The
remaining 24 (47.1%) did not reply to the researcher’s initial recruitment contact. An
additional 13 participants were recruited through the general flyer posting, and four
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participants were recruited and enrolled through snowball sampling for the final sample
size of 44 participants. Sample demographics are presented in Table 1.
Table 1
Sample Demographics (n = 44)
Variable

Variable category

n

Percent of
sample

20-29 years
30-39 years
40-49 years
50-59 years
60-69 years

n=4
n=9
n = 13
n = 15
n=3

9.1%
20.5%
29.5%
34.1%
6.8%

Asian
Black
Latinx
Pacific Islander
White
Other

n = 12
n=2
n=2
n=1
n = 26
n=1

27.3%
4.5%
4.5%
2.3%
59.1%
2.3%

Female
Male

n = 14 31.8%
n = 30 68.2%

Primary
High school
College
Graduate schooling

n=2
n=8
n = 10
n = 24

4.5%
18.2%
22.7%
54.6%

Environment
Labor & human rights
Maritime crime & regulations
Migration & immigration

n = 18
n = 12
n=6
n=8

40.9%
27.3%
13.6%
18.2%

North America
Europe
Southeast Asia
Africa
Pacific, Oceania, & Australasia
Global

n=3
n=5
n = 15
n=3
n=3
n = 15

6.8%
11.4%
34.1%
6.8%
6.8%
34.1%

Less than 10
10-19

n = 10 22.7%
n = 12 27.3%

Age

Race/Ethnicity

Gender
Education

Organizational Focus

Regional Focus

Years of Experience
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20-29
30-39

n = 14 31.8%
n = 8 18.2%

No
Former
Current

n = 33 75.0%
n = 4 4 (9.1%)
n = 7 7 (15.9%)

Employment as a Fisher

To protect against bias and subjectivity in determining theoretical data saturation,
the study used an average accumulation curve with the Monte Carlo technique to
calculate sample size (Colwell, Mao, & Chang, 2004; Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). In this
approach, mathematical modeling considering known map concepts and the presence of
an unknown quantity of undisclosed concepts generates an accumulation curve that
extrapolates the number of new themes that could potentially be yielded if more maps
were added to the sample (Tran, Procher, Tran, & Ravaud, 2017). A researcher-specified
number of iterations randomizes the sample order, producing multiple curves that are
then aggregated into the final accumulation curve (Colwell & Coddington, 1994), with
each data point on the final curve representing the mean value of these randomizations
(Kristensen & Balslev, 2003). The slope of the accumulation curve—at the point of
tangency—with a cut-off established a priori, then becomes the criterion for concluding
recruitment (Tran et al., 2017).
In this study, the accumulation curve was based on the cumulative number of
unique map variables obtained per participant as a function of the number of participants’
maps in the sample (Colwell et al., 2004; Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). The slope value was
set at ≤ 0.05, or one new concept for every 20 maps, for stopping recruitment. Since the
methodology originated in ecology to estimate species richness and abundance, and has
only recently started being applied to qualitative research, the literature does not provide
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a rationale for selecting a number of iterations. As such, this study used 20 iterations
since a relatively small sample size was projected at the onset of the study based on
previous research using FCM.
The EstimateS v. 9.1.0 software was used to sequentially calculate an
accumulation curve based on 20 randomizations, and its slope after every five maps in
the study up until 35 participants (Tran et al., 2017). The slope of the expected cognitive
map concept accumulation curve after the inclusion of 35 participants was 0.021 (Figure
6). The slope at the point of tangency at 32 participants was also calculated, since on a
graph this appeared to be where the slope was the steepest (and thus error would be at its
highest), and was 0.034. The asymptote was estimated to be at 36 participants. Based on
this approach, the sample size of 44 participants and maps thus achieved theoretical
saturation.
Figure 6. Accumulation Curve for Sample Size Estimation

Figure 6. Final accumulation curve comparing the diversity of concepts based on the number of maps sampled. The curve was
used to extrapolate the number of concepts that would likely be produced if the entire population was sampled.
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Each participant and their fuzzy cognitive map counted as one data point, no
matter how many fishers’ experiences they included or aggregated in the map’s creation.
If multiple participants were interviewed from the same organization, then each interview
counted as a separate data point. Multiple participants from the same organization were
only included if the participants differed in their country or fishing community of focus.
Expert Mapping
Prior to data collection with participants, the researcher created an expert derived
FCM (Figure 7). The expert mapping activity is intended to provide the foundation for
theory building and aides in hypothesis generation, selecting study site(s) and population,
and developing the interview schedule (Gray et al., 2014). The first step of the expert
mapping was identifying the system’s key variables through a directed content analysis,
of existing literature (Gray et al., 2014). The content analysis is described as directed
since initial coding was guided by Brashares et al.’s (2014) theory and a global review of
key literature on fisheries, overfishing, forced labor, and modern slavery (Hsieh &
Shannon, 2005).
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Figure 7. Expert Map

Figure 7. Researcher’s model of the relationship between fish stock declines and forced labor slavery constructed in the Mental Modeler
software. Blue lines indicate a positive relationship wherein an increase in the transmitter variable causes an increase in the receiver variable.
Orange lines indicate a negative relationship wherein an increase in the transmitter variable causes a decrease in the receiver variable.

After identification of variables for each pertinent construct noted in Figure 1, a
directed content analysis of peer-reviewed empirical literature and trend analyses of open
source data was used to generate inferences about direction and strength of causelinkage-effect relationships between variables (Gray et al., 2014). Empirical data
regarding the contextual constructs were obtained from the 2016 and 2017 Global
Slavery Indices (ILO & Walk Free Foundation, 2017; Walk Free Foundation, 2016).
Fisheries data was obtained from FAO FishStatJ and the Sea Around Us Project, both
open source fisheries repositories (FAO, 2017a; Sea Around Us, 2017). The expert
derived map was then transcribed into the Mental Modeler software.
In the FCM methodology, the generation of an expert derived map functioned
similarly to bracketing techniques, encouraging the researcher to acknowledge and
separate attachment to the expert map during date analysis. Often employed in other
qualitative research methodologies, bracketing reduced the influence of the researcher’s
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biases resulting from preconceptions and extreme familiarity with the research topic
(Creswell, 2013; Tufford & Newman, 2012).
Data Collection
Interview and mapping procedures. The author of this dissertation, herein
referred to as the researcher, completed all interviews and data collection. Once
participants enrolled in the study, they completed either face-to-face or web-based semistructured interviews that included self-construction of a cognitive map intended to
measure how fish stock declines would influence human decision-making about whether
or not to use forced labor slavery. All maps were drawn in front of each participant by the
researcher in the Mental Modeler software (see Figure 8 for an example map), and as
described by the participant, to ensure consistency across differing interview modalities.
Twenty-six web-based interviews were conducted using the Zoom platform, while the
remaining 18 (40.9%) interviews, including the first four participant interviews
completed, were conducted in-person. Interviews were selected over focus groups due to
the topic’s sensitivity and power dynamics that could have suppressed marginalized
identities in focus groups (Stringer & Simmons, n.d.). Further, research suggests
theoretical saturation is more likely to be reached in FCM when using interviews instead
of focus groups (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004).
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Figure 8. Example Participant Map

Figure 8. Example of a participant map constructed in the Mental Modeler software. Blue lines indicate a positive relationship wherein an
increase in the transmitter variable causes an increase in the receiver variable. Orange lines indicate a negative relationship wherein an increase
in the transmitter variable causes a decrease in the receiver variable.

An interview schedule including fuzzy cognitive mapping facilitation is included
in Appendix B. After the researcher formulated the initial interview schedule, the
questions and mapping activity were piloted with four persons, whose data were not
included in the study. After the pilot, the researcher obtained feedback on the questions
and facilitation of the mapping activity and edited the interview schedule as necessary,
resulting in the final, appended interview schedule. Interview duration ranged from 43
minutes and 15 seconds to 112 minutes and 59 seconds, with a mean interview time of 85
minutes and 55 seconds.
For some participants, the interview started with closed-ended demographic
questions followed by open-ended questions about their fisheries employment
experiences. Other participants completed the closed-ended demographic questions in
advance of the interview via the web-based survey software Qualtrics, and thus their
interviews started with the questions about fisheries employment experiences (question 9
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in the appended interview schedule). After the demographic and employment questions,
the researcher explained how to draw a cognitive map using an unrelated and neutral
example that was culturally relevant, and differed based on the participant’s home
country (Taber, 1991). For instance, one unrelated example concerned drought and
increased energy prices impacts on the dynamics of a farm. Once the participant indicated
understanding of the mapping process, the researcher proceeded with the mapping
exercise included open-ended questions about ecological knowledge, labor conditions,
and then linkages between fish stocks and labor conditions as disclosed by fishers and
that they themselves may have observed. Probing questions were added to the interview
as needed. The only two variables participants were provided at the beginning of variable
brainstorming were “fish stocks” and “labor conditions”. In the FCM literature, some
studies have provided participants with a list of variables to choose from (Gray et al.,
2014), while others have only provided two to three key variables (typically one variable
to identify the problem and one to identify the outcome of interest) to help bound the
system and maintain the mapping activity’s relevance to the research question (Nyaki et
al, 2014). The latter approach was selected to reduce the researcher’s bias and influence
and to maximize the participant’s knowledge construction (Kosko, 1986). Participants
also had the ability to eliminate either or both of these variables during the iterative
mapping process, and indeed, participants who felt that fish stock declines were not
influential in the decision to use forced labor slavery eliminated the construct in their
maps.
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While the participant was speaking, the researcher recorded key variables and
constructs in the Mental Modeler software. As indicated in the interview schedule, at
various time points and after set questions, the researcher paused questioning and
together with the participant reviewed the list of key variables. Once the participant
approved the list of key variables, the researcher then asked the participant how the
variables should be arranged. The researcher also facilitated questions to aid the
participant in identifying relationships between variables (known as nodes in directed
graph theory) and assessments of the relationships’ direction and strength (see interview
schedule in Appendix A for further detail). Because the relationship’s direction was
based on a directed edge-connection, participants were asked to delineate between the
source (i.e., cause) variable and the target (i.e., outcome) variable when identifying and
describing a relationship between two variables. Promoting relationships, defined as
increases in the source variable causing increases in the target variable, were signed with
a +. Inhibiting relationships, defined as the increases in the source variable causing
decreases in the target variable, were signed with a -. Demarked by a 0, no edge
relationships implied the relationship was bidirectional, and the two variables neutralized
each other (Axelrod, 1976). Signs were denoted in the software by the researcher. If
participants did not know if a relationship existed, no relationship was entered. For
participants who added relationships that they were unsure or less sure about, the Mental
Modeler software allowed the researcher to indicate degree of certainty for each entered
relationship. While this value did not impact the adjacency matrix, it was noted in the
map via color-coding, and thus could be assessed qualitatively during map aggregation.
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Regarding relationship strength, participants were first asked to weight the
relationship qualitatively (low, medium, high), and then to translate their qualitative
weightings into quantitative weightings using the scale delineated in Table 2. These
weightings were also denoted in the digitized cognitive map by the researcher.
Participants were able to add and delete variables at any time, and the process was
iterative, reducing the maps into the participant’s most salient variables (Henly-Shepard
et al., 2015; Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). This process was repeated until the participant had
no new content to add and indicated their cognitive map accurately described their
knowledge, experience, and observations.
Digitization, recording, transcription. Once the participant indicated they had
completed their cognitive map, it was saved and stored electronically. Interviews,
including formal interview questions and dialogue while constructing the cognitive map
were audio recorded. Interviews conducted face-to-face were recorded using a digital
audio recorder. Interviews conducted via the Zoom platform were recorded using Zoom’s
audio recording feature and transcribed by the researcher. Recording was optional for all
participants, and 21 (47.7%) participants declined to have their interview recorded.
All data collection methods and procedures were approved by the University of
Denver’s Institutional Review Board.

52

Table 2
Scales for Converting Qualitative Weightings into Quantitative Weightings for FCMs
Qualitative Weighting

Quantitative Weighting Range

No relationship

0

Low/weak relationship

0.1 to 0.3 or -0.1 to -0.3

Medium/moderate relationship

0.4 to 0.7 or -0.4 to -0.7

High/strong relationship

0.8 to 1.0 or -0.8 to -1.0

Data Analysis
Coded cognitive maps for simplification. To achieve aim one, an iterative,
systematic, and inductive thematic content analysis (i.e., coding) of each participant’s
interview transcript and/or notes and map were used to condense each map’s variables
into the major variables most pertinent to the two phenomena under investigation—fish
stocks and forced labor (Figure 9) (Buede & Ferrell, 1993; Harary, Norman, &
Cartwright, 1965; Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). Since the FCM literature does not specify
the coding techniques that should be used in data analysis, the researcher used techniques
consistent with grounded theory. As such, the researcher employed in-vivo, process, and
initial coding for first-cycle coding techniques and focused, axial, and theoretical coding
for second-cycle coding (Saldaña, 2013). This process included using interview quotes to
attribute meaning and definitions to map variables, and combining similar variables into
over-arching themes as is typical in qualitative data analysis (Saldaña, 2013). Condensing
the maps into major themes, constructs, and/or variables is considered a “best practice”
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and intended to make comparisons across maps and map aggregation more interpretable
(Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). The data-driven, inductive approach was selected to limit the
researcher’s influence and to center the participant’s knowledge construction (Fereday &
Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Coding of transcripts and maps was completed in Dedoose, as
well as memoing wherein rigorous notes were maintained on the researcher’s cognitive
interpretation of each map for greater transparency and to create an audit trail (Özesmi &
Özesmi, 2004; Thomas, 2017). Memoing that occurred during data collection was also
transcribed into Dedoose.
Figure 9. Example Participant Map Coded

Figure 9. Example participant map represented in Fig. 8 after being coded by the researcher.

Inter-rater reliability. After the researcher initially coded all interview transcripts,
notes, and maps, a codebook was generated. The codebook was then supplied to an
outside research assistant, trained in FCM, who independently coded all transcripts,
notes, and maps. Inter-rater reliability was then measured as a percentage of agreement
between the researcher and research assistant in the application of codes and
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condensation of maps. With percentages ranging from 83% to 96% agreement, the interrater reliability for all variables was deemed acceptable. Areas of substantial
disagreement between the researcher and research assistant (e.g., when the research
assistant felt that a necessary code was not included in the codebook) were negotiated
until a consensus was achieved (Patton, 1999).
Converted cognitive maps into adjacency matrices. Using structural models
derived from graph theory, each cognitive map was converted by the Mental Modeler
software into an adjacency matrix (see Table 3)—the standard mathematical
representation of a graph or the quantification of a cognitive map—to accomplish aim
two (Harary et al., 1965; Kosko, 1986; Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). In graph theory, each
variable in the cognitive map operates as a vertex (also known as a node). Edges are the
lines between each variable indicating a relationship. The software transformed the map
into a square adjacency matrix based on counts of the number of edges between adjacent
vertices—variables that shared at least one common edge. In this study, edges were both
directed and weighted in that participants were asked to identify the source and target
variables (orienting the relationship direction) and then assigned a qualitative and
quantitative weight to describe the relationship strength (Harary et al., 1965; Kosko,
1986). Directing and weighting the edges allowed for more complex structural analyses
of the matrices.
Analyzed individual maps with graph theory indices and metrics. Graph
theory variable influence indices and structural map metrics were calculated from the
adjacency matrix (see Table 4 for a complete list). All metrics and indices were
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calculated in the Mental Modeler software. Standard measures included a count of the
number of variables and connections (i.e., edges). Edge indegree and outdegree were
calculated to classify variables as transmitter (forcing or independent variables), receiver
(end or dependent variables), or ordinary (defined as mean variables that possess both
force and receive) variables (Eden, Ackerman, & Cropper, 1992). Degree centrality,
connectedness, and density were computed from variable indices and map metrics to
elicit further information about each graph’s structure, fulfilling aim two (Özesmi &
Özesmi, 2004).
Table 3
Example Adjacency Matrix Corresponding with Figure 9
Fish
stock
declines
Fish stock
declines
Labor
shortages
IUU
Risk
Use of
disposable
vessels
Fishers
perceived
disposable
Fishing
costs
Reg.
problems
and
challenges
Forced
labor
slavery

Labor
short

IUU

0.25

0.69

Risk

Use of
disposable
vessels

0.69

Fishers
perceived
disposable

Fishing
costs

0.28
0.72

Force
labor
slave
0.72

0.56

-0.53

-0.5

-0.22

-0.5

0.83

-0.31
-0.67

0.17

-0.61

Note. This adjacency matrix corresponds with the participant map depicted in
Figure 9.
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Compared individual maps. All interviews and map facilitations were
conducted by the same researcher to allow for individual map comparisons using
qualitative and quantitative comparison strategies further described below (Özesmi &
Özesmi, 2004). These comparisons were intended to 1) test reliability across different
interview modalities and 2) elucidate important, likely contextual, variables confounding
the relationship between fish stocks and slavery, achieving aim three.
Initially maps were divided into two groups, with all maps in one group noting
some type of relationship between fish stock declines and labor conditions, and all maps
in the second group not identifying a relationship between fish stock declines and labor
conditions. Maps in the second group were analyzed separately, akin to a negative case
analysis, as another strategy to identify potential mediators, moderators, and buffering
effects (Patton, 1999).
Table 4
Standard FCM Variable Indices and Structural Metrics
Metric
N (Vertices)
N

Definition
Number of
variables and/or
constructs in the
model

Purpose
Describes how
many vertices are
included in the
model

Formula
Count of the total number

N (Edges)
E

Number of
relationships or
connections
between
variables in the
model
Cumulative
strength of edges
(i.e.,
connections)
entering vertices
(i.e., variables)

Describes how
many edges are
included in the
model

Count of the total number

Used to identify
receiver variables,
which have a
positive indegree
and no outdegree

Colum summation of
absolute value of
quantitative weightings,
where N is the total number
of variables and aki is is the
absolute value of the
cumulative strength of

Indegree
id
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Source
(Gray, Zane,
& Gray,
2014; Özesmi
& Özesmi,
2004)
(Gray, Zane,
& Gray,
2014; Özesmi
& Özesmi,
2004)
(Bougon,
Weick, &
Binkhorst,
1977; Gray et
al., 2014;
Nyaki et al.,
2014; Özesmi

connections entering a
variable

& Özesmi,
2004)

-

𝑖𝑑(𝑣% ) = ) 𝑎+,%
,./

Outdegree
od

Cumulative
strength of edges
(i.e.,
connections)
exiting vertices
(i.e., variables)

Used to identify
transmitter
variables, which
have a positive
outdegree and no
indegree

Row summation of
absolute value of
quantitative weightings,
where N is the total number
of variables and aki is is the
absolute value of the
cumulative strength of
connections exiting a
variable

Bougon et al.,
1977; Gray et
al., 2014;
Nyaki et al.,
2014; Özesmi
& Özesmi,
2004)

-

𝑜𝑑(𝑣% ) = ) 𝑎+,%
,./

N (Receiver
Variables)
R

Variables that
have a positive
indegree and
zero outdegree,
thus they have
only “receiving
functions” in the
model

“Indicates number
of variables that are
influenced by other
variables but do not
influence other
variables”

Count of the total number

N (Transmitter
Variables)
T

Variables that
have positive
outdegree and
zero indegree,
they have only
“forcing
fuctions” in the
model
Variables that
have both
indegree and
outdegree;
typically
characterized as
leaning toward
either transmitter
or receiver
Absolute value
of a variable’s
total influence
within the model

“Indicates the
number of variables
that influence other
system variables,
but are not
influenced by other
variables”

Count of the total number

“Indicates the
number of variables
that influence but
are also influenced
by other variables”

Count of the total number,
to characterize as leaning
toward transmitter or
receiver calculate the ratio
of indegree to outdegree

(Bougon et
al., 1977;
Eden et al.,
1992; Gray,
Zane, &
Gray, 2014,
p. 36)

Indicates how
connected a
variable is to other
variables, and
therefore, how

Summation of the absolute
value of indegree and the
absolute value of
outdegree:

(Eden et al.,
1992; Harary
et al., 1965;
Özesmi &

N (Ordinary
Variables)
O

Degree
Centrality
CD (V)
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(Bougon et
al., 1977;
Eden,
Ackerman, &
Cropper,
1992; Gray,
Zane, &
Gray, 2014,
p. 36)
(Bougon et
al., Eden et
al., 1992;
1977; Gray,
Zane, &
Gray, 2014,
p. 36)

Connectedness
(C/N ratio,
link-node
ratio)
C/N

Measures a
FCM’s
connectivity to
determine the
strength of the
causal arguments

Complexity
C

Ratio of receiver
variables to
transmitter
variables

Density
(clustering
coefficient)
D

Connectivity
index
demonstrating
the “number of
connections
compared to the
number of all
possible
connections”

much a variable
contributes to the
structure of a FCM
based on the
number and
strength of
connections;
typically variables
are ranked by
centrality
“The lower the C/N
score, the higher
the degree of
connectedness in a
system”

“Degree to which
outcomes of
transmitter/driving
forces are
considered. Higher
complexity
indicates more
complex systems
thinking” where
more outcomes and
implications are
considered. Low
complexity is
described as
“flatness” in that
too few causal
arguments are
considered because
of top-down
thinking.
The higher the
density, the more
potential
intervention points

𝐶2 (𝑉)
= Σ(𝑖𝑑(𝑉) + 𝑜𝑑(𝑉))

Number of edges divided
by number of vertices:
𝐸8
𝑁

𝐶=

𝑅
𝑇

Number of edges divided
by the maximum number
of possible edges between
N variables
𝐷=

𝐸
𝑁(𝑁 − 1)

Özesmi,
2004)

(Gray, Zane,
& Gray,
2014; Özesmi
& Özesmi,
2004)

(Devisscher
et al., 2016;
Eden et al.,
1992; Gray,
Zane, &
Gray, 2014,
p. 36; Özesmi
& Özesmi,
2004)

(Devisscher,
et al., 2016;
Gray, Zane,
& Gray,
2014, p. 36;
Hage &
Harary, 1983)

Comparative content analysis of variables. Using a directed, comparative content
analysis, the researcher constructed a present/absent variable index categorizing all
variables and their definitions across all 44 maps as common, partially common, or
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uncommon concepts (Clarke & Mackaness, 2001). Proportional to sample size, common
concepts indicated the variable was used in at least 22 maps and uncommon concepts
were unique variables that were only identified by one participant. Partially common
concepts were variables that were included in a minimum of two and maximum of 21
maps (Clarke & Mackaness, 2001). Variable definitions were derived from the original
interview coding as described previously. This index was used to identify similarities and
differences in variable inclusion and exclusion between participants.
Variable rankings. Variables were then ranked into three separate lists including
most mentioned variables, variable types, and most central variables (Özesmi & Özesmi,
2004). Most mentioned variables were a list of the top 10 variables in frequency across
all 44 maps. Variable types included sub-lists of the top 10 transmitter, receiver, and
ordinary variables across all maps. All previously listed variables were then ranked by
their centrality (see Table 4 for definition and formula), an index of the variable’s
importance to the entire system. These lists were then used to identify similarities and
differences in variable importance and role amongst the 44 participants.
Structural indices comparisons. The graph theory indices including C/N ratio,
complexity, and density were also compared across all participants. These measures were
used to identify similarities and differences in map structure, particularly how connected
or sparse (i.e., how complex) each map was and how strongly individual variables
influenced the entire system (Yoon & Jetter, 2016).
Pairwise comparisons. Once qualitative coding techniques provided preliminary
reasoning for grouping like maps, quantitative pairwise analyses corroborated similarity
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between group members’ variables. Since each participant’s map already had a
corresponding adjacency matrix, the Phi similarity coefficient and the Yule Q coefficient
were calculated for count variables (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). A matrix of counts created
from the individual adjacency matrices was used to calculate both coefficients. For the
Phi similarity coefficient, values ranged from -1 to 1, with 1/-1 indicating most similar.
The Yule Q coefficient was “the proportionate reduction in errors in predicting whether
or not one group has the variable” and therefore was used to confirm the Phi values
(Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004, p. 52).
Identifying commonalities. Based on the comparative content analysis, variable
ranking, and pairwise structural indices comparisons, the researcher identified similar
participants. Once similar participants were identified, the researcher returned to the
coded interviews to ascertain commonalities, particularly demographic, amongst the
similar participants. Similar participants were then grouped by commonalities, for
example, former fishers versus non-former fishers.
Group comparisons. For each group, the mean value for participants’ metrics
and indices reported in Table 3 were calculated. Each outcome variable’s skewness was
between negative two and positive two, and kurtosis between 0 and positive three,
meeting the normality assumptions for univariate tests (George & Mallery, 2010). To
assesses similarities and differences between group means, ANOVA and independent
samples t-tests for variables with two groups were performed (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004;
Palmquist, Carley, & Dale, 1997). A series of univariate ANOVAs were selected over the
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) since FCM violates multiple
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assumptions—particularly small cell numbers and high multicollinearity since some
dependent variables are calculated, in part, from other dependent variables. As such,
Bonferroni corrections of p ≤ .008 for the ANOVAs and p ≤ .01 for the independent
samples t-tests were applied to reduce Type I error inflation. However, both the adjusted
and non-adjusted significant findings are presented in the Results chapter since these
FCM quantitative analyses ideally prove the null hypothesis of similarity to aid in map
aggregation. Thus the absence of the Bonferroni correction is the more conservative
approach.
For comparisons amongst demographic variables race, education, and former
employment as a fisher were recoded due to small sample sizes for some groups. Race
was recategorized as White, Asian, and other—which included the original other
category in addition to Black, LatinX, and Pacific Islander. For education, primary school
and high school were combined into a category of high school or less. Lastly, the variable
employment as a fisher was transformed into a dichotomous, nominal variable wherein
the categories of current and former fisher were combined into a “yes” category. SPSS v.
23.0 software was used to perform the ANOVAs and independent samples t-tests.
Created cumulative consensus map. Individual maps were then aggregated into
one cumulative, consensus, social cognitive map using both qualitative and quantitative
procedures. To begin, the researcher selected which variables to include in the aggregated
FCM based on a content analysis of the variable rankings lists, graph theory indices
comparison table, and results elucidated from the group comparisons about the role of
potential mediators, moderators, and contextual factors. Using vector-matrix operations
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and the creation of augmented matrices that listed every variable used in the individual
matrices, common matrix components were added or averaged to infer the sign and
strength of each connection in the aggregated map (Halbrendt et al., 2014; HenlyShepard, 2015; Kosko, 1992; Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). All vector-matrix operations
were completed in the Mental Modeler software. In this approach, consensus amongst
participants strengthened the fuzzy causal relationship in the aggregated map, whereas,
dissent was still recognized (and added to the map’s complexity) but weakened the fuzzy
causal relationships (Kosko, 1992).
Returning to aim one, once finalized, the cumulative consensus map was used to
refine the amended Brashares et al. (2014) Wildlife Decline and Social Conflict
framework posited by Decker Sparks & Hasche (2018).
Established system’s steady state. Prior to performing the case scenario analyses
needed to fulfill aim four, the researcher established the consensus map’s steady state—
what happens to the outcome of interest (forced labor slavery) if there are no
interventions and fish stock levels stagnate, meaning stock declines will level off, but
stocks will not rebound and increase either. Using a neural network computational
method (Kosko, 1992) where initial state variable vectors were multiplied by the
adjacency matrix, iterations were run by the Mental Modeler software until the “system
converged to a fixed point” (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004, p. 55). That fixed point was then
the steady state or baseline for comparisons to assess the value of variable changes in
case scenarios described below (Devisscher, 2016).
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Executed case-scenario simulations. Running case scenario analyses allowed
the researcher to generate “what if” inferences based on the current relationships between
system components and assumptions of plausible scenarios, and achieve the study’s
fourth aim (Devisscher et al., 2016). Four scenarios were tested. Two scenarios explored
both problem intensification and amelioration while the third and fourth scenarios tested
interventions. All four scenarios were developed once the consensus map was finalized
and analyzed and were based on transmitter variables and target variables with the high
degrees of centrality (Devisscher et al., 2016).
For scenario runs, the same mathematical calculations (vector-matrix
multiplication) used in the baseline determination were replicated, but this time included
manipulation of targeted variables and/or the weights of causal connections in the
consensus map (Devisscher et al., 2016). Because the FCMs and consensus map were
semi-quantitative, scenario outcomes were not “compared with absolute indicators but
rather interpreted as a summary of relationships between variables and changes [in those
variables] compared to the baseline” (Devisscher et al., 2016, p. 7).
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Chapter Four: Results
This chapter presents the quantitative and qualitative analyses of participants’
individual maps and interviews, with the similarities in problem construction across
diverse participants demonstrating the universality and systemic nature of the problem
globally. Following individual map analyses is the map aggregation results and a detailed
explication of each variable and relationship in the consensus map, as supported by the
qualitative analysis of participants’ maps and interviews.
The pervading sentiment expressed by study participants was that the relationship
between overfishing-induced fish stock declines and forced labor slavery was “like a
tangled web” in that fish stock declines led to other reverberating changes throughout the
linked social and ecological systems which ultimately contributed to changes in forced
labor slavery. Participants also clearly articulated that incidents of fish stock declines
relating to forced labor slavery were not isolated cases, but rather representative of a
systemic, widespread problem that is likely “severely underestimated and still
increasing.” Out of the 44 participants, 41 (93.2%) stated that since 2010 they had seen
substantial increases in the number of forced labor slavery victims from fishing vessels.
Acknowledging that a portion of this increase could be shifts in the content and delivery
of questions professionals ask to accurately determine if someone has been victimized or
not, all 41 participants stated the majority of the increase should be attributed to a
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growing problem that “started slowly, and is now snowballing.” Participants also
discredited claims that more victims are coming forward to report abuses and/or seek
services, saying that most victims lack the education and comprehension of the English
language to consume media content that would help them identify themselves as a victim.
In total, 32 out of 44 (72.7%) participants linked fish stock declines and forced
labor slavery in their cognitive maps. Per data obtained from participants, forced labor
slavery related to fish stock declines was occurring on both short and long-haul vessels
that fished primarily for low and mid-value fish (e.g., white, albacore tuna), on trawlers
and long-line vessels, and in territorial and international waters (i.e., the high seas).
Figure 10 represents all countries mentioned by participants where victims and vessels
originated from, as well as the flag state of vessels caught using forced labor slavery, and
territorial waters where vessels were known or suspected of using forced labor slavery.
The most cited countries of origin for victims were Cambodia, Indonesia, India,
Myanmar, and the Philippines. Specific to the vessels, participants were less familiar with
flag states, since many of the implicated vessels flew multiple flags or changed their
flags. However, the most frequently noted countries of origin for vessels were Thailand,
Spain, China, and Taiwan (whose fishing fleet participants considered distinct from
China’s). The territorial waters of concern referenced by the most participants were
Senegal, Indonesia, and South Africa—though participants noted that the forced labor
occurring in these waters was typically on foreign, not domestic, vessels. The Indian and
southern Pacific oceans were the most frequently indicated locations for vessels using
forced labor slavery on the high seas.
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Bivariate and multivariate analyses were used to determine if demographic
variables (see Table 1 for variables) along with interview modality were associated with
and/or significant predictors of whether a participant linked fish stock decline and forced
labor slavery in their cognitive map. First, bivariate Chi-square tests of independence
were performed. As detailed in Table 5, organizational focus was the only demographic
variable significantly related to linking fish stock declines and forced labor slavery. All
other demographic variables, and interview modality, were independent from linking fish
stocks and slavery, though it should be noted that most analyses had at least 1 cell with a
count less than five, and Age and Region had more than 20% of its cells with counts less
than five.
Table 5
Chi-Square Tests of Independence between Demographic Variables and Forced Labor
Slavery
Variable
Result
Interview Modality
𝒳2(1) = .004, p = .95
Education
𝒳2(2) = .14, p = .93
Age
𝒳2(4) = 7.98, p = .09
Race/Ethnicity
𝒳2(2) = .56, p = .75
Gender
𝒳2(1) = 1.75, p = .19
Organizational Focus 𝒳2(3) = 8.08, p = .04*
Region
𝒳2(5) = 5.01, p = .42
Years of Experience 𝒳2(3) = 2.67, p = .45
Fisherman
𝒳2(1) = .61, p = .43
*p < .05
a
At least one cell, but less than 20% of cells with counts less than five
b
More than 20% of cells with counts less than five
A binary logistic regression model was then used to determine if demographic
variables (see Table 1 for variables) along with interview modality were significant
predictors of whether a participant linked fish stock declines and forced labor slavery in
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their cognitive map. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test was non-significant, X2(8) = 4.37, p =
.82, thus it was assumed the model had adequate fit to the data, though low power may
also explain the high p-value. While the overall model was significant, X2(23) = 51.56, p
= .001, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that any specific demographic
predictor or interview modality was significant in explaining whether a participant linked
fish stock declines and forced labor slavery. Of the 12 participants who did not connect
the two issues in their cognitive map, seven (58.3%) reported during their interviews that
they had not previously considered the connection, and therefore had not expanded either
their ecological view to include social systems or vice versa.
The two participants purposefully sampled for negative case analyses failed to
yield insight about confounders distinct from other participants. In particular, the
participant from Sweden expressed concerns about the presence of slavery in the sector,
despite popular opinion that Sweden is slave free. The participant reported multiple risk
factors along Sweden’s maritime border with Russia such as unsustainable stock
management driven by Russia’s economic interests instead of science, and illegal fishing
by Russian and Ukrainian vessels. In addition, the participant disclosed recent reports of
labor abuses of migrant crew members on transport and ice breaking vessels.
Map Composition
At the conclusion of data collection, 111 unique variables were identified by the
44 participants. After two coding cycles, the 111 variables were reduced to 53 variables,
categorized by number of appearances in the Present/Absent Variable Index (Table 6).
Excluding the two bounding variables (fish stock declines and forced labor slavery) and
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the uncommon variables (i.e., the variables only listed by one participant), Figure 11
ranks each variable by how many maps it appeared in during the study. After each map
Figure 10. Hotspots for Forced Labor Slavery in the Fishing Industry

Figure 10. Map of the world depicting which countries participants identified as
being origin countries for victims and vessels, flag states, and countries whose
territorial waters are hotspots for vessels using forced labor slavery.
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was converted to an adjacency matrix, structural metrics were calculated (Table 7). Map
composition was then further elucidated by using these metrics to rank the top 10
transmitter, receiver, and ordinary variables, and the 10 most central variables (Table 8).
Map Comparisons
Quantitative pairwise comparisons of map composition determined two distinct
groups with high levels of similarity in variable inclusion (i.e., more than 50% of the
pairwise comparisons yielded a Phi coefficient and Yule Q coefficient of 0.7 or higher).
The first grouping was participants with at least 20-29 years of experience and whose
organizational focus was on maritime crime and regulations. Similar pertinent variables
in this group’s maps included transshipment and supply chain complexity. The second
grouping was participants whose regional focus was Southeast Asia and who were
currently or previously employed as fishers. Their similar pertinent variables included
xenophobia, racism, and marginalization of small-scale fishers.
Table 6
Present/Absent Variable Index for Individual Participant Maps
Common
Variables
(n ≥ 22)
Regulatory problems
and challenges
Illegal, unreported,
and unregulated
fishing

Partially Common
Variables
(2 ≤ n ≤ 21)
Consumer demand
Increased
fishing capacity
Social vulnerabilities
Wildlife crimes

Profit margins
Fishing effort

Fishing costs
Overfishing
Use of foreign and migrant
workers, often
undocumented
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Fishing safety
Market prices
for fish
Risk

Uncommon
Variables
(n = 1)
Community
accountability
Fishermen
perceived as
disposable
people
Limited data
Marine
exploitation
Ocean warming

Government inaction

Seeking of costcutting
measures
Disposable
vessels

Race to fish
Labor shortages
Racism
Supply chain complexity
Transshipment
Catch-per-unit-effort

Lack of deterrents
Marginalization of smallscale and/or legal fishers
Fisheries interventions and
regulatory reforms
Monopolization of resources
Xenophobia and stricter
immigration laws
Demand for cheap labor
Power differentials
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Political
instability
Geographic
remoteness
Globalization
Other
transnational
crime
Presence of
transnational
criminal
syndicates
Underdeveloped
economy
(national)
Capitalism
Consumer
disconnect
Governance
Licensing
schemes
Nationalism
Normalizes
exploitive
practices

Phantom owners
Seafood
certification
schemes
Shell companies
Subsidies

Figure 11. Number of Models Including Each Variable
Power differentials
Normalizes exploitive practices
Nationalism
Licensing schemes
Governance
Consumer disconnect
Capitalism
Underdeveloped economy (national)
Presence of transnational criminal syndicates
Other transnational crime
Globalization
Geographic remoteness
Political instability
Disposable vessels
Seeking of cost-cutting measures
Risk
Market prices for fish
Fishing safety
Wildlife crimes
Increased fishing capacity
Demand for cheap labor
Xenophobia & stricter immigration laws
Monopolization of resources
Fisheries interventions and regulatory reforms
Marginalization of small-scale and/or legal fisheries
Lack of deterrents
Catch-per-unit-effort
Transshipment
Supply chain complexity
Racism
Labor shortages
Race to fish
Government inaction
Use of foreign and migrant workers, often undocumented
Overfishing
Fishing costs
Social vulnerabilities
Consumer demand
Fishing effort
Profit margins
Illegal, unreported, and unregualted (IUU) fishing
Regulatory problems and challenges
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Figure 11. Variables included in at least two participant maps, ranked by number of appearances.
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Table 7
Structural Metrics of Individual Participant Models

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Vertices
(N)

Edges
(E)

Density
(D)

Connectedness
(C/N)

15
16
12
16
9
10
11
11
11
10
7
12
6
8
9
10
8
12
14
21
13
12
15
9
17
15
5
9
12
14
13
7
5
9
10
7
8
12
9
16
7
7
12
7

30
33
21
27
17
14
13
16
16
16
10
17
6
11
10
12
12
22
20
33
18
16
20
12
25
20
5
13
16
21
15
7
4
13
13
8
7
21
8
20
8
8
17
6

0.14
0.14
1.16
0.11
0.24
0.16
1.12
1.15
1.15
0.18
0.24
1.13
0.20
0.20
0.14
0.13
0.21
0.17
0.11
0.08
0.12
0.12
0.10
0.17
0.09
0.10
0.25
0.18
1.12
1.16
0.10
0.17
0.20
0.18
0.14
0.19
0.13
0.16
0.11
0.08
0.19
0.19
0.13
0.14

2.00
2.06
1.75
1.69
1.89
1.40
1.18
1.45
1.45
1.60
1.43
1.42
1
1.38
1.11
1.20
1.50
1.83
1.43
1.57
1.38
1.33
1.33
1.33
1.47
1.33
1.00
1.44
1.33
1.50
1.15
1.00
0.80
1.44
1.30
1.14
0.88
1.75
0.89
1.25
1.14
1.14
1.42
0.86

Transmitter
Variables
(T)
3
1
3
2
1
2
3
2
1
1
3
3
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
5
4
5
5
5
4
5
3
0
2
5
5
0
1
1
4
3
5
3
4
4
3
2
1
5
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Receiver
Variables
(R)
0
3
1
2
1
0
2
1
2
1
0
2
2
1
2
1
1
2
4
4
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
0
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
0
3
1
1
0
0
2

Ordinary
Variables
(O)
12
12
8
12
7
8
6
8
8
8
4
7
1
6
5
6
6
8
7
12
8
6
9
3
11
9
1
8
9
9
6
5
3
6
5
3
2
0
2
11
3
5
11
0

Complexity
(C)
0
3
0.33
1
1
0
0.67
0.5
2
1
0
0.67
0.67
1
1
0.33
1
1
1.33
0.8
0.25
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.5
0.2
0.33
Infinity
0.5
0
0.4
Infinity
1
2
0.25
0.33
0.2
0
0.75
0.25
0.33
0
0
0.4

Table 8
Variable Rankings from Individual Participant Maps
Ranking Transmitter
Variables

Receiver
Variables

Ordinary
Variables

1

Consumer
demand
(n = 20)

Forced labor
slavery (n =
10)

Forced labor
slavery
(n = 34)

2

Regulatory
problems and
challenges
(n = 14)
Government
inaction
(n = 8)
Labor
shortages
(n = 7)

Profit
margins
(n = 8)

Fish stock
declines
(n = 27)

Wildlife
crimes
(n = 6)

Fishing effort
(n = 18)

5

Social
vulnerabilities
(n = 7)

Fishing
effort
(n = 3)

Overfishing
(n = 17)

6

Use of foreign
and migrant
workers, often
undocumented
(n = 7)
Racism
(n = 6)

Other
transnational
crime
(n = 3)

Profit margins
(n = 15)

3
4

7

Fishing costs IUU
(n = 6)
(n = 23)

Supply chain Fishing costs
complexity
(n = 13)
(n = 3)

Degree
Centrality
(Total)
Forced labor
slavery
(CD[VT] =
117.24)
IUU
(CD[VT] =
56.95)

Degree
Centrality
(Mean)
Forced labor
slavery
(CD[VMean] =
5.21)
Fishing costs
(CD[VMean] =
4.19)

Profit margins
(CD[VT] =
55.84)
Fish stock
declines
(CD[VT] =
55.82)
Regulatory
problems and
challenges
(CD[VT] =
45.14)
Fishing effort
(CD[VT] =
44.98)

IUU fishing
(CD[VMean] =
3.93)
Fishing effort
(CD[VMean] =
3.91)

Fishing costs
(CD[VT] = 41.9)

Fisheries
interventions
& regulatory
reforms
(CD[VMean] =
3.08)
Increased
fishing
capacity
(CD[VMean] =
2.64)
Presence of
transnational
criminal
syndicates

8

Fish stock
declines
(n = 5)

Regulatory
problems and
challenges
(n = 13)

Overfishing
(CD[VT] =
35.58)

9

Lack of
deterrents
(n = 5)

Race to fish
(n = 11)

Use of foreign
& migrant
workers, often
undocumented
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Fish stock
declines
(CD[VMean] =
3.38)
Power
differentials
(CD[VMean] =
3.24)

10

Xenophobia
(n = 5)

Use of foreign
and migrant
workers, often
undocumented
(n = 11)

(CD[VT] =
35.25)
Race to fish
(CD[VT] =
24.43)

(CD[VMean] =
2.58)
Profit margins
(CD[VMean] =
2.43)

According to univariate, one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) there were no
statistically significant differences in map structure (i.e., the mean number of vertices,
edges, transmitter, receiver, and ordinary variables and the mean density, connectedness,
and complexity) across participants regardless of organizational focus, education, and
race (Table 9). However, mean map density differed amongst years of experience (F(3,
38) = 3.87, p = .02) and age (F(3, 38) = 4.07, p = .01). Specific to years of experience,
Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances was significant (F(3, 40) = 10.11, p < .001), and
post hoc Dunnett’s T3 testing indicated a significant difference (p = .016) in mean
density between less than 10 years of experience (𝑥̅ = .66, s = .52) and 11-19 years of
experience (𝑥̅ = .14, s = .04). For age, homogeneity of variance was not assumed (F(4,
39) = 103.88, p < .001), and post hoc Dunnett’s T3 testing indicated a significant
difference (p = .04) in mean density between 40-49 years (𝑥̅ = .54, s = .49) and 60-69
years (𝑥̅ = .11, s = .03). Additionally, the mean number of vertices (F(3, 38) = 3.94, p =
.006) and edges (F(3, 38) = 4.13, p = .005) differed across region, and were the only
statistically significant findings after the application of the Bonferroni adjustment.
Regarding vertices, Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances was not significant (F(5, 38)
= 1.43, p < .24), and post hoc Tukey’s testing indicated a significant difference (p = .019)
in mean vertices between Africa (𝑥̅ = 7.33, s = 2.08) and North America (𝑥̅ = 15.0, s =
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2.65). Assuming homogeneity of variances, (F(5, 38) = 1.26, p = .30), post hoc Tukey’s
testing indicated a significant difference (p = .019) in mean edges between Southeast
Asia (𝑥̅ = 13.13, s = 4.66) and North America (𝑥̅ = 26.33, s = 6.11); a significant
difference (p = 0.2) between Africa (𝑥̅ = 9.33, s = 3.79) and North America (𝑥̅ = 26.33, s
= 6.11); and a significant difference (p = .023) between the Pacific (𝑥̅ = 9.67, s = 2.89)
and North America (𝑥̅ = 26.33, s = 6.11). Lastly, mean connectedness differed by years of
experience (F(3, 38) = 2.98, p = 0.4). Assuming equal variances (F(3, 40) = .38, p = .77,
post hoc Tukey’s testing indicated a statistically significant difference in mean
connectedness (p = 0.48) between 20-29 (𝑥̅ = 1.20, s = .28) and 30-39 (𝑥̅ = 1.56, s = .32)
years of experience.
For demographic variables with only two groups (i.e., gender and former
employment as a fisher), independent samples t-tests did not find statistically significant
differences in map structure (i.e., the mean number of vertices, edges, transmitter,
receiver, and ordinary variables and the mean density, connectedness, and complexity)
(Table 10). Whether the interview was recorded and interview modality were also
assessed. There were no statistically significant differences in map structure metrics
based on interview modality. However, statistical differences were noted in number of
map edges, connectedness, number of transmitter, receiver, and ordinary variables, and
complexity amongst participants that were recorded and not recorded (Table 10).
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Table 9
Univariate Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) Comparing Map Structure Across
Participants

Vertices
Edges
Density
Connectedness
Transmitter
variables
Receiver
variables
Ordinary
variables
Complexity

Organizational Region
focus
F = .82,
F = 3.94,
p = .49
p=
.006**
F = 1.52,
F = 4.13,
p = .23
p=
.005**
F = .25,
F = .55,
p = .86
p = .74

Years
experience
F = 2.03,
p = .13

Education

Age

Race

F = 1.15,
p = .34

F = .81,
p = .53

F = .99,
p = .38

F = 2.87,
p = .05

F = 1.76,
p = .17

F = .44,
p = .78

F = 1.32,
p = .28

F = 3.87,
p = .02*

F = 1.02,
p = .39

F = .55,
p = .58

F = 1.66,
p = .19
F = .55,
p = .65
F = .16,
p = .92
F = .40,
p = .75
F = .49,
p = .69

F = 2.98,
p = .04*
F = .17,
p = .92
F = 1.71,
p = .18
F = 2.52,
p = .07
F = .93,
p = .43

F = 2.30,
p = .09
F = .76,
p = .52
F = 2.55,
p = .07
F = 1.05,
p = .38
F = 2.66,
p = .06

F = 4.07,
p=
0.01*
F = .26,
p = .90
F = .43,
p = .78
F = .51,
p = .73
F = .64,
p = .64
F = .36,
p = .84

F = 1.85,
p = .13
F = 1.15,
p = .35
F = 1.41,
p = .24
F = 2.38,
p = .06
F = 1.08,
p = .39

F = 1.42,
p = .26
F = 1.25,
p = .30
F = .98,
p = .39
F = .90,
p = .42
F = 2.08,
p = .14

Note. For each F statistic, the between group degrees of freedom were three, and the
within group degrees of freedom were 38.
*p < .05
** p < .008 (Bonferroni correction)
Assuming equal variances across all pairwise comparisons5, participants that were
not recorded had a higher mean number of edges (𝑥̅ = 17.81, s = 7.59) and ordinary
variables (𝑥̅ = 7.57, s = 2.77) and higher mean connectedness (𝑥̅ = 1.51, s = .28) and
complexity (𝑥̅ = .84, s = .69) than participants who were recorded (i.e., edges (𝑥̅ = 13.17,
s = 6.12), ordinary variables (𝑥̅ = 5.52, s = 3.55), connectedness (𝑥̅ = 1.23, s = .24), and
complexity (𝑥̅ = .38, s = .44)). Participants who were recorded; however, had a higher
5

Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances: edges (F = .17, p = .68), ordinary variables (F
= .3.96, p = .055), connectedness (F = .26, p = .61), complexity (F = 2.31, p = .14), and
transmitter variables (F = 2.69, p = .11).
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mean number of transmitter variables (𝑥̅ = 3.26, s = 1.74) than participants who were not
recorded (𝑥̅ = 2.33, s = 1.11). Connectedness was the only finding that was statistically
significant after the application of the Bonferroni correction.
Table 10
Independent Samples t-Tests Comparing Map Structure Across Participants
Gender
Vertices

t(42) = -.90,
p = .37
Edges
t(42) = -.21,
p = .84
Density
t(36.7) =
1.41,
p = .17
Connectedness t(42) = .49,
p = .63
Transmitter
t(42) = -1.40,
variables
p = .17
Receiver
t(42) = .59,
variables
p = .56
Ordinary
t(42) = -.77,
variables
p = .44
Complexity
t(40) = 1.34,
p = .19

Former
employment
as fisher
t(42) = -.34,
p = .74
t(42) = -1.16,
p = .25
t(12.4) = -1.74,
p = .11

Interview
modality

Recording

t(42) = 1.35,
p = .18
t(42) = 1.48,
p = .15
t(42) = .77,
p = .98

t(42) = 1.10,
p = .28
t(42) = 2.24,
p = .05*
t(34.5) = 1.43,
p = .16

t(42) = -1.94,
p = .06
t(42) = .68,
p = .50
t(42) = .63,
p = .53
t(42) = -1.10,
p = .28
t(11.8) = -.66 ,
p = .52

t(42) = .75,
p = .46
t(28.2) = .61,
p = .55
t(42) = -.36,
p = .72
t(42) = 1.60,
p = .12
t(42) = .18,
p = .86

t(42) = 3.60,
p = .001**
t(37.7) = -2.13
p = .04*
t(42) = 1.54,
p = .13
t(37.1) = 2.13,
p = .04*
t(40) = 2.52,
p = .02*

* p ≤ .05
** p ≤ .01 (Bonferroni correction)
Map Aggregation
To simplify the quantitative aggregation of maps, additional coding occurred after
individual map analyses to further reduce the 53 map variables. As a result, market prices
for fish was collapsed into consumer demand, fishing costs was collapsed into profit
margins, capitalism and globalization were collapsed into race to fish and recharacterized as a global race to fish, presence of transnational criminal syndicates was
collapsed into other transnational crime, seafood certification schemes was collapsed into
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consumer disconnect, and xenophobia, racism, and nationalism were grouped together
and recoded as discrimination. This additional coding is further clarified in the codebook
(Appendix C). When variables were collapsed or re-characterized, vector multiplication
was used to determine the strength of the relationship between the now collapsed
variables and other system variables. Other variables, such as risk, were eliminated prior
to vector multiplication since they functioned more as pathway descriptors than distinct
variables.
The vector multiplication of each of the 44 participant maps’ adjacency matrices
yielded the aggregated consensus map represented in Figure 12 (aim one). Table 11 lists
the aggregated map’s structural metrics, derived from the quantification of each
relationships’ strength (aim two). Within the map, there were four transmitter variables
(global race to fish, political instability, geographic remoteness, and underdeveloped
economies) and two receiver variables (wildlife crimes and other transnational crime).
Excluding forced labor slavery, the outcome of interest, the five most central variables in
the map were profit margins, IUU fishing, regulatory problems and challenges,
overfishing, and fish stock declines (Table 12). Each of the transmitter most central
variables were evaluated as potential mediators and moderators of the relationship
between fish stock declines and forced labor slavery (aim three). A definition for each
variable used in the aggregated map is included in the study’s codebook in Appendix C.
Each pathway is also further explicated below using qualitative data from participant
interviews (aim one).
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Figure 12. Cumulative, Consensus Map

Figure 12. The overalls study’s cumulative and aggregated consensus map, produced in
the Mental Modeler software by using vector multiplication to combine the 44
participant’s individual adjacency matrices which corresponded to their individually
constructed models.
Table 11
Cumulative and Aggregated Consensus Map Structural Metrics
Vertices
(N)

Edges
(E)

Density
(D)

Connectedness
(C/N)

30

70

0.08

2.33

Transmitter
Variables
(T)
4

80

Receiver
Variables
(R)
2

Ordinary
Variables
(O)
24

Complexity
(C)
0.5

Table 12
Cumulative and Aggregated Consensus Map Variable Indices
Variable
Forced labor slavery
Profit margins
IUU fishing
Regulatory problems and
challenges
Overfishing
Fish stock declines
Fishing effort
Transshipment
Supply chain complexity
Discrimination
Fisheries interventions and
regulatory reforms
Marginalization of small-scale
fishers
Social vulnerabilities
Disposable vessels
Use of foreign and migrant
workers, often undocumented
Government inaction
Global race to fish
Consumer demand
Geographic remoteness
Monopolization of remoteness
Catch-per-unit effort
Subsidies
Increased fishing capacity
Fishing safety
Consumer disconnect
Labor shortages
Wildlife crimes
Political instability
Underdeveloped economy
Other transnational crime

Indegree
5.56
4.72
3.50
3.02

Outdegree
2.19
2.14
2.55
1.70

Centrality
7.75
6.86
6.05
4.72

Type
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary

3.86
2.30
1.22
1.34
1.22
0.33
0.47

0.72
1.50
2.50
2.28
1.89
2.61
2.25

4.58
3.8
3.72
3.62
3.11
2.94
2.72

Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary

1.00

1.69

2.69

Ordinary

1.84
1.11
0.33

0.39
1.11
1.81

2.23
2.22
2.14

Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary

0.89
0
0.50
0
0.69
0.67
0.25
0.42
0.75
0.31
0.33
0.64
0
0
0.19

1.11
1.94
1.09
1.58
0.81
0.61
0.83
0.61
0.11
0.50
0.33
0
0.39
0.22
0

2.00
1.94
1.59
1.58
1.50
1.28
1.08
1.03
0.86
0.81
0.66
0.64
0.39
0.22
0.19

Ordinary
Transmitter
Ordinary
Transmitter
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Receiver
Transmitter
Transmitter
Receiver
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Explication of the Consensus Map’s Social-Ecological System
Fish stock pressures. The first issue identified by participants, and supported by
existing empirical data was the decline of fish stocks in various territorial and
international waters globally. As noted by one participant who identified as a former or
current fisher, “Stocks are declining. Everyone knows that. Even people who are not
working in or with the sector know that. The problem is so pervasive that fish stocks is a
topic of conversation in elections, town hall meetings, etcetera.” Multiple participants
across differing regions also described the declines as “fast and extreme,” beginning
around 2010, and resulting in cumulative fish hauls for fishermen decreasing anywhere
from 30 to 75% in five years or less.
Per participants, both overfishing and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU)
fishing increased fish stock declines. Examples of IUU activities described by
participants included underreporting or not reporting catch; the use of environmentally
damaging methods that, in part, yielded high rates of bycatch; failure to obtain fishing
licenses; turning off or manipulating vessel tracking devices; and high-grading wherein
poorer quality fish already caught and likely dead were thrown overboard to
accommodate higher value fish. One of the drivers of IUU noted by participants was
political instability (e.g., civil war and disease outbreaks). For example, multiple
participants relayed an increase in IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea during the West
Africa Ebola outbreak because governments with already limited capacity to prevent IUU
had to reallocate funds to more emergent issues. Additionally, IUU fishing increased
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overfishing, because catch limit and quota calculations did not account for illegally
harvested fish—which could compromise as much as one-third of all landed fish.
Therefore, catch thresholds were based on an incorrect, lower cumulative haul which
likely overestimated the stock size, resulting in the legalized overexploitation of the stock
beyond sustainable levels. Participants also reported fishing in no-take areas (i.e., areas
where fishing activities have been banned to help stocks recover or to conserve declining
stocks).
However, not all overfishing (i.e., unsustainable fishing to such an extent that
stock depletions exceed replacement and recruitment causing the stock to decline) was
caused by illegal or unregulated activity. Regulatory problems and challenges increased
overfishing, subsequently increasing fish stock declines, which are a byproduct of
overfishing. Some participants even described current fisheries regulations as
“legalizing” overfishing because economic self-interests undermined national and
international cooperation creating differentiated, rather than common, fishing
responsibilities that exceed the capacity of shared or common waters. Consequently, this
“low degree of transboundary coordination and cooperation” resulted in
uncomprehensive, piecemeal regulations with too narrow of scopes and numerous
loopholes that left many overly exploitive fishing activities unregulated. This lack of
cooperation in implementing regulations then also carried over into a lack of
transboundary enforcement of regulations, particularly concerning IUU fishing, which
participants ubiquitously identified as a transnational issue. As a result, a lack of political
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will predicated on economic self-interests further eroded international coordination and
cooperation.
Economic consequences of fish stock declines. During the mapping activity,
participants described fishing as becoming “more difficult and more expensive,”
explicating a chain reaction where fish stock declines decreased catch-per-unit-effort, and
the fishing sector responding with increased fishing effort (e.g., fishing farther, longer, or
deeper, deploying nets more frequently, and using fishing gear more indiscriminately).
The increased fishing effort decreased profit margins. As one participant described:
When stocks decline, catches decline. When catches decline, profits decline
because they are spending the same effort or more effort, which is going to cost
even more, but have less product to sell, or the quality of the product has
diminished because the fish are smaller, which means they are going to get less
money for that fish.
This increased effort then increased overfishing:
Overfishing causes catches to decline, but it’s a vicious cycle because as catches
decline you have more effort to still maintain your catches, so as catches decline
overfishing increases. And this type of overfishing is even more dangerous,
because you are more likely to be catching, smaller, younger fish which will first,
make it harder for the stock to reproduce and maintain its population, and second,
which will generate less profit.
Drivers of overfishing. Despite the narrowing profit margins, participants
described two main mechanisms perpetuating overfishing. Foremost, primarily in
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developed countries, consumer demand increased overfishing. Participants explained that
the increased consumer demand was a more recent phenomenon and driven by the
portrayal of seafood’s wholesomeness (e.g., its health benefits and that it is more humane
than other animal protein sources), relative inexpensiveness, and product diversity.
Unlike other agricultural activities, when demand increased overfishing and fishing
effort, profits decreased because “at some point the total cost needed to sustain the
activity exceeds the revenue earned from the product because you are not growing your
product, you are exploiting a naturally occurring resource.” As a result, one participant
noted:
Consumers have a degree of responsibility for overfishing because we leverage
power over the price of the product. We want cheaper and cheaper seafood
delivered en masse, and the price we are willing to pay for it is not reflective of
the true cost of labor production, but because of the diversity of choices, we as
consumers can keep the cost low, and our disconnect from how fish get from the
ocean to our plates—that is we can’t see the activity like we see, say farming—
increases our consumer demands while helping us ignore the true cost of
production.
Another participant, who identified as a former or current fisher, also added:
It feels like the fishing industry is just out of options. No one knows what to do. If
we try and raise the cost of a fish, consumers just won’t buy it. So then we are
forced to lower the price again. And now there are even more types of fish that
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people are eating. And of course, environmentalists and their organizations are
wanting people to eat all different types of fish that are more sustainable. Which
makes sense, but no one is considering the consequences of these actions on those
of us in the industry. Eating other types of fish may lead to importing more fish,
which further burdens our local industry by reducing our profits even more.
Participants also described a series of cause and effects that started with consumer
demand and ended with IUU fishing. While they described commercial demand for fish
as expanding throughout the sector, the demand was greatest for cheap fish, which when
coupled with product diversity, kept consumer costs down. However, “the market still
demands consistent quality and size so you have to fish farther and deeper, dump your
catches, and fish illegally.” The illegally caught fish then “flooded the market with cheap
product” perpetuating a cycle wherein “some fish prices, like canned tuna, haven’t
changed in over 30 years.” Therefore, IUU was labeled as a financially motivated
response, and “an effort to maximize profits.”
In developing countries, consumer demand also existed, driven by growing
populations and a lack of alternative food sources. However, most participants described
overfishing in developing countries’ territorial waters being caused by either IUU or
“legal” overfishing through “licensing schemes.” Most of these developing countries had
small and underdeveloped economies, which disproportionately relied on fishing to
support impoverished populations. Lacking the infrastructure to store and transport fish
within the country though, selling fishing licenses to foreign countries was “a substantial
and much-needed source of income to support development.” As a result, these licensing
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schemes created an increased fishing capacity, where “too many boats are fishing for too
few fish,” thus increasing overfishing.
These two mechanisms intersected when fish consumption in primarily the United
States, the European Union countries, and China became too great and grew too fast. This
increased consumer demand led vessels that had already overexploited their own stocks
in their territorial waters to look for new areas to fish, which is when developing
countries’ territorial waters became a target. Participants described these waters as
historically resource rich and less exploited since the local communities lacked the
capacity. The arrival of foreign fleets thus increased fishing capacity to the point of
overfishing. As articulated by participants:
In a lot of developed countries where there is high demand for cheap seafood, the
coastal waters do not have productive enough fisheries to satisfy demand anymore
because they’ve already been overfished, so then these countries’ fishing fleets go
fish in other, poorer, countries’ territorial waters.

You also have huge power differences between these developed and developing
countries. The vessels’ countries are rich and powerful, and these poorer countries
are still developing their economies and many are extremely desperate so they
will take the money being offered for licenses regardless of environmental
regulations. There are lots of agreements about fishing licenses that happen in
secrecy. But the amount of money these developed countries, primarily western
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countries and China offer, it’s a lucrative cash source for these very poor
countries.
The race to fish—defined by participants as a profit-driven fishing motivation,
versus tradition or subsistence, that is rooted in capitalism and that creates extreme global
competition for scare fish resources—also increased fish stock declines and IUU fishing,
and was identified by participants as the reason that the fishing industry often increased
effort instead of reducing capacity when stocks declined. Not only did the race to fish
perpetuate overfishing, but participants also linked it to the power differentials and
exploitation described between developed and developing countries. The race to fish
compounded increases in IUU fishing caused by regulatory problems and challenges,
because countries such as China and Thailand “preyed upon” the poorest of developing
countries’ waters because they “knew that they were out of reach of authorities and that
the developing countries lacked the capacity to enforce their own environmental
regulations, thus reducing their risk.”
Forced labor slavery as a response to decreasing profits. When fish stocks
declined and effort increased, reducing profit margins, owners of fishing companies and
captains of fishing vessels sought ways to cut costs and increase profits. IUU fishing was
one such strategy, which is why participants noted that decreased profit margins
increased IUU fishing. Per participants, this is also why decreased profit margins
increased forced labor slavery—because “cutting labor costs is an attempt to protect
profits.” Overall there was a lack of control over production, and few fixed costs. “Unlike
other agricultural activities, there is no investment in the commodity itself—the fish.”
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And one of the only other competitive advantages would be investment in new
technologies and equipment. However, most participants reported that in comparison to
using forced labor, technology was perceived as an expensive, long-term investment;
whereas, using forced labor slavery was a quick and inexpensive solution. Further,
fishing operations in general were described as labor-intensive, with crew wages typically
the largest cost—constituting 40-50% of operating costs when paid fairly. The use of
forced labor slavery then increased profit margins, reinforcing the use of forced labor to
offset increasing costs. As detailed by a participant identifying as a former or current
fisher:
When fishing effort increases, your costs also increase, which leads to more labor
abuses such as withheld wages. All of the other stuff like the shootings and the
beatings is to keep power over them so they can continue to withhold wages. So
then when your abuses increase, your cost-per-unit of effort decreases, which
means you are reducing your cost pressures which are threatening your profit.
The multitude of labor abuses detailed by participants included: misleading contracts;
bonded debt; wage theft; a lack of overtime pay; payments amounting to less than
minimum wage; dangerous working conditions and a lack of safety equipment; threats to
report to immigration officials; no access to healthcare after suffering injuries or illness
spurred by working conditions; at sea for years at a time and contact with family
forbidden; inadequate housing on the vessel including living quarters that lacked
electricity and sanitation consistent with humanitarian standards; unfree to leave boat
when docked; food and water withheld; immigration and employment papers confiscated,
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imprisoned in cages and other sub-humanitarian apparatuses; tricked onto vessel;
kidnapped; working for more than 24 hours without sleep and other forms of extreme
sleep deprivation; threats to family; forced use of drugs (i.e., amphetamines to stay awake
and work all night); false promises and a failure to honor commitments in contract; and
murder.
Related cost-cutting measures. Of the other strategies participants described as
being employed to offset decreasing revenue and increasing costs, many were related to
forced labor slavery. For example, participants disclosed that IUU fishing and decreasing
profit margins decreased safety and that subsequently decreased safety increased forced
labor slavery, with participants characterizing disregard for crew safety as a precursor to
more egregious labor abuses.
When the vessels are generating less profits, they have less money to invest in
maintenance and repairs and safety equipment, which contributes to the unsafe
and inhumane working conditions that constitute forced labor.
Transshipment, when fishing vessels tie up to reefer or mother ships in the middle
of the ocean to refuel and unload fish catch to prevent coming to port for supplies or
catch unloading, was also described as increasing profit margins because it reduced fuel
costs and the time needed to traverse between open, international waters and shore. While
purportedly posited by some in the sector as a strategy for improving fishing efficiency,
participants suggested that it increased IUU because it allowed legally caught fish to be
“mixed” with illegally-caught fish rendering traceability impossible, and decreasing the
risk of getting caught illegally fishing. It also increased forced labor slavery because crew
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were being traded at sea to other vessels without their consent, keeping some crew
members at sea for up to a decade. By keeping crew at sea, hidden from authorities and
assistive services, users of forced labor slavery again reduced their risk of being caught.
Disposable vessels were also identified as increasing profit margins (because they
reduced costs) and increased forced labor slavery. IUU fishing also increased the use of
disposable vessels. As summarized by a participant:
One reason that both IUU and forced labor slavery are appealing as ways to
reduce costs, are that because even though these illegal activities are already low
risk of getting caught because of regulatory challenges, they essentially become
even less risk, or minimal, or zero risk because they will often use old vessels that
are poorly maintained and lack more advanced technology. These vessels are
cheaper up front, already reducing costs, but they are then essentially disposable.
They lack safety equipment, etc. Anything that would drive up the cost, it would
lack, because the idea is that you want this boat and equipment to be disposable
should you get caught illegally fishing or using illegal labor, or both. And they do.
They do abandon boats. They even abandon boats with crew on them. And of
course the crew was forced labor, because again to lower your risk you don’t want
to invest money into crew just like you don’t want to invest in technology. Your
crew also needs to be disposable.
Indeed, six out of 44 (13.6%) participants had direct contact with forced labor slavery
victims that had been stranded at sea when the captain abandoned the vessel either after
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getting caught illegally fishing or using forced labor slavery, or was under the imminent
threat of getting caught.
One of the most prevalent tactics expressed by participants for decreasing costs
within the industry was the use of foreign and migrant laborers, often undocumented, as
crew members. In delineating how migrant workers increased profit margins, one
participant recounted:
They can pay them [migrant workers] less money than others, and they are
typically willing to stay in these jobs for several years because they have no other
alternative employment opportunities.
And while using migrant labor may be so ubiquitous that it no longer supplies a
competitive advantage, “using local labor is perceived as making you less competitive in
the global market—especially for large corporations—because you have to pay them
higher wages.” Compounding this issue was what some participants described as a more
readily available and mobile supply of migrant workers, whose mere “presence [in the
sector] discouraged them [companies and boat owners and captains] from investing in
technological solutions to increase labor productivity and efficiency as a means of
reducing costs and/or increasing revenues.”
Participants also outlined a series of events wherein government subsidies
increased profit margins by lowering fishing costs and thus “delaying the tipping point of
when fishing becomes unprofitable.” And the reason why subsidies were even being used
was because of the “race to fish:”
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Now you have this unprecedented international competition in the race to fish,
that was really caused by all these countries overfishing their own waters. But
because the fuel and just getting to these international waters are so expensive,
subsidies are one of the only reasons they can afford to fish in these waters. But
these subsidies are just delaying the inevitable, which is why you still have the
use of other cost-cutting measures such as the use of forced labor.
Axes of structural inequalities. While all the aforementioned measures, including
forced labor slavery were rationalized as economically justifiable actions in a
competitive, globalized industry, participants also detailed various systemic structures
supporting this rationalization. For example, when fishing effort increased, labor
shortages also increased.
With just regular effort, fishing is already one of the most labor intensive, hardest,
jobs there is, and one of the most dangerous. Everyone knows this. No one wants
these jobs. But then when fishing effort increases because of dwindling stocks,
fishing becomes an even less desirable job. Which means you can’t find laborers
who voluntarily want to enter the fishing workforce. So you have an increased
demand for labor because you need more crew to fish the longer distances, the
longer hours, to cast the nets more, but you have a dwindling pool of laborers. So
you have to get them any way you can, which often means trafficking them or
tricking them onto the boat, and then you get the abuses.
Labor shortages then increased the use of foreign and migrant laborers, often
undocumented.
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Most crew are foreign (either immigrants or undocumented migrants). Low
unemployment rates in the ports [of developed countries] means that even lowskilled workers can bypass fishing crew jobs. The only ones who cannot are often
the undocumented migrants or a few immigrants… because of barriers they
cannot obtain better employment. They take the jobs that no one else will take…
Most citizens, non-migrant, non-immigrants don’t want this kind of job because
working conditions are unsafe, hazardous, and very difficult and the pay is low.
Regardless of whether they identified a link between fish stock declines and forced labor
slavery, all 20 participants, whose organizational focus was either labor and human rights
or immigration and migration included the use of foreign and migrant laborers, often
undocumented, increasing forced labor slavery in their concept maps, and reiterated that
the empirical data has long supported irregular migration as one of the primary risk
factors for the use of forced labor slavery in the fishing industry, as it creates a vulnerable
supply of laborers in sectors where “inequities between race and citizenship status
maintain long-existing power hierarchies.” This finding was also consistent across all
regional foci.
With increased globalization we are seeing more migration than ever before,
including more irregular migration. But nationalistic, isolation policies are
making migration more difficult, so now you have larger, irregular (often
undocumented) migration flows so you have a ready and easily exploitable supply
of victims.
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These participants expanded upon this relationship, describing how the use of
foreign and migrant workers, often undocumented, increased discrimination from
nationalism, racism, and xenophobia—with these laborers perceived as “stealing jobs”
despite most citizens not wanting to work in the fishing sector. This discrimination in
turn increased forced labor slavery because it made labor abuses against foreign, migrant,
and undocumented workers not only economically justified but also “socially acceptable
so you see a lack of shame on part of the perpetrators.”
But the [labor] abuses stem from racism. Racism and xenophobia is the bubble
that this relationship [fish stock declines and slavery] should be nested in.

Labor abuses are socially acceptable because there is such a poor opinion, like
hostilities and racism towards migrants and immigrants. This isn’t just in
Thailand. It’s any country that is wealthier than the countries where their migrant
labor force comes from—which is most. You see it in the US and the EU and UK
too. So we supposedly want to help victims, but first and foremost we want to
criminalize “illegal” working through detention, deportation etc. And because of
misrepresentations of modern slavery in the media, most people in these more
developed or developed countries think that “illegal” or undocumented work is a
much bigger issue than forced labor or slavery so that gets priority.
Additionally, political instability and discrimination increased social vulnerabilities,
defined by participants as the inability of people to withstand adverse impacts from
multiple stressors (e.g., exclusionary attitudes that impact employment opportunities).
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These impacts are due in part to discriminatory characteristics inherent in social
interactions, institutions, and cultural values. But foremost, political instabilities were
portrayed as a frequent impetus for migration, but then being a migrant increased a
person’s social vulnerability because of discrimination. Examples of social vulnerabilities
that increased migrant worker’s risk for exploitation included high rates of poverty and
unemployment, language barriers, education disparities and low literacy rates, and a lack
of support systems. This discrimination also increased government inaction, which
participants defined as “complicit regulatory bodies” hampered by “pervasive corruption”
wherein officials are “paid to look the other way and not ask questions because of the
powerful, vested interests that benefit from the trade” and/or “complacency.” In a domino
effect, the government inaction then increased regulatory problems and challenges for
curbing the use of forced labor slavery because it resulted in a lack of initiative to address
regulatory failures and loopholes. As a result, this government inaction increased the use
of forced labor slavery (versus other cost-cutting measures) because it lowered the risks
associated with using forced labor slavery.
The antipathy towards migrants from neighboring states means there are fewer
social inhibitions about treating migrant laborers poorly, which also means that
most, including government officials, police, immigration authorities, etc. fail to
see anything criminally, culturally, or socially wrong with the use of forced labor
as a means of increasing profit.
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You have people—company owners, captains—who just won’t follow the rules
and there are no repercussion for them because governments are complicit. So
they just don’t follow the rules. Take for example new regulations requiring bankto-bank transfers for fishermen’s wages. Oh, but these rules aren’t enforced
because of the inequalities created by racism—so these poor fishermen can’t
access bank services. So then there is still the presence of a middleman or
recruiter or agent who is going to supposedly do the bank-to-bank to transfer.

Forced labor is the go-to cost saving strategy because it is VERY low risk. All of
these social vulnerabilities lack language barriers, legal challenges like the high
cost of legal assistance and legal status issues if the victim is undocumented, and
just all the discriminatory attitudes. These factors all add up to make forced labor
a surprisingly low-risk activity.
As a result, while the use of foreign and migrant laborers, often undocumented,
discrimination, social vulnerabilities, government inaction, and regulatory problems and
challenges were all individually risk factors for forced labor slavery, participants
described their convergence in the fishing industry to create a supply of extremely
vulnerable laborers to meet the demand for cheap labor created by the overfishinginduced fish stock declines.
Regulatory problems and challenges. Already described in various pathways
and relationships, such as regulatory problems and challenges increased overfishing and
disposable vessels, and discrimination increased regulatory problems and challenges,
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participants outlined a litany of issues with environmental, human rights, and labor
regulations. Foremost, participants characterized regulations as siloed in that each
problem was governed by its own policies that were not concerned with or intersected
with policies and regulations from interrelated issues. For example, fisheries authorities
may board a vessel to investigate for IUU fishing, but would likely not assess or question
the crew concerning labor conditions, because despite the co-occurrence of these
problems, “most governments consider IUU to only be an environmental crime.” As a
result, “segregated inspections create an environment for illegal activities to flourish. We
need to look at safety, labor, and environmental practices together, not separately.”
Additionally, there were many stages in the recruitment process from when a worker was
recruited to work on the vessel to the actual abuse, and each of these steps were regulated
by different laws. And laws could also differ in some countries based on the vessel size.
This bureaucracy and lack of interconnected policies thus created regulatory loopholes
that were easily exploited by perpetrators.
Similarly, participants chronicled isolated regulatory practices between local,
regional, and international institutions and governing bodies. On a more micro level,
participants recounted cases where a lack of cooperation existed amongst relevant
agencies and departments (again divided by and hyper focused on specific issues), and on
a more macro level, cooperation between countries and all relevant regional and
international bodies was also characterized as lacking. As a result, participants described
a “distribution of competence” and a “diffusion of responsibility” in which it was unclear
which agency or country should take the lead, and a lack of data and information sharing
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between actors. Flags of convenience was the problem most cited by participants as
exemplifying these issues. Some participants also depicted how this lack of coordination
resulted in a displacement of the problem versus a real solution.
These problems happen both in and out of the EEZs. Sometimes one country will
implement a new regulation, and it may have some success, but in reality you
have to look at the regional picture, because it likely just displaced the problem to
another area or another country’s waters.
Problems with cooperation and enforcement exacerbating one another were
detailed when participants discussed such international regulations as the Port State
Measures. In the case of the Port State Measures, intended to reduce IUU fishing, it has
yet to be universally adopted. As of March 1st, 2018, it was ratified by just 52 countries.
Participants cautioned that when such measures have not been universally adopted, the
potential exists to displace the problem instead of solve or address the problem’s root
causes.
It is possible that the Port State Measures will create ports of convenience similar
to flags of convenience. Though it has now finally entered into force, not every
country with a port is party to the agreement. We already see the use of these
ports of convenience and I suspect this practice will increase and vessels engaging
in IUU will use these ports of convenience that are in countries that are not part of
the agreement. There is no incentive not too. And to get all countries to agree to
the measure you would likely have to dilute its regulations to such an extent that
the measure would be futile.
99

Even if the political will existed to develop intersectional regulations, local or
regional authorities, particularly in developing countries, would likely lack the capacity
to enforce such progressive measures. For example, in the scenario detailed earlier, where
authorities may be investigating IUU fishing, the vessel’s crew would likely be
comprised of foreign or migrant laborers. Consequently, local or regional authorities may
lack the ability to communicate with crew members based on language differences. This
lack of capacity was evident in other scenarios recounted by participants, and led to a
lack of enforcement of regulations and/or weak monitoring of compliance with
regulations. In particular, geographic remoteness increased regulatory problems and
challenges because the spatial vastness and distance of fishing fleets was either too
expensive or technologically unfeasible for monitoring, enforcement, and inspections,
and thus allowed perpetrators to evade regulatory bodies.
Moreover, when monitoring and enforcement were effective or successful in
catching a perpetrator, the penalties for violating regulations were too minimal to deter
the behavior. In some countries, participants described the fines for illegal fishing to be as
low as a couple of hundred dollars, or that officials could be bribed for even less money
than the fine would have been because officials were so poor, and this poverty led to their
corruption. And in countries where the fines were higher, or there could be the risk of
arrest and detention, there was an increased use of the disposable vessels previously
described that could ultimately be abandoned.

100

The other problem is that the risk of getting caught is actually a fairly minimal
risk. They know how to exploit legal loopholes and gaps so the most that happens
to them is that the boat may be confiscated and/or they may be fined.
And in many instances where there were concerns of labor abuses, participants
recounted crews being aided in obtaining a “nominal fraction” of lost wages and
repatriated back to their country of origin, despite most of the human rights field
advocating for criminal prosecution of perpetrators. Similarly, participants delineated
numerous challenges to prosecution including most governments wanting to treat
immigration, migration, labor conditions, and environmental crimes as separate issues.
Because of the “criminalization of migration” stemming from “creeping global
nationalism,” participants reported that in most countries if the victims were
undocumented immigrants or migrants, they would “be punished for immigration
violations first and foremost.” Reinforcing this lack of deterrents, victims were also
purportedly “afraid to come forward and report labor abuses if they were engaged in IUU
because they were fearful of being prosecuted or fined for IUU” which often took
precedent over the labor concerns. Other barriers to using prosecution as a meaningful
deterrent included the number of jurisdictions because of the number of stages in the
recruitment process and supply chain already described, and that in most countries, labor
abuses were interpreted as employment not criminal matters. This interpretation often
resulted in cases being sent to civil courts not criminal courts, placing the burden of proof
on victims.
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Pursuing legal action often places the burden on the victim. There are huge
language barriers, lack of legal services, and it can be costly for victims because
they may need to stay in the country where they were victimized, but if they were
already here undocumented, then they can’t work and they already likely just
worked without wages, so earning income is their highest priority.
Further, when both IUU and forced labor cases were sent to criminal courts, participants
noted the “threshold for what constitutes hard evidence is really high.” This high
threshold then became unrealistic and was further compounded by a lack of hard
evidence because many captains and boat owners did not keep log books or they falsified
them. And when circumstantial evidence was admitted, most cases ended in an acquittal
of the perpetrator because discrimination against foreigners resulted in owners and
captains being, “more credible than complaining migrants.”
But when we find victims, because they are foreigners, they are treated first and
foremost like criminals by immigration officers. It is very hard for us to get them
services because of this. And I think this plays off the long history of racism in
this country. Prosecution is out of the question. Often the men have no evidence
but each other. There are language barriers. The crews we see are often mixed,
and the captain fosters racism and animosity between them, so they will not help
each other. And the victims are given contracts that say all of these abuses are
permissible. So the victims lack evidence. But it is forced labor because these
men were exploited.
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As a result, the consequences for illegal fishing and/or the use of forced labor,
compounded by the lack of monitoring and enforcement failed to provide meaningful
deterrents that increased the risk associated with these illegal activities. Thus,
perpetrators of both environmental and labor crimes frequently changed their vessel
name, registration, flag country, and disabled their automatic identification system to
subvert regulations with “no fear of the law.”
All these countries can really do is fine them, and fines are not a deterrent. IUU,
trafficking, these are economically rational decisions for these boat owners and
captains. The risk is worth the reward.
Furthermore, as previously detailed, discrimination increased regulatory problems
and challenges in that labor issues were not a priority for officials because victims of
forced labor slavery were not citizens. Magnifying this relationship were reports that
most countries’ labor laws do not apply to persons who are not citizens and do not step
foot on land. Therefore, these regulatory problems and challenges increased
transshipment since transshipment kept victims at sea, and thus uncovered by labor
protections. And transshipment itself was not an illegal activity. As a result, some
participants depicted these regulations as legitimizing exploitation.
Laws prevent them [victims] for getting help, or from leaving the situation. There
are currently loopholes in most developed countries’ laws, so the country where
they are docked, is not responsible for human rights violations against foreign
workers. 9/11 was also a factor. After that, countries wanting to trade with the US
had to increase security. For example, putting up fencing around a port. That
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keeps the fishermen out and isolates them from getting help. And with the more
recent crackdowns on immigration, and isolationism it is even worse. In many
countries immigration and border control authorities refuse every fisherman’s
landing permit so they are not allowed to set foot on soil, and instead are kept on
vessels. And if fisheries inspectors board the vessel, they are not responsible for
checking on crew welfare. Not only does this limit any opportunities a fisherman
may have to report bad conditions and make complaints, but it also means that the
fishermen are not protected by that country’s labor laws despite being in that
country’s waters. And if a captain has confiscated the victim’s papers [i.e.,
passport] the situation is even more dire. It is legal impunity.
Other regulatory problems and challenges outlined by participants included
lobbying efforts by the tuna industry in developed countries, particularly the United
States, that influenced the creation (or absence thereof) of cooperative fishing
regulations. And some participants from North America and Europe portrayed newer
regulations as institutionalizing labor exploitation.
There is also a legislative loophole that allows Hawaiian fleets to employ men
from impoverished Southeast Asian and Pacific countries for a fraction of the cost
they would have to pay American workers. It is a law that grants fishing licenses.
So this law encourages fishing vessel captains to use foreign labor because it is
cheaper and it allows them to pay foreign crew below minimum wage, but the
same law prevents these fishermen from leaving the vessels. It legitimizes the
exploitation of migrant workers.
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Supply chain complexities. Participants portrayed the seafood supply chain as
one of the most complex of any commodity due to the sheer number of steps in the chain,
the number of times fish are aggregated, the geographic coverage (labeled as geographic
remoteness increased supply chain complexity), and the length of time (seafood can
remain in the chain for up to one year) from when a fish was harvested from the ocean to
when it appeared on a plate. As such, participants reported this supply chain complexity
increased consumer disconnect in that it was difficult for consumers to know if their fish
products were ethically sourced and sustainably fished. In developed countries,
consumers often relied on seafood certification schemes to better educate themselves and
make informed choices as consumers; however, a recent inundation of these schemes into
markets resulted in a lack of transparency and consistency that threatened their quality
and their ability to appropriately inform consumer choices. Additionally, the consumer
preference in developed countries to eat just fish filets made the chain more complex as
whole fish were easier to trace and harder to fraudulently label. Due to the overwhelming
nature of this supply chain complexity, government inaction also increased. Because
transshipment mixed legally and illegally caught fish out of sight of authorities, it
increased supply chain complexity by hindering traceability initiatives, which then
increased forced labor slavery (depicted on the consensus map as supply chain
complexity increased forced labor slavery). Lastly, due to the aforementioned barriers to
cooperation between agencies and departments and countries and regional and
international bodies, supply chain complexity also increased regulatory problems and

105

challenges since each step of the chain was likely to occur in a different geographic
location.
But of course traceability in such a large, globalized supply chain is incredibly
hard. The more steps you have, and the more places that those steps happen in, the
harder traceability becomes. Countries are not going to pay the costs of using
improved technology for surveillance, particularly poorer countries. Thus the
private companies are going to have do that. And because consumers are so
disconnected from the seafood they eat, the pressure from consumers is just not
there yet to make the private companies invest in this technology.
Fisheries interventions and regulatory reforms. Participants delineated two
primary regulatory interventions—the implementation of marine protected areas (MPAs)
and catch shares/quota systems—in response to declining stocks, overfishing, and IUU
fishing (depicted as fish stock declines increase fishery interventions and regulatory
reforms). Marine protected areas are swaths of the ocean with defined boundaries, that
are designated as protected akin to a terrestrial protected area or national park. MPAs
differ considerably in regards to their restrictions (no, limited, or highly regulated fishing,
harvesting, boating, and tourism activities), enforcement, and size, and are more likely to
be located in territorial waters versus the high seas. Catch shares or catch quotas are a
managerial regulation in which the total catch limit for the year is established, and then
each licensed fisherman and/or vessel is granted a percentage or portion of the
established total allowable catch, typically through a fishing license.
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While typically lauded by environmentalists and ocean conservationists, eight
(25%) of the 32 participants who linked fish stock declines and forced labor slavery also
reported fisheries interventions and regulatory reforms increased forced labor slavery.
Though there are tensions resulting from a conflict of interests between regulating
authorities and fishing communities about policies and interventions, only two of the
eight participants who identified this relationship were current or former fishers. Overall,
participants characterized some environmental policy interventions to reduce overfishing
as not considering the social justice and human dimensions of the problem and proposed
solution, particularly in non-coastal waters.
In particular, participants suggested MPAs lacking enforcement mechanisms
increased the problem of forced labor slavery on fishing vessels because they created
areas of more abundant fish stocks while simultaneously expelling legal fishers who may
informally police an area against illegal activities.
Protected areas are difficult to enforce. And most law abiding boats will stay out
of the area, so now you don’t have that natural accountability within the fishing
community. You don’t have the presence of these other boats to deter or report
illegal activities. And then boats illegally fishing target these reserves because
they know that fish are more abundant in these areas, and enforcement is almost
non-existent.
As a result, MPAs reduced the risk of detection when using forced labor slavery while
increasing the reward—more fish for a greater profit—with one participant reporting,
“the probability of being detected using forced labor in a MPA is near zero. If you are
107

most likely to see forced labor with high profits and low risk of detection, bingo! That’s a
MPA.” These participants also posited that increased forced labor slavery as a response to
MPA implementation was most likely to occur when MPAs were “haphazardly
implemented in a kneejerk response to drastic declines, public outcry, or intense scientific
pressure.”
A lot of them were implemented too quickly and as a result are poorly
implemented and not really enforced. Their initial goal was to protect the
ecosystem and the fish, but I don’t think they considered the socioeconomic
consequences on fishermen and fishing companies at all. So now you have
negative outcomes for both the fish and the fishermen. To be honest, they have
done more bad than good.

There was a rush to create MPAs because of the Sustainable Development Goals.
But most of these MPAs lack enforcement because either that wasn’t part of their
implementation, or they were established in areas that lack the capacity to enforce
them and there were no assistance funds disseminated to help with enforcement
capacity. Without the enforcement, the low risk of using forced labor in general is
now even riskier.
Alternatively, where MPAs had some enforcement mechanisms, their existence
increased fishing effort (e.g., fishing longer, farther, and deeper to circumvent the
protected area), thus increasing costs and decreasing profit margins and further justifying
the use of forced labor slavery as an economically rational decision to maximize profits
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even on “legal” and registered vessels. This increased effort and cost also marginalized
small-scale fishing operations. For vessels and companies that did not resort to using
forced labor slavery as a cost-cutting measure, many became financially overwhelmed
and left the sector, consolidating power and capital in industrial operations more prone to
using forced labor.
Similarly, catch shares implemented “haphazardly without careful consideration
of the socio-economic consequences” (i.e., those lacking measures to prevent quota
accumulation) were also detailed as increasing the marginalization of small-scale
fisheries in that “they crippled the profitability of the sector by making fishing more
expensive.” As chronicled by participants, because distributed quotas or shares were
based on historical landings, small-scale fishermen were not given a large enough share
to make their fishing effort profitable. Also, other measures, such as the use of observers
on board vessels to ensure compliance with regulations, resulted in additional expenses
incurred by the vessel owner and/or fishing captain (i.e., fisheries interventions and
regulatory reforms decreased profit margins). Further, some participants viewed the
system as rewarding illegal behavior, by giving larger shares to fishermen and companies
that had inflated their previous landings with illegal catch. Then when fishing was no
longer profitable for small-scale fishers, they sold their quotas to larger competitors who
had previously used illegal activity to gain a competitive advantage and were now
rewarded with a “monopolization of the market” (described on the map as
marginalization of small-scale fishers increases monopolization of resources) because
there were no appropriate consolidation caps to prevent the accumulation of shares.
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So what happened was that it [catch share system] essentially privatized open
access fisheries. The small-scale fishermen had no choice but to sell their sliver of
quotas to larger competitors, because they could not catch enough fish under their
quotas to make a profit. More medium-scale commercial fishers “rented” quotas
from larger-scale commercial fishers who leased out their quotas. So if you are
talking about labor and slavery issues, I would say it was comparably to
sharecropping. They basically pay these exorbitant fees/rents just for the right to
do the work, that is often the only work they know how to do.
The result of these systems was the consolidation, concentration, and accumulation of
power and capital in the hands of a few “sea lords” at the expense of many small-scale
fishers. Of note, the implementation of ineffective fisheries interventions and regulatory
reforms was not the only driver of this marginalization. Fish stock declines and IUU
fishing, which was perceived as providing a competitive advantage, also increased the
marginalization of small-scale fishers.
Stock declines wipe out small-scale fishing operations in general because these
guys have really small profit windows to begin with, and it doesn’t take much to
collapse it and for them to end up losing money. This results in further
consolidation of power. It is like get big or get out. And they lack the capacity to
get bigger, so they get out, and the then you have the corporate takeover of
fisheries.
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Most of the vessels that were lost during the rapid stock declines were small-scale
commercial fishing vessels. The number of boats just declined because fishing
was no longer economically viable. In a three-year span, the average cost of a trip
doubled.
Once this marginalization of small-scale operations caused fishers to exit the
industry, participants relayed multiple chain reactions. First, marginalization increased
IUU fishing in that those that did not fold their operations were more likely to illegally
fish by catching more fish or different fish than their share allowed, or high grading their
fish amongst other illegal activities. Marginalization also increased other transnational
crimes and wildlife crimes because collapsed small-scale fishers still possessed boats that
were not being used. Therefore, participants shared reports of former fishers getting paid
by transnational criminal syndicates to use their boats to smuggle and traffick people,
drugs, and illegal wildlife across maritime borders because “they have this resource [the
boat], and see it [smuggling] as the only opportunity to earn income with this resource
they likely accrued debt for.”
For transnational criminal syndicates, fishing vessels are ideal receptacles for all
kinds of illegal activity because they are so poorly regulated, and when they are
regulated there is limited enforcement. Add onto that, the crippling of the sector
from fish stock declines, stagnant market prices of fish, and increasingly
expensive regulatory reforms you end up with hundreds of small-scale fishermen
needing to use their boats, which they likely still have debt on, to generate an
income.
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This desperation to generate income by any means was also highlighted by participants
describing the monopolization of resources that resulted from marginalization as
increasing social vulnerabilities, particularly poverty and unemployment, that are then
risk factors for becoming a victim of forced labor slavery. “This elimination of smallscale operations is often in places that are already socio-economically depressed, so you
have really desperate people.”
So now you have fewer fish, increasing competition, and a consolidation of power
because quotas are being purchased by the same foreign companies and pushing
small-scale operations in poorer countries out. So quotas initially based on
history, but if a later generation cannot use it or sells it out of desperation because
they were too small to be profitable because of the fish stock issues, it’s almost
impossible for them to ever get it back. And these foreign countries prey on these
small-scale fishermen knowing they are desperate for the cash. In response, some
countries have made laws that so many crew members have to be local, to give
locals, especially small-scale fishermen squeezed out, work. But they become
vulnerable because [they] don’t speak the same language and cannot
communicate with other crew, captain, etc.
Further, the intersection of power consolidation and resource monopolization, in the
context of an industry where discrimination and inequities are deeply rooted, created
power differences that led to and normalized forced labor slavery.
Labor abuses happen to fishermen all over the world. Doesn’t matter if you are
black, white, brown, green, or purple, if there are any inequities between you and
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the boat owner and/or captain, you are at risk. Could be that your religion is
different, or your skin color or language. It doesn’t matter. Could be anything. But
it is really the inequitable access to fish and the consolidation of power that gives
the abusers their power. The other things [e.g., physical violence, threats, wage
withholding, etc.], the abusers just use these other things to keep their power.
Moreover, one participant who identified as a current or former fisher, described a
sector management system under their catch share program that they perceived as
institutionalizing IUU fishing and normalizing labor abuses. The participant recounted
that they had been in the sector long enough to remember when fishers were organized
under unions, which provided some social protections. However, unions were now rare,
and to help promote social organization, sector management systems were implemented
to help fishers self-organize. At the same time, the leaders of these micro-organizations
were also intended to be responsible for informal policing of the vessels under the sector
organization; however, this participant noted that frequently the person with the most
power led the organization, and this person’s power was often derived from illegal
activity (depicted on the map as fisheries interventions and regulatory reforms increased
IUU fishing). Thus, corruption allowed labor abuses and illegal fishing to flourish with
impunity.
Because even catch shares are difficult to enforce, because you know people can
fraudulently label their fish, they can mix illegally caught and legally caught fish,
they can high-grade their fish, etc. We still don’t have good ways to enforce this.
So because there is no enforcement, or limited enforcement, or in some instances
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inequitable enforcement where small-scale fishermen’s catch are more closely
monitored than industrial fishing because the small-scale fishermen are closer to
shore, thus it does not require as much capacity. I’ve heard a lot of fishermen say
that the criminals are in charge of the enforcement under sector management.
Forced labor slavery’s contributions to environmental degradation.
Conversely, participants also identified forced labor slavery as a driver of pressures on
fish stocks including increasing overfishing and IUU fishing. Specific to IUU fishing,
using forced labor slavery reduced the risk of getting caught since most victims were
undocumented migrants and immigrants who “kept silent” and “were afraid to be snitches
out of fear that they would be deported if they reported the illegal activities their vessels
were engaged in,” which is consistent with participant descriptions of immigration and
migration violations being perceived as more pressing than environmental and labor
crimes. Regarding forced labor slavery increasing overfishing, participants depicted
slavery as functioning like a subsidy that sustains overfishing and intensification of effort
despite negative economic feedbacks. Slavery allowed company owners and vessel
captains to increase effort, and potentially harvest more fish, without increasing costs.
As a result the tipping point where it becomes uneconomical to fish more is
pushed down the track. So you can keep fishing more and longer. So then this
modern slavery also contributes to increased fishing pressures, because when your
cost-per-unit effort decreases, you are going to increase your effort even further to
make as much money as possible. Slavery functions like a subsidy. Exploiting
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workers temporarily increases profitability, but in the long-term the overfishing
caused by it is further diminishing profitability.
Participants also noted that forced labor slavery increased wildlife crimes, in
particular, shark finning, trafficking of endangered species, and the illegal harvesting of
marine species such as sea cucumbers. Some participants shared anecdotes from victims
wherein shark finning was used as a threat and/or intimidation tactic. For example,
victims would get thrown overboard and told they would only be rescued if they captured
a shark. Other participants compared shark finning to IUU, in that in areas where shark
finning is banned yet shark fins generate high monetary value, enslaved crew members
are used to harvest the sharks because they will not report the crime when the vessel
returns to land. This process was comparable for the trafficking of endangered species on
vessels as well as the illegal harvesting of marine species such as sea cucumbers.
Case Scenario Executions
To explore how the system—and in particular forced labor slavery as an
outcome—might react under a range of possible changes precipitated by interventions
and/or a lack of action to prevent continued fisheries degradation, case scenario
executions were performed to achieve aim four. Variables for each case scenario were
identified based on degree of centrality in the model, meaning they were the most
connected and/or had the highest absolute values of relationship weightings. For each
scenario, four iterations were performed—with the increase or decrease strengthening
each iteration. In total, 10 scenarios were performed. Increases and decrease in fish stock
declines, overfishing, fishing effort, IUU fishing, and regulatory problems and
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challenges. Of note, a key assumption for the regulatory scenario was that when
regulatory problems and challenges were decreased (implying a more unified regulatory
environment), unintended consequences did not outweigh the benefits of the regulatory
changes.
Each scenario’s impact was then evaluated by comparing the relative change in
forced labor slavery to the baseline, steady state values by using hyperbolic tangents that
resulted in a range of increases and decrease from -2 to 2 (Figure 13). For fish stock
declines, fishing effort, and IUU fishing, the impacts on forced labor slavery were greater
when the mental model variables were increased than when they were decreased.
However, for regulatory problems and challenges, the absolute value of the change from
the steady state was larger when the variable was decreased than increased. And for
overfishing, increasing yielded no changes in forced labor slavery from the steady state.
When profit margins were manipulated in case scenarios, both the increasing and
decreasing of the variable yielded increases in forced labor slavery, though the increase in
forced labor slavery was higher when profit margins decreased. For example, when profit
margins were decreased by -.25, -.5, -.75, and -1, the subsequent increases in forced labor
slavery were .01, .02, .02, and .04. Whereas when profit margins were increased -.25, -.5,
-.75, and -1, the increases in forced labor slavery were .03, .04, .06, and .09 respectively.
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Figure 13. Forced Labor Slavery Mental Model Scenarios
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Figure 13. Numeric values represent the relative, predicted deviation in forced labor
slavery from the steady state when pertinent central variables (i.e., mental model
variables) were manipulated by decreases of -.25 (light blue), -.5 (orange), -.75 (light
gray), and -1 (yellow) or increases of .25 (green), .5 (dark blue), .75 (brown), and 1
(dark gray). Changes from the steady state range on a scale of -2 to 2. All mental
model variables were positively associated with forced labor slavery, thus increases
and decreases in all five variables led to increases and decreases respectively in
forced labor slavery.
Since forced labor slavery was the most central variable in the system, it was also
manipulated to determine its impacts on other system variables in the event that forced
labor slavery increased (Figure 14) or decreased (Figure 15). If slavery increased, the
mental models suggested that profit margins and wildlife crimes would incur the greatest
increases, with fishing safety decreasing. Whereas if slavery decreased, the outcome
variable with the largest corresponding decrease was IUU fishing. Per the mental model
scenario, decrease in forced labor slavery could also lead to decreases in profit margins, a
-1.5 shift from the baseline state.
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Figure 14. Impacts of Increased Forced Labor Slavery on System Variables

Figure 14. The hypothesized changes from the steady state (y-axis) for each system
variable (x-axis) if forced labor slavery increases, based on the perceived connections
between variables in the Mental Model scenario.
Though in the middle of the range for centrality, participants also discussed how
fisheries interventions were having unintended social consequences that could potentially
be increasing forced labor slavery. As a result another scenario was executed wherein
fisheries interventions were increased, further decreasing profit margins, which did result
in an increase of forced labor slavery by a 0.08 shift from the baseline (Figure 16).
However, when the researcher manipulated the aggregate map by flipping the sign of the
relationship between fisheries interventions and profit margins, so that an intervention
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would increase profit margins, the subsequent increase in forced labor slavery was
reduced to a 0.02 increase from the baseline.
Figure 15. Impacts of Decreased Forced Labor Slavery on System Variables

Figure 15. The hypothesized changes from the steady state (y-axis) in each system
variable (x-axis) if forced labor slavery decreases, based on the perceived connections
between variables in the Mental Model Scenario.
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Figure 16. Potential Impacts of Fisheries Interventions on Forced Labor Slavery

Figure 16. Predicted changes from forced labor slavery’s steady state (x-axis) if fisheries
interventions are increased, based on the assumption of participants that fisheries
interventions decrease profit margins.
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Chapter Five: Discussion
Study Findings
Overall, the study found preliminary evidence supporting fish stock declines as a
driver of forced labor slavery, but that many challenges and barriers exist for
determining, with greater certainty, the strength of the relationship. Foremost, all
participants noted a lack of rigorous, longitudinal data for forced labor slavery counts on
fishing vessels, despite most participants sharing anecdotally that the number of victims
they were encountering had been steadily increasing since approximately 2008 to 2010.
Early fish stock declines were first noted in the 1940s (Graham, 1943; Russell, 1942).
However, the aggregation of study participants’ noted increases in forced labor slavery
victims on fishing vessels around the same time frame (2008-2010) suggests that: 1) a
timescale exists wherein there is a lag between when stocks begin to decline and forced
labor slavery starts to increase, and 2) a tipping point exists in that stock declines have to
reach a certain threshold of severity, or decline drastically in a short enough time period
to tip the system and result in forced labor slavery as an outcome.
Challenges to estimating forced labor slavery prevalence. Estimating the
prevalence of forced labor slavery on fishing vessels is further hindered by difficulties in
identifying victims and understanding what is and what is not forced labor slavery. While
this is a challenge for all sectors, as one participant noted, “fishing just looks like
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slavery” in that fishing is consistently one of or the most dangerous profession and even
non-abused fishers work excessively long hours during hauls, are at sea for several
months, and earn wages less than standard national minimum wage thresholds. However,
this sentiment is harmful because it can minimize the experiences of victims; it allows
non-abused workers in all sectors to appropriate the experiences of those ensnared in
forced labor slavery; and it likely leads to underestimation of the problem’s prevalence.
Similarly, in this study the researcher noted even key stakeholders that have worked in
the field for several years were hesitant to label labor abuses as modern slavery, despite
the situations they described meeting the criteria for forced labor/modern slavery as
delineated by the ILO (International Trade Union Confederation & Special Action
Programme to Combat Forced Labor, ILO, 2008). Instead most participants qualified the
abuses as “slave-like” or “resembling modern slavery.” This hedging is likely a product
of outsiders labeling human rights activists and scholars as hyperbolic.
And then compounding the problem, was the recent CNN investigation which
uncovered African migrants being sold at an auction in Libya, akin to conceptions of
historical slavery (2017). However, human rights scholars have affirmed the differences
between modern and historical slavery for many years now, and that instances of persons
being sold at auctions are nominal compared to debt bondage and other forms of modern
slavery (e.g., Bales, 2016). This type of media recognition, though, reinforces a false
image of what constitutes slavery to the public because it is more consistent with widespread hermeneutics of slavery, making it harder for people outside of the field to believe
that slavery exists on fishing vessels if victims are not being sold in a public forum.
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As a result, nuanced understandings of consent are overlooked or not explored,
resulting in a multitude of legal definitions for forced labor slavery that ignore the crux of
the issue—informed consent (Bales, 2017). Thus, this habit of not emphasizing and
understanding consent also makes it difficult to prosecute offenders because when people
interpret the law, they misconstrue consent, and typically not in the victim’s favor (e.g.,
Saengpassa, 2018). This situation is then further exacerbated by the overwhelming scale
of the problem, in that so many people and processes are involved in forced labor slavery
on fishing vessels that no one appears to be accountable. The absence of an offender then
makes it more difficult to identify a victim for prosecution purposes.
Furthermore, because victims are on vessels at sea and thus inaccessible for
purposes of obtaining victim counts, estimations often rely on victims coming forward
for purposes of reporting and/or seeking services. However, study participants described
numerous barriers to victims coming forward including: punishment for undocumented
migration, IUU fishing, and/or wildlife or transnational crimes; not wanting to lose their
job out of hopes that they will eventually receive their wages; not wanting to be identified
as a victim which would be shameful in their culture; not wanting to be “blacklisted” for
future work; a lack of realization that they are a victim because they too do not
understand what constitutes modern slavery; a lack of incentives for coming forward
since wage recovery rarely occurs; and discrimination. As such, these barriers likely lead
to further underestimation of the problem.
Interrelationships and processes. While the study could only provide a cursory
understanding of the strength of the relationship between fish stock declines and forced
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labor slavery, it did yield a clearer understanding of the processes and interrelationships
that connect these two phenomena. Analyses of the consensus and individual maps
suggests that key variables confounding the relationship between fish stock declines and
forced labor slavery are regulatory problems and challenges, fishing effort, profit
margins, and IUU fishing. Of note, all four of these variables were listed as common
variables in the individual map analyses as they were included in more than half of the
participant maps, and all four were in the top six most central variables in the consensus
map—excluding forced labor slavery. Without better quantitative data, though, it is
difficult to determine with greater certainty whether each variable functions as a mediator
or moderator, but the preliminary qualitative data in conjunction with the individual maps
suggests the following.
Regulatory problems and challenges may moderate the relationship between fish
stock declines and forced labor slavery as participants described it as strengthening the
relationship. Many participants also identified this as a key point of intervention, and
indeed during case scenario executions the decrease of regulatory problems and
challenges yielded the highest decrease on forced labor slavery of all scenarios. However,
when regulatory problems and challenges was increased, it resulted in a nominal increase
in forced labor slavery suggesting that if it is a moderator, its interactions weaken the
effects between fish stock declines and forced labor slavery.
On the other hand, fishing effort and profit margins may mediate the relationship
between fish stock declines and forced labor slavery. Describing fishing effort as driving
declines in profit margins, participants described both of these variables as the impetus
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for using forced labor slavery as a response to fish stock declines, thus detailing a
scenario wherein fishing effort and profit margins may explain the relationship. The
results from the case scenario analyses support this conclusion in that decreases in fishing
effort caused nominal decreases in forced labor slavery and decreases in profit margins
still produced increases in forced labor slavery, albeit smaller in value than the increases
provided by decreasing profit margins. Thus the presence of increased effort and
declining profit margins may explain the relationship.
Though IUU fishing was one of the most common variables in individual maps
and one of the most central variables in the consensus map, the findings from the case
scenario executions supported the participants’ ambiguity around its role in the system.
While other variables such as regulatory problems and challenges and fishing effort had
nominal impacts on forced labor slavery in one scenario (either increasing or decreasing),
the impacts in the inverse scenario were substantial. However, IUU fishing had nominal
influence on forced labor slavery when increased and decreased. Thus, it may be
impacted by the same factors, processes, and relationships as forced labor slavery, and
coexist in the system, but it may have less direct influence on forced labor slavery and
therefore not interact with the relationship between fish stock declines and forced labor
slavery. Instead, it may be more important to consider forced labor slavery’s influence
on IUU fishing. During the qualitative interviews, several participants detailed how using
forced labor slavery helped vessels engaging in illegal fishing activities keep their
activities secret or hidden. And as represented in Figure 15, when forced labor decreased,
IUU fishing had the largest absolute value shift from the baseline of any variable in the
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mental model (a decrease of 1.82), though when forced labor slavery was increased, it
only increased by a value of .02.
Results from the study also provided tentative empirical support for Bales’ (2016)
and Brashares et al.’s (2014) hypotheses that while fish stock declines may initiate the
increase in forced labor slavery in the sector, the system self-perpetuates through
feedback loops as forced labor slavery increases fishing effort and overfishing, thus
further declining stocks. Indeed, forced labor slavery was the most central variable in the
consensus map, suggesting that it has influence over many aspects of the ecological
system, and not just the social system. In addition, in the mental model scenario
represented in Figure 15, when forced labor slavery decreased the greatest impacts were
in the ecological system on IUU fishing (-1.82), overfishing (-1.77) and fish stock
declines (-1.72).
While not as central of a variable to the social system, the role of consumer
demand was important to individual models. Based on counts of participant models,
consumer demand was the most frequently identified transmitter variable, reflecting an
ideology that consumers have the power to change the system. However, during map
aggregation, other effects on consumer demand, particularly relationships where
consumer demand was on the receiving end of influences from supply chain complexity
and consumer disconnect through seafood certification schemes, transposed the variable
to an ordinary variable. This shift is notable, and may have possible social justice
implications for consumption.
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Previous research indicates that persons are willing to pay more for ecologically
and socially sustainable fish, but that they have difficulty understanding and choosing
between the discrete and numerous seafood certification schemes, suggesting that these
schemes are not meeting their education objectives (McClenachan, Dissanayake, & Chen,
2016). In addition, the trustworthiness of these schemes, due in part to transparency and
conflict of interest concerns, has recently been questioned by experts (e.g., Webster,
2016). Since study participants noted that low-value fish (e.g., canned, white albacore
tuna) are the type of fish most likely to be harvested using forced labor slavery—and
canned fish is marketed as an inexpensive, nutritious, and high-protein food source for
low-income and food insecure persons—there should be concern about how time and
material/financial poverty interact with consumer demand and disconnect. For example,
“the working poor” may be more inclined to purchase these seafood products since they
are low-cost and nutritious and because these persons likely lack the privilege of excess
time to self-educate about the credibility and reliability of seafood certification schemes.
Thus, there should be cognizance of how this issue is framed by stakeholders, otherwise
rhetoric could lead to the blaming of poor people’s consumption for unsustainable and
unjust fisheries practices.
Toward a universal theoretical model. Though frequently framed and/or
presented as a problem in Southeast Asia (e.g., EJF, 2014, 2015a, 2015b; FishWise,
2014), the data presented in Figure 10 suggests that forced labor slavery is a global
problem. Developed countries, like the United States and European Union member states,
are exploiting legal loopholes that do not require them to provide labor protections to
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fishers to justify their declarations that there are no victims in their waters or on their
fleets. Without labor protections, there can be no violations, and therefore no victims.
However, while the prevalence of the problem could be the highest in Southeast Asia, the
field is doing an egregious disservice to victims globally, and itself, by hyper focusing on
Southeast Asia as it minimizes the role developed countries play in perpetuating a
stagnant regulatory environment. Additionally, the relatively few statistical differences
between demographically varied groups suggests that a universal framework may be
useful in guiding future research and interventions in a globalized industry, while using
specific proxies for each construct to tailor the framework to a specific region or locale.
Building upon Figure 1, Figure 17 represents the use of participants’ knowledge
to refine Figure 1’s social-ecological system components, organization, and their
interrelationships, achieving the study’s first specific aim. Most of the original
framework’s contextual constructs, main relationship variables, and interrelationships
were validated in the study. However, changes from Figure 1 to Figure 17 include: 1) the
addition of a political context construct intended to represent the national environment’s
influences on a country’s citizens, 2) collapsing the cultural context into the
socioeconomic context as participants described discrimination, in particular, as being
closely related and highly influential to the main relationship, 3) eliminating the variable
of “demand for cheap labor increases” due to redundancy, and 4) adding arrows to show
that while contextual constructs influence the main relationship, the main relationship
also influences the contextual constructs. Table 13 then lists the variables from the
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consensus map that were not represented in the theoretical framework’s constructs as
proxies for the contextual constructs.
Figure 17. Theory of Fish Stock Declines and Forced Labor Slavery
Industry Context

Anthropogenic
Pressures

Geographic
Context

Fish catchper-uniteffort
decreases

Fish
stocks
decrease

Regulatory
Context
Effort
increases
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Context

Profits
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Political
Context

Slavery
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Figure 17. Coupled social-ecological systems’ interactions linking fish stock declines and forced labor slavery.

Table 13
Consensus Map Variables as Proxies for the Theoretical Framework’s Constructs
Geographic
Context

Regulatory
Context

Political
Context

Industry
Context

Geographic
remoteness
Use of foreign and
migrant workers
(i.e., high rates of
migration/migrants)

Fisheries
interventions
Government
inaction

Underdeveloped
economy
Increased
fishing capacity

IUU fishing

SocioCulturalEconomic
Context
Discrimination

Disposable
vessels

Social
vulnerabilities

Regulatory
problems
and
challenges

Race to fish

Subsidies
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Anthropogenic
Pressures
Consumer
disconnect
Consumer
demand
Overfishing

Other
transnational
crime
Wildlife
crimes

Political
instability

Labor
shortages
Transshipment
Fishing safety
Supply chain
complexity
Marginalization
of small-scale
fishers
Monopolization
of resources

Recommendations for Future Research
The researcher’s long-term research agenda includes using mixed methods
research that considers varied and diverse knowledge sources as data—in part, to expand
beyond the human rights field’s data limitations—to compile a list of evidence-based
factors that contribute to slavery on fishing vessels and to move from conceptualization
to quantification of how these factors uniquely contribute to the problem, and how they
interact with each other to create a supply and demand that allows slavery to persist in the
fishing sector. As such, the Theory of Fish Stock Declines and Forced Labor Slavery
framework should be used to guide future empirical testing, and this empirical testing
should also be used to continue to validate the framework. While FCM provided the next
step in confirming conceptualization of the linkages, as research about the relationship
between fish stock declines and forced labor slavery progresses, it should advance along
the continuum from conceptualization to quantification. As noted on page 34, structural
equation modeling would likely be the most rigorous approach to quantitatively testing
the relationship and the end of this continuum. However, this study identified several
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pathways where better quantitative data is still needed before a SEM approach could be
undertaken.
While this dissertation’s analysis of the pertinent constructs and their
interrelationships that contribute to the links between fish stock declines and forced labor
slavery corroborated NGO investigations about the importance of IUU fishing;
transshipment and lack of traceability and transparency due to supply chain complexity;
the use of undocumented migrant workers; and regulatory gaps in environmental and
labor laws (EJF, 2015; FishWise, 2014, ILO, 2013a, UNODC, 2013), the emergence of
environmental policies’ potential contributions to forced labor slavery is a timely and
pertinent knowledge gap. In addition to this study’s findings represented in Figures 14
and 15 wherein increases and decreases in forced labor slavery respectively increase and
decrease IUU fishing, overfishing, and fish stock declines, prior theoretical (Brashares et
al., 2014) and empirical (Bales, 2016) research suggests the use of forced labor slavery
could be increasing overfishing. In September 2018, the United Nations will begin twoand-a-half year negotiations for a new internationally binding high seas treaty under the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea with a goal of strengthening Regional Fisheries
Management Organizations’ catch share/quota systems and more readily establishing
large-scale marine protected areas on the high seas to curb overfishing in international
waters and advance greater protections for biodiversity (High Seas Alliance, 2017; UN,
2017). Without understanding how these environmental measures impact the use of
forced labor slavery on fishing vessels, these policies may undermine their own
conservation objectives, thus perpetuating a cycle wherein fish stock declines are a driver
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of forced labor slavery and use of forced labor slavery is a driver of overfishing-induced
fish stock declines. As such, retrospective time-series research designs offer an efficient
way to better understand the impacts of MPAs and catch share/quota programs on forced
labor slavery counts in areas where forced labor slavery data is collected via Gallup-style
polls.
Considering the ambiguity and unclear findings around the connections between
forced labor slavery and IUU fishing, this relationship also needs to be explored and
explained further. Along with obtaining counts of the number of “disposable vessels,”
these are areas where the human rights/slavery field can and should apply innovative and
emergent technologies such as the use of drones. Though some NGOs have started using
satellite data obtained from vessel automated identification systems (AIS) to identify
vessels that have “gone dark” or turned off their AIS to engage in illegal activity without
being tracked (e.g., FAO, 2017b; Malarky & Lowell, 2018), the scale of the problem and
data needed may be too great to effectively or efficiently use this type of data as it
requires mining billions of satellite transmissions and then closely studying patterns to
ascertain if a ship is “going dark” for illegitimate or legitimate reasons. “Going dark” is
legal under certain circumstances, most notably, to evade pirates in dangerous waters.
The use of drones may also be able to provide more reliable and valid data since the
control over data collection will belong to researchers instead of relying on vessel
compliance, which is known to be problematic.
Additionally, wildlife crime was only included in six participant maps. However,
in all six maps, the variable functioned as a receiver of the effects from forced labor
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slavery. When the individual maps were aggregated, the relationship strength was
maintained, suggesting reliability amongst these six participants in how they viewed
forced labor slavery impacting wildlife crimes. Though a multitude of studies have
explored the socio-cultural and economic drivers of wildlife crimes (e.g., Challender &
MacMillan, 2014; Duffy, St. John, Büscher, & Brockington, 2016), there has not yet been
an exploration into how social conflicts, like forced labor slavery, may help facilitate the
processes of these crimes. Since wildlife crimes are a major threat to biodiversity loss
(Sodhi, Koh, Brook, & Ng, 2004), this is another emergent pathway that should be
prioritized for future research.
Study Implications
Findings from this dissertation suggest a need for transdisciplinary research to
inform intersectional and holistic policies in order to produce more cost-effective policybased interventions, waste less fiscal resources on interventions that are producing
unintended consequences that undermine the intervention rather than mitigate the
problem, and a reduction in both fish stock pressures and forced labor slavery victims on
fishing vessels. To date, the social justice and human dimensions of environmental policy
interventions to reduce overfishing are often not considered in non-coastal waters.(De
Santo, 2013; Gruby, Gray, Campbell, & Acton, 2016). With the upcoming negotiations of
the new high seas treaty, this could provide an opportunity to begin to address fish stock
pressures and declines and slavery under the same, unified regulations. However, the
same model also needs to be replicated at regional, national, and subnational levels. As
noted by participants during their interviews, if holistic regulations are implemented, then
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reverberations occur throughout the whole process—making every step more holistic. In
particular, authorities boarding a vessel for fishing violations could also possess the
authority (and ideally the training and resources) to simultaneously investigate for labor
abuses. However, when developing more holistic and cooperative policies, policy makers
must be sensitive to the potential of overreach by developed countries when countries of
varying identities (e.g., economic status) are involved in collaborative negotiations.
Furthermore, analyses of potential interventions to reduce forced labor slavery
and forced labor slavery’s impacts on profit margins suggests that once a vessel, captain,
or owner is economically driven to use forced labor slavery, and justifies it, they are
unlikely to stop using forced labor—even if stocks rebound. This is likely due to the
competitive advantage they have now gained, and the maximized profits the advantage
yields. To stop using forced labor slavery would reduce their profits. This conclusion is
supported by the finding in Figure 13 that regulatory problems and challenges—and not
fish stock declines, fishing effort, or overfishing—was the only variable in the mental
model scenario that produced substantial decreases in forced labor slavery. In addition,
when forced labor slavery increased, it generated the largest impacts on profit margins
(Figure 14) and when forced labor slavery was decreased, it resulted in a decrease in
profit margins of a -1.5 from the baseline.
These findings in regards to profit margins imply that fields addressing both the
ecological and social systems, and their interface, need to shift their approaches from
reactive to preventive. In order to do this, there must be a greater emphasis on research,
particularly research that is collaborative, transdisciplinary, and transparent. As such,
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mutual respect and understanding for different methodological approaches and varying
definitions of what constitutes empirical data must be built across disciplines. And as
Bales (2017) noted, human rights experts and NGOs must be willing to publicly share
their data to build effective collaborations that translate into improved practices, and they
must be more transparent about their methods and approaches and subject the data to
critiques and peer-review.
One potential challenge to this shift from reaction to prevention is that forced
labor slavery essentially functions as a subsidy in the fishing sector—prolonging the
industry’s inevitable collapse due to unprofitability. And to date, there has been a lack of
political will to end traditional financial subsidies in the sector, despite recognition that
subsidies drive IUU fishing and overfishing. In fact, renegotiating and/or eliminating
fisheries subsidies first appeared on the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade
Organization’s agenda in 2001 (Whalén, 2017). However, despite the inclusion of
eliminating harmful fisheries subsidies by 2020 in Sustainable Development Goal 14
target six (UN Development Programme, 2018), the Eleventh Ministerial Conference of
the WTO, held in December 2017, deferred any advancements toward policy-based
action on the matter again (Whalén, 2017).
On the other hand, with the recent media attention afforded to labor abuses in the
fishing sector, numerous working groups (e.g., Conservation International's Social
Responsibility in Global Fisheries and Aquaculture Program) have formed to ensure not
only sustainable fisheries, but socially responsible fisheries. Unfortunately, reports from
labor rights stakeholders and NGOs suggest the human and labor rights fields and their
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expertise are being excluded from these working groups. In addition, data and evidence
produced by the human and labor rights fields are often not considered in these working
groups because the data is obtained through methods that diverge with the biological and
ecological sciences’ methods and definitions of knowledge. Without the integration of
this expertise, though, the risk for creating policies and interventions that unintentionally
exacerbate forced labor slavery remains.
Because of these transdisciplinary challenges and the historical treatment of these
two problems as separate issues, there is also likely a role for a discipline to claim
expertise as the facilitator of the integrating of the differing disciplinary knowledge,
methodologies, philosophies, and approaches. Social workers, by nature of their training,
already have expertise in systems thinking and situating persons within environmental
contexts laden with structural barriers; are trained in both quantitative and qualitative
research methodologies that recognize inclusive definitions of empirical data; and are
comfortable bringing together large and diverse groups of people—including
stakeholders whose voices may have historically been obscured—for a multitude of
purposes including problem solving, intervention development, policy change, domestic
and international community development, and advocacy. Despite the calls to action
noted on page 31, and an obligation based on the profession’s values, social work as a
whole still has yet to engage in issues of environmental degradation and slavery
separately, let alone linked. By carving out expertise in this novel transdisciplinary
facilitation role, social work could avoid “turf wars” with more established disciplines in
this space with similar areas of expertise and applied research approaches such as human
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geography and international development. Additionally, it would allow social work
professionals to center social justice in research and practice approaches, particularly
since this facet of the profession is unique in comparison to other social sciences
engaging in this space.
Study Limitations
FCM’s primary limitation is that quantitative analyses are based on connection
weightings, which each participant subjectively quantifies. While SEM would be the
more rigorous quantitative methodological approach to test hypotheses about the
relationship between fish stock declines and human slavery, the research question is not
yet amenable to quantification for multiple reasons. Foremost, while the researcher
developed a theoretical framework from an extensive review and amalgamation of
empirical and theoretical literature, there is a paucity of empirical research validating the
inclusion and exclusion of pertinent constructs. Additionally, the overall research
question is not amenable to quantification since longitudinal data is lacking for some
constructs in the proposed framework. In particular, longitudinal slavery data is almost
non-existent due to the inaccessibility of the hidden study population and the activity’s
illegality (IOM, 2008). Time, cost, and safety constraints also hinder researchers’ abilities
to collect longitudinal slavery data that could be geotagged to sites (i.e., ports) for fish
stock assessment measures.
As a result of FCM’s subjective quantification, non-probability sampling, and the
small sample size, the findings from the study cannot be interpreted as causality. As
noted on page 37, the sample also failed to recruit any stakeholders working specifically
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in South America. And while enrollment in the study was contingent upon having direct
contact with fishers, only 25% of the sample identified as a former or current fisher, and
thus had first-hand knowledge of activities at sea. Moreover, though almost 50% of the
study sample elected to not have their interviews recorded, the lack of recordings did not
appear to impact the study’s findings since the main unit of analysis was the cognitive
map created by the participant versus an interview transcript. This conclusion is
supported by the univariate analyses for interview modality reported in Table 1 on page
43.
Additionally, the numeric values produced by FCM’s case scenario executions to
describe shifts in a variable from the baseline are difficult to interpret and lack meaning
outside of comparisons within the study. While they can be compared to other variables
in the model, they have little practical relevance as they do not represent percentages,
odds ratios, or other more typical predictive measures produced by statistical analyses.
Lastly, while the participants brought longitudinal and historical knowledge into
their interviews and maps, the study itself employed a cross-sectional design. Without
multiple interviews with the same stakeholders over a substantial period of time, it is
difficult to generate conclusions about the previously discussed issue of timescale.
Conclusion
Based on an assessment of the vulnerabilities and risk factors presented in this
study, it is plausible to conclude that fish stock declines are increasing forced labor
slavery, and that in turn, forced labor slavery is placing more pressure on fish stocks,
accelerating their decline. As such, this study’s results point to a compelling need for
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innovative transdisciplinary research employing the newest technologies to understand
the strength of the relationship between fish stock declines and forced labor slavery; more
comprehensive and holistic policies at the international, regional, national, and
subnational levels; and social-ecological interventions which are assessed for unintended
consequences prior to wide scale implementation.
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Appendix A: Definitions
Though lacking formal and standardized global definitions, these terms are often
used to describe the scale and scope of fisheries and the vessels used within them.
Descriptive

Term
Artisanal

Definition
Traditional fisheries involving fishing households; can
be for subsistence or commercial purposes; typically
small-scale; may not use vessels, but if so, typically
Social
short-haul
Characteristic Industrial
Fisheries involving enterprises/companies that fish for
commercial purposes; large scale; can be short or
long-haul
Recreational Harvesting fish for fun or sport
Purpose
Subsistence Harvesting fish for household consumption, fish are
not sold or traded into informal or formal markets
Commercial Harvesting fish to generate a profit from selling the
fish
Small
Small gear and vessel size; fishers typically selfScale
employed but not always; typically low technology
and capital, but not always
Large
Large gear and vessel size; fishers part of an
employed crew; high technology and capital
Haul
Short
Short fishing trips, typically close to shore
Long
Longer fishing trips, typically on the high seas beyond
territorial waters
Seiners
Vessels that use large nets to harvest fish nearer the
Most
surface of the water
Common
Commercial Line Vessels Vessels that use fishing lines (instead of nets) with
Vessels
baited hooks attached
Trawlers
Vessels that drag large nets in deep water or along the
seabed/sea floor
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Appendix B: Study Materials
Recruitment Email
Hello,
My name is Jess Sparks and I am a doctoral candidate at the University of Denver,
Colorado, USA. For my dissertation research, I am studying forced labor and slavery on
fishing vessels by interviewing staff affiliated with NGOs working with fishers around
these issues. I am writing to invite you to participate in the research study. You are
eligible to participate if you are aged 18 years or older, can participate in an interview
conducted in English, are affiliated with a NGO registered with a government, and have
direct contact with fishers.
If you decide to participate in this study you will be asked to share your thoughts about
forced labor and slavery on fishing vessels, based primarily on knowledge and
information that fishers have provided to you in your work and your own observations
and experiences. The interviews will last approximately 90 minutes.
This study is completely voluntary, and you can choose to be in the study or not. If you’d
like to participate or if you have any questions about the study please email me at
Jess.Sparks@du.edu.
Also, please feel free to forward this email to others who may be interested in
participating in the study.
Thank you very much for your time.
Sincerely,
Jess Sparks, MS, MSW, LICSW
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Recruitment Flyer

Seeking Participants
for a study on Forced Labor and Slavery on Fishing Vessels
being conducted by researchers at the University of Denver Graduate
School of Social Work

Participants must be:
• Aged 18 years or older,
• Working for a NGO registered with a government,
• Have direct contact with fishers during your work, and
• Able to complete an interview in English
Eligible participants will complete a 90-minute interview either in person or on a
computer.
For more information contact the principle investigator, Jess Sparks, at:
Jess.Sparks@du.edu or +1 (636) 368 6157
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Interview Script
As a reminder, please use pseudonyms to identify yourself, colleagues, or fishers during
the interview, and do not name your organization.
Demographic Questions:
1) Please provide a pseudonym that we can use throughout the interview to keep
your identity confidential.
2) Does your organization primarily focus on anti-slavery and labor abuse issues,
environmental issues, or both?
3) What country do you currently work in?
4) What is your discipline?
5) Please describe your training and educational background such as your highest
degree earned and any specialized training you have received for your job.
6) What is your age?
7) What race(s) and ethnicity(ies) do you identify with?
8) How do you identify your gender?
9) Have you previously worked on a fishing vessel? If yes, please describe your
primary employment activities.
10) How long have you worked with fishers around issues of forced labor and
slavery?
11) What kind of work have you done/do you do with the fishing community?
12) Which fishing communities do you primarily interact with?
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a. Possible prompt if not stated above: Would you describe these
communities primarily as small-scale, large-scale, or artisanal fisheries?
b. Possible prompt if not stated above: Where do these communities
primarily fish at?
13) Please describe the socio-economic composition of the fishing communities that
you primarily interact with (e.g., migration status, race/ethnicity/tribe/case,
religion, education levels)?
14) How did most of the fishers decide to enter the fishing sector?
15) Please tell me about the work experiences the fishers have described to you
(including how long they have worked in the fishing industry, and what activities
they currently or in the past, have participated in?)
Migration Questions:
16) Where do the fishers live? How far are their homes from the landing site?
17) Do they live there all year long? If they do not live there all year, where else do
they live?
18) Where is their place of birth/origin?
For individuals reporting that they were not born in the participant’s home
country or near the home country’s major fishing ports:
a) When did they begin residing in [insert location]?
b) How and when did they decide to come to [insert location]?
c) How did they reach [insert location]?
d) How did they find work when they first moved to [insert location]?
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e) What was their occupation prior to leaving their place of origin?
f) Have they considered returning to their place of origin?
For individuals reporting that they were born in the participant’s home country
and near the major fishing ports:
a) Can you describe any relationships that you are aware of, if any, that migrant
fishers have with non-migrant fishers in the sector?
b) What impact has migration had on access to jobs in the fisheries?
c) Has migration in some way affected the relationships between employers and
employees in the fisheries sector?
Cognitive Map Facilitation:
Explain what we are mapping and why. How researcher will be recording the
important things that they mention, but can and should correct them! Give a neutral
example of a map.
Interviewer will record key variables mentioned in the following with each question
used as a heading.
19) Can you tell me about any changes that fishers have noticed in fish stocks?
If described changes in question 11:
a) What do fishers think are causing the changes in fish stocks?
b) What do fishers think could prevent these changes?
The interviewer will repeat back to the participant the list of key variables generated
based on the participant’s response. The interviewer will then ask, “Do you think these
things accurately describe what you just told me? Are there any things that you want to
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add or take away?” Once the list is finalized by the participant, the interviewer will ask
the participant to define each variable. The interviewer will then ask the participants,
“identify two things that you think are related or that affect each other.” When the
participant identifies two variables, the interviewer will ask, “how are these things
related?” To ascertain fuzzy causality and the relationship’s direction, probing questions
may include, “Does one of these things cause the other one? When [insert causal
variable] increases, does [insert outcome variable] increase or decrease?” An arrow
pointing away from the cause and toward the effect will be drawn. A green arrow will
indicate a positive relationship (meaning that as one variable increases, so too does the
other variable), and a red arrow will indicate a negative relationship (meaning that as
one variable increases, the other decreases). The interviewer will also note a + sign for
promoting relationships, a – sign for inhibiting relationships, and a 0 for neutralizing
relationships. The interviewer will then ask the participant, “do you think the relationship
is weak/low, medium strength, or strong/high.” Once the participant assigns a
qualitative weighting, then they will be asked to assign a quantitative weighting that
corresponds with the qualitative weighting (Table 2). For example, if the participant
describes the relationship as weak, they will be asked to pick a number (to the one tenth)
from 0.1 to 0.3 for positive relationships and from -0.1 to -0.3 for negative relationships.
This process is repeated until the participant no longer identifies any further
relationships.
The interview then resumes, and the interviewer will continue recording key
variables.
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c) Are there any other changes that fishers have reported in the fishing sector
when fish stocks change?
The interviewer will repeat back to the participant the list of key variables
generated based on the participant’s response. The interviewer will then ask, “Do you
think these things accurately describe what you just told me? Are there any things that
you want to add or take away?” Once the list is finalized by the participant, the
interviewer will ask the participant to define each variable. The interviewer will then ask
the participants, “identify two things that you think are related or that affect each other.”
When the participant identifies two variables, the interviewer will ask, “how are these
things related?” To ascertain fuzzy causality and the relationship’s direction, probing
questions may include, “Does one of these things cause the other one? When [insert
causal variable] increases, does [insert outcome variable] increase or decrease?” An
arrow pointing away from the cause and toward the effect will be drawn. A green arrow
will indicate a positive relationship (meaning that as one variable increases, so too does
the other variable), and a red arrow will indicate a negative relationship (meaning that
as one variable increases, the other decreases). The interviewer will also note a + sign
for promoting relationships, a – sign for inhibiting relationships, and a 0 for neutralizing
relationships. The interviewer will then ask the participant, “do you think the relationship
is weak/low, medium strength, or strong/high.” Once the participant assigns a qualitative
weighting, then they will be asked to assign a quantitative weighting that corresponds
with the qualitative weighting (Table 2). For example, if the participant describes the
relationship as weak, they will be asked to pick a number (to the one tenth) from 0.1 to
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0.3 for positive relationships and from -0.1 to -0.3 for negative relationships. This
process is repeated until the participant no longer identifies any further relationships.
The interview then resumes, and the interviewer will continue recording key
variables.
20) Have fishers ever described any changes in labor conditions in response to fish
stock changes? If yes, can you describe these changes in labor conditions?
The interviewer will repeat back to the participant the list of key variables generated
based on the participant’s response. The interviewer will then ask, “Do you think these
things accurately describe what you just told me? Are there any things that you want to
add or take away?” Once the list is finalized by the participant, the interviewer will ask
the participant to define each variable. The interviewer will then ask the participants,
“identify two things that you think are related or that affect each other.” When the
participant identifies two variables, the interviewer will ask, “how are these things
related?” To ascertain fuzzy causality and the relationship’s direction, probing questions
may include, “Does one of these things cause the other one? When [insert causal
variable] increases, does [insert outcome variable] increase or decrease?” An arrow
pointing away from the cause and toward the effect will be drawn. A green arrow will
indicate a positive relationship (meaning that as one variable increases, so too does the
other variable), and a red arrow will indicate a negative relationship (meaning that as
one variable increases, the other decreases). The interviewer will also note a + sign for
promoting relationships, a – sign for inhibiting relationships, and a 0 for neutralizing
relationships. The interviewer will then ask the participant, “do you think the relationship
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is weak/low, medium strength, or strong/high.” Once the participant assigns a qualitative
weighting, then they will be asked to assign a quantitative weighting that corresponds
with the qualitative weighting (Table 2). For example, if the participant describes the
relationship as weak, they will be asked to pick a number (to the one tenth) from 0.1 to
0.3 for positive relationships and from -0.1 to -0.3 for negative relationships. This
process is repeated until the participant no longer identifies any further relationships.
The interview then resumes, and the interviewer will continue recording key
variables.
21) How, if at all, have fishers described changes in fishing practices when fish stocks
change?
The interviewer will repeat back to the participant the list of key variables generated
based on the participant’s response. The interviewer will then ask, “Do you think these
things accurately describe what you just told me? Are there any things that you want to
add or take away?” Once the list is finalized by the participant, the interviewer will ask
the participant to define each variable. The interviewer will then ask the participants,
“identify two things that you think are related or that affect each other.” When the
participant identifies two variables, the interviewer will ask, “how are these things
related?” To ascertain fuzzy causality and the relationship’s direction, probing questions
may include, “Does one of these variables cause the other one? When [insert causal
variable] increases, does [insert outcome variable] increase or decrease?” An arrow
pointing away from the cause and toward the effect will be drawn. A green arrow will
indicate a positive relationship (meaning that as one variable increases, so too does the
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other variable), and a red arrow will indicate a negative relationship (meaning that as
one variable increases, the other decreases). The interviewer will also note a + sign for
promoting relationships, a – sign for inhibiting relationships, and a 0 for neutralizing
relationships. The interviewer will then ask the participant, “do you think the relationship
is weak/low, medium strength, or strong/high.” Once the participant assigns a qualitative
weighting, then they will be asked to assign a quantitative weighting that corresponds
with the qualitative weighting (Table 2). For example, if the participant describes the
relationship as weak, they will be asked to pick a number (to the one tenth) from 0.1 to
0.3 for positive relationships and from -0.1 to -0.3 for negative relationships. This
process is repeated until the participant no longer identifies any further relationships.
The interview then resumes, and the interviewer will continue recording key
variables.
22) When I mention fish stocks and labor conditions what comes to mind based on
your conversations with fishers?
23) How, if at all, do you think changes in fish stocks affect labor conditions based on
your interactions with fishers?
24) What other things come to mind or are important when you think about how fish
stocks affect labor conditions based on your interactions with fishers?
The interviewer will repeat back to the participant the list of key variables generated
based on the participant’s response. The interviewer will then ask, “Do you think these
things accurately describe what you just told me? Are there any things that you want to
add or take away?” Once the list is finalized by the participant, the interviewer will ask
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the participant to define each variable. The interviewer will then ask the participants,
“identify two things that you think are related or that affect each other.” When the
participant identifies two variables, the interviewer will ask, “how are these things
related?” To ascertain fuzzy causality and the relationship’s direction, probing questions
may include, “Does one of these things cause the other one? When [insert causal
variable] increases, does [insert outcome variable] increase or decrease?” An arrow
pointing away from the cause and toward the effect will be drawn. A green arrow will
indicate a positive relationship (meaning that as one variable increases, so too does the
other variable), and a red arrow will indicate a negative relationship (meaning that as
one variable increases, the other decreases). The interviewer will also note a + sign for
promoting relationships, a – sign for inhibiting relationships, and a 0 for neutralizing
relationships. The interviewer will then ask the participant, “do you think the relationship
is weak/low, medium strength, or strong/high.” Once the participant assigns a qualitative
weighting, then they will be asked to assign a quantitative weighting that corresponds
with the qualitative weighting (Table 2). For example, if the participant describes the
relationship as weak, they will be asked to pick a number (to the one tenth) from 0.1 to
0.3 for positive relationships and from -0.1 to -0.3 for negative relationships. This
process is repeated until the participant no longer identifies any further relationships.
The interview then resumes, and the interviewer will continue recording key
variables.
25) How, if at all, do you think changes in labor conditions affect fish stocks based on
your interactions with fishers?
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26) What other things come to mind or are important when you think about how labor
conditions affect fish stocks based on your interactions with fishers?
The interviewer will repeat back to the participant the list of key variables
generated based on the participant’s response. The interviewer will then ask, “Do
you think these things accurately describe what you just told me? Are there any things
that you want to add or take away?” Once the list is finalized by the participant, the
interviewer will ask the participant to define each variable. The interviewer will then
ask the participants, “identify two things that you think are related or that affect each
other.” When the participant identifies two variables, the interviewer will ask, “how
are these things related?” To ascertain fuzzy causality and the relationship’s
direction, probing questions may include, “Does one of these things cause the other
one? When [insert causal variable] increases, does [insert outcome variable] increase
or decrease?” An arrow pointing away from the cause and toward the effect will be
drawn. A green arrow will indicate a positive relationship (meaning that as one
variable increases, so too does the other variable), and a red arrow will indicate a
negative relationship (meaning that as one variable increases, the other decreases).
The interviewer will also note a + sign for promoting relationships, a – sign for
inhibiting relationships, and a 0 for neutralizing relationships. The interviewer will
then ask the participant, “do you think the relationship is weak/low,
medium/moderate strength, or strong/high.” Once the participant assigns a
qualitative weighting, then they will be asked to assign a quantitative weighting that
corresponds with the qualitative weighting (Table 2). For example, if the participant
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describes the relationship as weak, they will be asked to pick a number (to the one
tenth) from 0.1 to 0.3 for positive relationships and from -0.1 to -0.3 for negative
relationships. This process is repeated until the participant no longer identifies any
further relationships.
The interview then resumes, and the interviewer will continue recording key
variables.
27) When I mention fish stocks and labor conditions, does anything else come to
mind?
The interviewer will repeat back to the participant the list of key variables generated
based on the participant’s response. The interviewer will then ask, “Do you think these
things accurately describe what you just told me? Are there any things that you want to
add or take away?” Once the list is finalized by the participant, the interviewer will ask
the participant to define each variable. The interviewer will then ask the participants,
“identify two things that you think are related or that affect each other.” When the
participant identifies two variables, the interviewer will ask, “how are these things
related?” To ascertain fuzzy causality and the relationship’s direction, probing questions
may include, “Does one of these things cause the other one? When [insert causal
variable] increases, does [insert outcome variable] increase or decrease?” An arrow
pointing away from the cause and toward the effect will be drawn. A green arrow will
indicate a positive relationship (meaning that as one variable increases, so too does the
other variable), and a red arrow will indicate a negative relationship (meaning that as
one variable increases, the other decreases). The interviewer will also note a + sign for
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promoting relationships, a – sign for inhibiting relationships, and a 0 for neutralizing
relationships. The interviewer will then ask the participant, “do you think the relationship
is weak/low, medium strength, or strong/high.” Once the participant assigns a qualitative
weighting, then they will be asked to assign a quantitative weighting that corresponds
with the qualitative weighting (Table 2). For example, if the participant describes the
relationship as weak, they will be asked to pick a number (to the one tenth) from 0.1 to
0.3 for positive relationships and from -0.1 to -0.3 for negative relationships. This
process is repeated until the participant no longer identifies any further relationships.
28) Can you tell me about any experiences, if any, that fishers have shared with
discrimination based on their gender, race, tribe, caste, or immigration or
migration status in the fisheries sector?
29) Are there groups of fishers who are more likely to experience discrimination in
the fisheries sector? Who are they and why do you think they face more
discrimination?
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Appendix C: Codebook
Catch-per-unit effort: The number of fish caught per some standardized unit of effort
(e.g., distance traveled, hours fished, type of gear used).
Consumer demand: The quantity, quality, and price of fish demanded by consumers of
seafood.
Consumer disconnect: The disconnect between consumers and the seafood they eat,
including disconnect from where and how the seafood is harvested, processed, and
imported into their own countries and markets. In developed countries, consumers often
rely on seafood certification schemes to better educate themselves and make informed
choices as consumers; however, a recent inundation of these schemes into markets has
resulted in a lack of transparency and consistency that threatens their quality and their
ability to appropriately inform consumer choices.
Discrimination: Derived from racism, xenophobia, and nationalism, the unjust,
inequitable, and systematic biased treatment of groups of persons based on specific
characteristics and traits.
Disposable vessels: Old, dilapidated vessels that are not equipped with modern
technology and therefore, when confiscated for illegal activity can easily be abandoned
without huge financial losses.
Fisheries interventions and regulatory reforms: Strategies for mitigating overfishing.
Fishing effort: Includes distance traveled, number of hours fishing, number of times
nets/gears cast, depth of fishing, number of crew needed to fish.
Fishing safety: Methods and equipment to protect fishers from danger, risk, or injury
incurred while fishing.
Fish stock declines: Changes in spatial distribution, size, abundance, and aggregation of
fish.
Forced labor slavery: “The involuntary entry and holding of people at a workplace
through force, fraud, or coercion for purposes of forced labor so that the slaveholder can
extract profit” (Free the Slaves, 2017, para. 1).
Geographic remoteness: Distance of vessel from land and/or inhabited areas.
Global race to fish: Rooted in capitalism, a profit-driven fishing motivation, versus
tradition, subsistence, etc., that creates extreme global competition for scarce fish
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resources and that perpetuates more developed countries exploiting less developed
countries’ territorial waters.
Government inaction: Lack of political will to address large-scale problems spurred by
corruption, complacency, complicity, and/or collusion.
Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing: A classification of fishing activities wherein
vessels operate in direct violation of binding and non-binding regulatory measures, or
vessels purposefully exploit regulatory loopholes to evade regulatory measures with
impunity (e.g., using a flag of convenience).
Increased fishing capacity: Adding more vessels to a fleet than the oceans and/or stocks
can support.
Labor shortages: Not having enough laborers to meet the demand for crew.
Marginalization of small-scale fishers: When small-scale fishers, including small-scale
commercial fishers, are forced out of the sector because of a consolidation of power
and/or wealth in the hands of corporations, or when fishing becomes so expensive only
corporations can afford it.
Monopolization of resources: Only certain individuals or companies have access to fish
because of barriers that disproportionately impact vulnerable and/or less powerful groups.
Other transnational crime: Crimes that occur across international borders with wide-scale
impacts across the greater international community. The distinction as transnational
suggests these crimes pose greater law enforcement challenges in developing impactful
strategies. Examples include drug, human, and arms trafficking, people smuggling, etc.
Overfishing: Unsustainable fishing to such an extent that stock depletions exceed
replacement and recruitment and the stock declines.
Political instability: A government’s inability to support or meet their citizen’s basic
needs.
Profit margins: The amount of revenue garnered by selling and/or trading fish that
exceeds the fishing costs.
Regulatory problems and challenges: Harmful barriers to strengthening fishing, labor,
and human rights standards that are difficult to overcome due to the amount of political
will and cooperation needed amongst authorities with varying interest and inequitable
power. Examples include enforcement difficulties, lack of cooperation between entities,
loopholes in policies and between policies, and too many regulatory bodies and
jurisdictions.
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Social vulnerabilities: The inability of people, organizations, and societies to withstand
adverse impacts from multiple stressors to which they are exposed. These impacts are
due, in part, to characteristics inherent in social interactions, institutions, and cultural
values. Examples include poverty, language barriers, and education disparities.
Subsidies: A sum of money granted by the government to assist an industry or business
so that the price of a commodity (here fish) or service (fishing) may remain low,
competitive, or profitable.
Supply chain complexity: The steps that it takes to get seafood from the ocean to a
consumer’s plate. Complexity comes from the number of steps, number of
locations/countries/sites, number of regulatory bodies, etc.
Transshipment: When fishing vessels tie up to reefer or mother ships in the middle of the
ocean to refuel and unload fish catch so that they do not have to come to port for supplies
or unloading.
Underdeveloped economy: Countries with small economies that struggle to provide
citizens with basic services (i.e., healthcare, education, etc.).
Use of foreign and migrant workers, often undocumented: Knowingly using available
migrant and/or foreign workers, or illegally recruiting and smuggling foreign and migrant
workers into the vessel’s country of origin, to crew a vessel with the explicit intention of
paying these workers less than available and more skilled domestic crew.
Wildlife crimes: The violation, either purposeful or unintentional, of regulations intended
to protect and conserve wildlife. Examples include shark finning, the harvesting of sea
cucumbers, and trafficking of endangered species such as pangolins.
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